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 At sea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I HAVE EMBARKED ON A VOYAGE. I BLINK, AND I SEE THE OCEAN AROUND ME. 
My vessel is floating amidst silky shades of crystal and green and blue. My eyes 
behold delicate drapes strewn with the movements of waves and of clouds. No 
line disturbs the transition from waters into skies. A lantern is dangling at the 
bow of my vessel, tinkling rhythmically against the wooden planks. I blink again, 
and my eyes focus on that awkward inscription at the base of the lantern. It reads:  
 
Is it possible to speak about the way  
others experience in their own, particular ways? 
 
I look up again, momentarily disoriented as my eyes widen to take in the vastness 
around them. And while the tinkling continues to drum its solemn, quiet beat 
through my ears, through my body, I am reminded again of the reasons I have 
come out here for. 
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 A first orientation 
 
Use usual words and say unusual things. 
 
- Arthur Schopenhauer - 
 
 
 
 
The inscription 
“THE MAIN DIFFICULTY IS STILL TO IDENTIFY THE EXACT QUESTIONS WE ARE 
asking,” writes Mary Midgley in Science and Poetry (2001:171). Throughout her 
book, Midgley weaves a thread of attentiveness for the importance of addressing 
every problem with appropriate questions. 
This thesis has a single objective: to unearth the question inscribed at the 
base of the lantern. 
The craft of philosophers is to pose questions, and to search for answers. 
The intuitive answer to our guiding question is: Of course it is not possible. In his 
famous article “What is it like to be a bat?”, Thomas Nagel (1993) arrived at a 
corresponding answer: We cannot know what it is like to be a bat. Yet this is not 
all there is to our question. Between the intuitive answer and the inscription at the 
base of the lantern spans a murky horizon, an unexplored realm in which the 
meaning of the question lies concealed. This thesis, then, does not immediately 
search for an answer. It searches for the meaning of the question itself. 
 
Sounding out the style 
This thesis unfolds as a narrative. It finds itself placed firmly in the 
phenomenological tradition of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and David Abram. Both 
philosophers are concerned with the way in which the style of a discourse “tacitly 
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 works to either enable, or to stifle, the solidarity between the human community 
and the more-than-human earth.”1 And both philosophers not only pay tribute to 
this concern by making it a direct venue of their deliberations. They also, and 
perhaps more importantly, try to enact their concern through an appropriate and 
rich style of conversing, a style that celebrates the evocative powers of language. 
In a similar way, this work is a search for ways of speaking that spawn 
fresh meaning. My work demands that I do not speak in conventional, ready-
made ways, for meaning can only continue to be created if we honor the living, 
ever-shifting nexus that we call language, and if we do not try to erect walls 
around it. My trials ask for great humility, and they demand of myself a real 
effort of expression. But they also demand a real effort of comprehension from 
my readers. I deliver myself gladly to my readers, fully aware that if they are 
unwilling to be my companions on this trying journey, the journey is destined to 
fail from the start. I ask them to join me so that together we may try to       
slowly, slowly swing from a solidified soliloquy into a somatic song. 
The readers will hardly find it fruitful to search a corridor behind the 
words, or behind the narrative style. It will do no good to strip the thesis naked 
until its bony figure stands before the intellect in full exposure. The words and 
structure are no haphazard costumes cast above bare arguments, only to make 
their nudity a little less appalling and a little easier to stomach. The style I have 
tried to harvest is no mere barrier to purely logical formulae. I have worked 
towards a unity of content and form, for I found it to be the most promising 
means to begin summoning voices and sounds from a heaving sea of silences. 
And that is what the thesis is about: making a beginning. 
This narrative approach to ethics is a way of performing, why, living 
ethics that has little to do with the more analytical method of meticulously 
deducing moral axioms from elaborate systems. It demands of the readers that 
they become active participants – conspirators – in the process themselves. The 
readers must not expect to be served readily processed morsels of ‘moral 
wisdom’, pre-digested axioms that are easy to swallow, and that relieve them, if 
                                                          
1 Abram: Between the Body and the Breathing Earth: A Reply to Ted Toadvine 
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 ever so lightly, of some of the inconveniences of moral decision-making in a 
world that does not halt in its step. What the readers can expect, though, is that 
they will be invited to relate to their own experience, and to pick up thoughts as 
they are reading, so they can weave them into a garment that fits them. 
 
Mapping the journey ahead 
Because the territory of our impending journey is vast and fluid, the reader will 
be grateful for a map of some kind. Therefore I here add a sketch of the story 
about to unfold. Just like any other map, it is meant to be used for orientation, 
now and later. 
 
This narrative begins with a discussion of approaches to ecological ethics that are 
largely normative. But all normative claims are tightly entwined with how we 
describe the world. If we now find this descriptive layer to be flawed, the old 
normative claims lose their foundation. This story uncovers such a flaw in the 
descriptive layer. And while it does not entirely rule out normative claims, these 
play a secondary role. The narrative as a whole then becomes the search for a 
more attuned way of describing the world. It works towards a phenomenological 
account of a multicentric world. 
 
Chapter One iterates the events that have led to my embarking. It develops a first 
presentiment of the theme that resurfaces again and again throughout the journey: 
the silence of others. The chapter makes this silence audible among the 
dominating concentric approaches to ecological ethics, and it suggests a critical 
collaboration between varying unifying holistic ethics that can inspire listening 
more attentively again. 
Chapter Two shows how the silence of others is wrought and actively 
maintained by the practice of definition. It argues that acts of definition set up 
barriers to our hearing. They are sources of noise beyond which it becomes 
harder and harder to hear anything but our own clamor. Relational language use 
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 is introduced as a measure to reverse our coercive silencing of others, and to seek 
mutually enriching relationships. 
As this journey draws its momentum from the creative force of direct 
experience, it is direct, lived experience that we must eventually turn to. The 
narrative must, in other words, at some point transmute from merely advocating 
experience into experiencing itself. This shift takes place in Chapter Three. The 
chapter presents an account of my journey to the killer whales off the Northern 
Norwegian coast. But the reader will find the account to be overshadowed, once 
more, by acts of defining that thwart creative relationships with others. The 
chapter exposes a particular way in which others are being defined and silenced: 
conventional whale watching tourism. It demonstrates how whales are being 
silenced through the transformative powers of technology, and how they are 
objectified into being both a monetary object and an object of dreams. 
These three chapters flow together in the final chapter, The poetry of 
leisure. Here we gather the accumulated evidence of all preceding discussions in 
order to confront the question at the base of the lantern most directly. What is the 
meaning of asking whether we can speak about the way others experience? And 
as we ponder this meaning carefully, we must remain attentive to what our 
findings imply: How far will the question take us? 
 
As a final introductory note, let me point out that this story is not initially told 
chronologically. Readers will find this note especially important for their 
comprehension of Chapter One. But what may appear like a compositional flaw, 
or perhaps like ‘artistic freedom’, is none of that. It is actually part of a binding 
necessity in the overall composition of this story. At the end of this thesis we 
must return to this thought. The Postscript unravels the reasons for why the 
narrative has been composed the way it stands now. 
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The land behind us, the world ahead 
  
 
The man who cannot think for himself, going beyond what other men have learned or thought, is still 
enslaved to other men’s ideas. Obviously the goal of learning to think is even more difficult than the goal 
of learning to learn. But difficult as it is we must add it to our list. It is simply not enough to be able to get 
up a subject of one’s own, like a good encyclopedia employee, even though any college would take pride 
if all its graduates could do so. To be fully human means in part to think one’s own thoughts, to reach a 
point at which, whether one’s ideas are different from or similar to other men’s, they are one’s own. 
 
- Wayne C. Booth - 
 
 
As we struggle to awaken from the dream of total dominion, we find ourselves struggling to understand 
the world as it is. 
 
- Freeman House - 
 
 
Retrospect 
AS EVERY OCEAN-GOING VOYAGE, THIS JOURNEY STARTED ON LAND. THE LAND 
from which I embarked is a land of people. It is a land of cities, fields, villages, a 
land hustling and bustling with the voices and sounds of people. In this land, 
there has been talk of a crisis. People whisper at the windows. Hushed voices are 
intercepted by wake-up calls. Wake-up calls are drowned by the sounds of 
engines, construction sites, air conditioners, talk of taxes, or of sports. But the 
whispering continues. Sometimes severe storms haunt the land. Sometimes a 
fatal poison seeps into its soil. Sometimes the papers report that yet another 
species has become extinct. If it weren’t for the papers, sorrowful news of this 
kind could perhaps easily be overlooked, because an estimated ninety-eight per 
cent of all species known to the people are arthropods, most of them unknown to 
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 the majority of people, some of them straightforwardly unappreciated – among 
them creatures that cause unease because they stagger on eight legs, or because 
they crawl into sleeping bags on sleepovers outside, or because their unsettling 
buzzing is sometimes complemented by a small sting into the earlobe, or the arm. 
There is also talk of imminent wars caused by quarrels over access to energy 
supplies, or of mass migrations set in motion by rains that will not stop, or by 
rains that will not come. Too many people now inhabit the land. More are being 
born still, putting a further strain on the land, and making the prospect of a 
peaceful future even dimmer. Why, some people are even beginning to seriously 
question the prospect of a livable future for our current civilization, because, as is 
becoming ever clearer, the world is in a state of fever, and it is expected that he 
temperature is rising still. All those events – and many more – might only be 
coincidences, but again and again there are voices that insist they are all 
connected. People start asking questions. Who did this? Who is doing this? Some 
people suggest that it is the people themselves. Some people begin to ask: If we 
are doing this, then how must we change our behavior to stop doing what we are 
doing, and to start acting in more benign ways? Among them are people who 
think that a mere change of action cannot be sufficient in the face of what we 
have maneuvered ourselves in to. With a profound anguish in their hearts, and an 
urge in their voices, they utter that the people “… need, most of all, a change of 
heart and mind that comes to tribal nations when they sense real danger”, as 
James Lovelock (2006:18) does. So some people suggest that one ought to begin 
to be more caring towards what they call ‘the environment’. They suggest that if 
one were to include parts of that so-called ‘environment’ into moral 
considerations, then these parts would be protected from invasion, from wanton 
destruction, from extinction. And if that environment were protected, it would 
continue to be a place that sustains their cities, their fields, their villages. 
Questions such as these have given rise to a large expedition, and a 
common header was soon found for its joint task: environmental ethics. If ethics 
in general asks whom we ought to include into our circle of moral considerations, 
then, clearly, the banner ‘environmental ethics’ indicated a direction into which 
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 this question would be developed: How far ought we to “expand our circle” (cf. 
Singer 1981) into this ‘environment’ of ours? Peter Singer encapsulated the 
rationale for the expedition in the words: “The general question, then, is how the 
effects of our actions on the environment of nonhuman beings should figure in 
our deliberations about what we ought to do.” (2003:55) 
The expedition – myself included – set out, remembering that the cities 
and fields and villages are all built around the foot of a large mountain. We set 
out to climb ever higher up the mountain, hoping that that the expanding view 
would help settle this urgent question. 
 
Part I. Trekking up the mountain 
AS OUR TREK MOVED UP THE MOUNTAIN, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT “THE TERRAIN” 
which environmental ethics set out to explore “is rich” (Light & Rolston III 
2003:10). In addition to being rich, it also proliferated vastly, so that any attempt 
to recollect some of its dominating forces must of necessity remain incomplete, 
emphasize some themes at the expense of others, and simplify what is contested 
and complex.2 Connected to this is another problem, namely that the very 
boundaries of environmental ethics are fuzzy. As Ott & Gorke (2000:10) said, 
environmental ethics does not constitute a self-contained and specialized field. 
Rather, its very being is interdisciplinary. Environmental ethics, they said, stands 
“in close interaction with ecological, social-psychological, political, and 
ontological questions”. However, as my intention here is to recollect how I have 
come to be sitting in this small vessel, led by a lantern with a nebulous 
inscription, I will accept these drawbacks and focus henceforth predominantly on 
the aspects of the expedition that are most important for my recollection. For this, 
I draw on exemplary advocates of the different positions. Completeness is not the 
                                                          
2 For a selection of different maps of this terrain, cf. for example Gorke 1999; Ott 2000; Potthast 2000; 
Light & Rolston III 2003; Palmer 2003. Ott (2000:19) writes that particularly the Anglo-American 
community of environmental ethics has fanned out in a way that makes an overview problematic even to 
insiders. 
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 intention. My predominant interest lies not so much in a detailed evaluation of all 
arguments entailed, as it lies in implicit strategies of arguing. 
 
The trek debates: anthropocentrists 
The first who spoke out among us called themselves anthropocentrists. 
Generally, anthropocentrists claimed that moral duty to others besides humans – 
whatever this moral duty might entail in detail – could only be indirect. They 
claimed that others are best considered ethically in terms of their instrumental 
values to human beings. Some early core representatives of this group include 
Aristotle, Baruch Spinoza, or Immanuel Kant. Anthropocentrism has been and 
currently still is the dominant worldview in the Western Hemisphere. Because of 
that, the burden of proof habitually lies with those who wish to widen the moral 
circle, and not the other way around. One needs not, in other words, defend why 
our moral considerations ought only to include humans. According to the 
dominating view, one must sooner justify why one wishes to expand the moral 
circle beyond humans. 
Among the anthropocentrists was Bryan Norton. In an exemplary way, 
Norton claimed that “an environmental ethic cannot be derived, first, from rights 
or interests of nonhumans and second, from rights or interests of future 
generations of humans.” (2003:163). The only ground on which a true 
environmental ethic could be erected would be a single, central value principle, 
namely that of ongoing human life and consciousness. For throughout all ethical 
evaluation it is always humans, according to this view, who are evaluating, and 
who are negotiating the criteria of evaluation among themselves. The goal of 
such an ethic would be to ensure an indefinite “resource allocation” (Ibid. 170) 
for continued human life. If human life depends on a livable planet, 
anthropocentrists argued, then we must make sure that the planet continues to be 
livable. Others who were not humans – other animals, trees, fungi, lakes, or 
mountain ranges – were unable to negotiate with us humans the precise criteria of 
our morals, so they could not have a direct, inherent value. And if they could not 
have any direct value, they were only valuable in relation to humans. Being 
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 looked at as so-called ‘resources’, they depended, in short, on their usefulness to 
humans. 
 
It soon became evident that a number of specific criticisms against this position 
were variations of the same, recurring theme: Anthropocentrism is fundamentally 
built on contingency, or arbitrariness. 
 
Take, as a first example of this criticism, a metaethical problem that was briefly 
indicated above: ‘The greatest obstacle to expanding the moral community’, 
anthropocentrists said, ‘is lacking mutuality’. How, they asked, could others 
possibly be intrinsically valuable if they are unable to negotiate with us humans 
the terms of the moral community? It was Martin Gorke (1999:260) who 
confronted this question. What the anthropocentric position oversees is that 
mutuality – or the lack of it – is no valid criterion of interhuman morals, either. 
Very small children, for example, cannot communicate on moral terms. Neither 
can a number of mentally handicapped persons. Neither can people who have 
fallen into a coma. But do we deny these people a value of their own because of 
that? We do not. We do not, in other words, decide to draw an arbitrary line 
called ‘mutuality’ throughout our own kin. We have begun to acknowledge that 
all humans, regardless their age, origin, state of health, gender, or any other 
conceivable dividing factor, are in principle intrinsically valuable, and thus 
worthy of moral consideration. Yet, Gorke asks – if mutuality is no valid 
criterion in interhuman ethics, why, then, should it be one in environmental 
ethics? To demand mutuality of others would be an act of arbitrariness.3 
 
A second example that illustrates anthropocentrism’s arbitrariness is a pragmatic 
one. We have not yet mentioned that Norton marked himself not as a hard-line 
anthropocentrist, but as a mediator who attempted to reconcile various positions. 
It was in view of this role that he set apart two very different versions of 
anthropocentrism (2003:165). The first is strong anthropocentrism. It explains all 
                                                          
3 It would also be a naturalistic fallacy, because a strictly human criterion would be taken as evidence to 
deny intrinsic worth to others who are not humans. 
 
 
10
 value “by reference to satisfactions or felt preferences of human individuals” 
alone. Norton himself rejected this strong position in favor of what he called 
weak anthropocentrism. In a somewhat technical lingo, Norton pointed out what 
distinguishes weak anthropocentrism. Weak anthropocentrism explains all value 
“by reference to satisfaction of some felt preference of a human individual or by 
reference to its bearing upon the ideals which exist as elements in a world view 
essential to determinations of considered preferences.” This means in practice 
that value is not only placed on people’s felt preferences – as it is in strong 
anthropocentrism –, but also on the process of value formation. And this, Norton 
argued, would draw “nature” back into the realm of values (through the back-
door, so to speak). In weak anthropocentrism, “nature” takes on the role of a 
“teacher of values” (Ibid.). It is still not granted intrinsic value. It is still not seen 
as a holder or place of value. It is, rather, a source of value that helps generate 
and mold human values. As such it would be worthy of protection, Norton said. 
But even weak anthropocentrism could not eliminate the fundamental 
conflict, arbitrariness. What, for example, if humans decide that a particular 
species cannot teach them anything worthwhile? If that species is found to lack 
any value as a source or teacher of human morals? What if the common reaction 
to a specific other is not care or curiosity, but repulsion or fear? Who except for a 
select few would think of all those spiders, mosquitoes, or scorpions as teachers, 
instructors, mentors? Or what if a vulnerable landscape is so remote that its value 
as a teacher of morals to a critical mass of humans amounts to practically zero? 
Neither strong nor weak anthropocentrism could, for example, justify why it 
should be wrong to drill for oil and minerals in Alaska, or to exploit the deep seas 
for human purposes. Both places are inaccessible for most of us. But does that 
mean they have no worth? In none of these examples, anthropocentrism would be 
able to side with the endangered ones. 
Norton’s suggestion to invite others into our morals through appointing 
them to be our teachers is a subargument of anthropocentrism’s general stance: 
Others are judged on the basis of their usefulness to us. But precisely in this lies 
the problem: what is useful, and what is not, is a matter of taste, convention, or 
 
 
11
 circumstance. But taste, convention, and circumstance are arbitrary categories. 
As long as others are defined solely via their usefulness for our own purposes, 
they will constantly be threatened by replacement, oblivion, or extinction. 
 
With these thoughts in mind, our trek decided to move on further up the 
mountain. We asked ourselves: Is there a way to overcome arbitrariness? 
 
The debate continues: sentientists 
Just a little further up the mountain, those who called themselves pathocentrists, 
or alternatively, sentientists, spoke out. They asked: ‘What if we expanded the 
moral circle to include also sentient beings? As we judge the situation, there are a 
number of good arguments in favor of our position: Sentience is a condition for 
the ability to suffer. Suffering, as well as the ability to experience pleasure, is an 
expression of interest. Interest, in turn, must then be a prerequisite for intrinsic 
value.’ This view was expressed, among others, by Peter Singer. Singer said: 
“Where our actions are likely to make animals suffer, that suffering must count 
in our deliberations, and it should count equally with a like amount of suffering 
by human beings, insofar as rough comparisons can be made” (2003:59). From 
this, Singer drew the opposing conclusion that “just as nonconscious beings have 
no interest, so unconscious life lacks intrinsic value” (2003:60). A problem that 
Singer’s position had to deal with was one we briefly touched on in the 
discussion of anthropocentrism: the problem of replaceability (cf. Palmer 
2003:19). Since Singer did not value the sentient being itself, but rather its total 
sentient experience, he opened a path to replacing one such being by another by 
killing the first painlessly. Singer reacted by setting up the dichotomy 
‘conscious’ vs. ‘self-conscious’. Conscious beings, he argued, share with the 
self-conscious beings the ability to experience pleasure and pain. However, in 
contrast to self-conscious beings they lack self-awareness, which is why they 
have no preference as to whether they ‘want’ to go on living or not. From this, 
Singer argued that conscious beings were indeed replaceable, but self-conscious 
beings were not (Ibid.). 
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 Pathocentrism, too, aroused opponents, and it would turn out that although 
the details of the counterargument differed from those against anthropocentrism, 
both shared a central intuition: Like anthropocentrism, pathocentrism rested on 
preliminary judgments that were arbitrary. The most serious variation of this 
argument criticized the narrow way in which pathocentrism defined interest. 
Dietmar v.d. Pfordten said this notion was so vague that “all depends on its 
interpretation” (in: Gorke 1999:262; own translation). Gorke (1999:262 f.) added 
that in fact, the term was but an arbitrary semantic construction, at times 
including invertebrates and plants, at times not. It all depended on a more or less 
rigid definition of what it meant to have interest. Thomas Potthast joined into the 
chorus of objections by adding that “the biological demarcation remains highly 
problematic because ‘suffering’ is an anthropomorphic construction of 
intentional experience which is difficult to determine.” (2000:121; own 
translation) This view was also shared by John Rodman, who found that the 
identification of value with sentient experience was just another form of 
anthropocentrism, “since it picks a quality paradigmatically possessed by human 
beings and uses it as a measure by which to judge other species.” (in: Palmer 
2003:21) Paul Taylor positioned himself against pathocentrists as well and said: 
“[T]he concept of a being’s good is not coextensive with sentience or the 
capacity of feeling pain.” (2003:75) Ultimately, Gorke drew attention to the fact 
that pathocentrists did not dissolve the fundamental problem of 
anthropocentrism, namely the “dichotomy between a postulated center and its 
resource reservoir” (1999:244). The only difference between the two positions 
was that pathocentrists did not claim that humans were the sole center, but that a 
single phylum – namely largely all vertebrates – constituted such a center. 
Vertebrates, however, make up less than three percent of all species. All such 
species that are most fundamental for the continuation of life on Earth – plants 
and microorganisms – would be excluded from the moral circle (Ibid.). In 
essence, the problem remained unchanged: Both anthropocentrism and 
pathocentrism were founded on assumptions that were arbitrary. 
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 Higher and higher: biocentrists 
So we strode on. Further up the mountain still, those who called themselves 
biocentrists began to speak. They suggested: ‘What if we include not only all 
sentient beings, but all other living beings into our moral considerations? The 
problems with limiting ourselves to sentient beings have become apparent 
enough. While we cannot arbitrarily define ‘interest’ as a conscious striving, 
what we can safely assume is that all life expresses some form of interest. 
Through this expanded notion of ‘interest’, we achieve a much greater moral 
community.’ 
Among the biocentrists, there were varying opinions as to whether there 
could be gradations of value on the so-called scala naturae (which would imply a 
gradualistic biocentric ethic), or whether such gradations were unnecessary 
(which would imply an egalitarian biocentric ethic). 
Dietmar v.d. Pfordten (1996) represented the former group. He claimed 
that all living beings who are able to unfold independent strivings were to be 
considered ethically. Hence, his ultimate criterion against which to test moral 
relevance was the level of self-reference (“Selbstbezug”). The more complex and 
intensive a being’s self-referential strivings, the more value this being possessed. 
The interest of plants, for instance, would be considered much weaker than 
human interest, and hence their value would be inferior to human value. 
Paul Taylor (1986; 2003), another member of this group, took an 
egalitarian stance. Taylor denied human superiority with regard to what is 
valuable, and what is not: “One who accepts [the doctrine of species impartiality, 
and thus rejects the doctrine of human superiority,] regards all living things as 
possessing inherent worth – the same inherent worth, since no one species has 
been shown to be ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ than any other.” (2003:83) Taylor further 
claimed that unique characteristics which humans believe to be the benchmarks 
for value, such as rational thought, aesthetic creativity, autonomy and self-
determination, or moral freedom, might be valuable from a strictly human point 
of view alright. But, Taylor asked, how can the good of all living beings be 
determined strictly by what is best for a single form of life? Such species 
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 fascism, such “irrational bias in our own favor” (2003:76), must be avoided at all 
costs. Such bias would be, once more, arbitrary. Instead, each organism is to be 
acknowledged “as a teleological center of life, pursuing its own good in its own 
way.” (Ibid.) 
Among the critics against biocentrism, Gorke (1999:244) distinguished 
himself once more. His criticism was twofold. First, Gorke argued that 
biocentrism upheld the dichotomy between a single center and its periphery, in 
that it only accredited animate matter its own reality, but not inanimate matter. 
Gorke said that such sharp divide was hardly plausible, not least because all life 
has arisen out of inanimate matter, and that the absolute rupture which 
biocentrism implies is difficult to justify4. Gorke’s second objection was directed 
at the pragmatic deliberation that in accord with all preceding positions, 
biocentrism, too, was an individualistic ethic. The disagreement among 
biocentrists, here shown in an exemplary way between v.d. Pfordten and Taylor, 
was directed solely at how far or narrow the notion of ‘interest’ ought to be 
understood. What they shared was the view that species cannot have interest, and 
that they therefore cannot become admitted to the moral circle. Third, Gorke 
pointed out that the attempt to expand the understanding of ‘interest’ to include 
also ecosystems or species (‘self-regulation’; ‘self-identity’) was met with great 
objections by many philosophers, because such an extreme widening of what it 
means to have interest would cause this notion to evaporate, until it is “hardly 
more than a metaphor which would lead further astray than it would illuminate 
… ” (Ibid.; own translation). Even though biocentrism tried to expand the notion 
of interest, it upheld the previous positions’ main problem: It drew an arbitrary 
line through being, then rested all its moral judgments onto this arbitrary 
decision. In this, all individualistic ethics were incompatible with the most basic 
lesson we have been taught by ecology: Our living planet cannot be looked at as 
a simple array of individuals. It also consists of a community of hierarchically 
structured wholes (Ibid. 1999:245). But, some of us said, ethical positions which 
aspire a ‘good life’ without paying heed to this insight, and which might prompt 
                                                          
4 This thought will be picked up again and developed further in the following chapter. 
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 actions that could corrupt this good life permanently, had to be rejected as 
failures. So we decided to move on. 
 
Surprise at the summit 
At length we arrived at the peak of the mountain. And what a surprise the peak 
held in store for us! For the first time we saw that the giant mountain – at whose 
foot are built all our villages and cities and fields – was actually an island! In the 
far and hazy distance, we saw that all around our island stretched out a vast 
ocean. There was water on all sides, shrouding the island in an unbroken line, 
forming a giant, circular horizon around our vision. With this impression branded 
into our hearts, we set up camp for the night. It would turn out to be a long night 
with engaged discussions and little sleep. 
 
Smoldering discontent 
When we settled around the small fire we had set up to fight the biting chill of 
the summit winds, none of us could say for sure whether our expedition so far 
was a success or not. Our immediate task had been to find a solution to the 
common question that had bound all of us together, and that had driven us up the 
mountain in the first place: How far ought we to expand the moral circle? Yet in 
the end, opinions had proliferated, arguments had solidified, a single question 
had been answered in many different ways. 
But some of us – myself included – became disgruntled with the way the 
discourse had evolved so far. ‘We have seen the sea’, we said. ‘How can we be 
so sure that our answers are appropriate if we seek to expand from our own 
center, the place of humans? How can we think we have universal answers 
without even having considered what lies beyond the horizon? It may be 
understandable that these expansive ethical positions talk about “widening the 
moral circle” to include also “nonhumans” into that circle. After all, moral duties 
have largely been conceivable only with regard to other humans for more than 
3000 years. But we have seen that our home, or house, for which the Greeks once 
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 had the name oikos, is not only this island that we inhabit. We have seen – or 
rather, we have begun to suspect – that our home may be more than that, and by 
far.’ 
Finally, we said: ‘Rather than trying to expand the moral community – 
rather than trying to look from down the vast mountain – , let us begin by 
assuming that all there is, within our own horizon and beyond, is morally 
relevant to our action, simply because it is.’ 
 
A question of the appropriate name 
I proposed that we direct our immediate pondering over the implications of our 
magnificent discovery – that we live on an island – to an issue that can be easily 
overlooked: the name of our expedition. I asked: Is not the name ‘environmental 
ethics’ discriminating? This was an uneasy question, considering that the name 
had quickly flourished among many of the expedition members5. But my 
question was not only outside the mainstream. It was also highly significant. 
Literary theory speaks of ‘telling names’. By this are meant storied names 
of literary characters that ‘tell’ us something crucial about a character’s 
personality, or their history. Old Norse mythology, for example, abounds with 
such telling names. Odin is but the most prominent instance. Derived from an 
intricate etymology, the name ‘Odin’ bespeaks the rich facets of this iridescent 
god. The Old Norse adjective óðr means ‘furious’, ‘obsessed’, ‘enraged’, and 
designates Odin as a god of warfare6. The nouns óðr and óður mean ‘poem’, 
‘thought’, or ‘unrest’, and show Odin to be also a god of intellectual force, of 
poetry, of rune wizardry. Telling names are also a popular stylistic device in 
modern literature. Astrid Lindgren’s celebrated novel Bröderna Lejonhjärta (The 
Brothers Lionheart, 1973), for example, begins with a scene in which the older 
                                                          
5 Recent anthologies such as Environmental Ethics – An Anthology by Light and Rolston (2003), or 
Spektrum der Umweltethik by Ott and Gorke (2000), bespeak this trend, as does the fact that Germany’s 
only professorship established within the discipline – at the Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald 
in 1997 – bears that same name. The names of various academic journals further indicate the trend: 
“Environmental Ethics”; “Environmental Values”; “Agricultural and Environmental Ethics”; “Ethics and 
the Environment”; “Newsletter of the International Society of Environmental Ethics”. 
6 Traces of this meaning live on in Modern High German ‘Wut’, which developed through the Anglo 
Saxon Woden and the Old High German Wōdan, Wuotan. 
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 of two brothers, Jonatan, shoulders his seriously ill younger brother Karl to jump 
out of a burning building together. While Karl is saved from burning alive, 
Jonatan – who has proved to have the heart of a lion – is killed through the fall. 
The telling name ‘Lionheart’ has of course a prominent historical model. The 
English king Richard I. (1157-1199) was called ‘the Lionhearted’ because of his 
military reputation. Interestingly, his brother and successor to the throne bore the 
much less favorable telling name John Lackland, due to his lack of an inheritance 
as the youngest son, and his loss of territories to France. 
In a parallel fashion, the name ‘environmental ethics’, too, would be best 
understood as a telling name. I impressed my observation on the others that next 
to telling about the historical origins of the discipline – which begun by asking 
how the circle can be expanded towards what was then conceived to be the 
environment – it also, and more importantly, told about a particular world view 
that those who accepted the term continued to defend, be it consciously or 
subconsciously. What world view might have been implied in the dominating 
name? The term ‘environment’ denotes ‘the state of being environed’. ‘To 
environ’ means, among others, ‘to surround’; ‘to encircle’; ‘to envelop’; ‘to 
enclose’. Its direct German rendition is ‘Umwelt’, which means ‘around-world’. 
Thus, an ‘environmental ethic’ questions human action with regard to what is 
around – and thereby strictly separated from – humans. 
Angelika Krebs (1997; 2000:67) agreed with me so far. She suggested 
therefore that we name our discipline ‘ethics of nature’. But I found it 
ambiguous. So I spoke: 
‘Krebs’s name is ambiguous for two reasons. The first reason is that, as 
Hans-Dieter Mutschler (2000:251 ff.) has shown, the word ‘nature’ has been 
used in two fundamentally different ways by different authors, which is why the 
name ‘ethics of nature’ will cause a great deal of confusion. Mutschler calls the 
first use of the word Nattot. ‘Nature’ seen in this way denotes the totality of all 
that exists; a ‘philosophy of nature’ is considered to be the primary philosophy. 
According to Mutschler, metaphysical authors such as Whitehead, Meyer-
Abbich, or Jonas are among those that use ‘nature’ in this way, but also 
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 positivists such as Carnap or Kanitschneider. The second way in which ‘nature’ 
is used is referred to by Mutschler as Natreg, by which is meant that ‘nature’ is 
but a local, or regional, occurrence. Prominent authors in favor of this second use 
of the term are Aristotle and Kant. Aristotle distinguished between physei on7 
(what emerges from and itself) and technê on (what is brought forth or 
unconcealed by the artisan). Kant delimited phenomena in nature not against 
what is made, but against an ethical-practical realm. When Krebs suggests to 
name our discipline ‘ethics of nature’, she quietly implied that we all accept her 
definition of nature, which stands in the tradition of Aristotle. This is how she 
explained her dualistic position: “The term ‘nature’ stands … for that part of the 
world which has not been made by humans, but which has emerged, is emerging, 
and is changing largely by itself: animals, plants, rocks, rivers, mountains, and 
planets. The counterpart of ‘nature’ … is the notion of the artifact.”  But if we 
reject such a dualistic ontology, then we must reject the name as well. The 
previous quote hints also at the second reason for the ambiguous character of 
Krebs’ name: The distinction between physei on (‘nature’ understood as what is 
being born, what develops from itself) and technê on (‘artifacts’) is by no means 
as clear-cut as it may seem. With the advancements of modern technology, and 
with modern man’s ability to alter the face of the planet he co-inhabits with so 
many other beings on a grand scale, the decision of what is ‘natural’ and what is 
an ‘artifact’ is becoming ever more difficult. Take, for example, genetically 
manipulated crops. Must we exclude these – and with them every likely and 
unlikely impact that they might have on the ‘nature’ around them – from our 
ethical deliberations because they are artifacts, according to our definition? And 
even if we did: It is now contested whether there is any landscape left that 
humans have not altered in one way or another (“wilderness”). Must we exclude 
all these areas that have been altered by man and man’s technology from 
‘nature’, for according to our definitions they are artifacts? Why, the division 
between artifacts and nature is even creeping in on humans themselves: Must we 
see test-tube babies as artifacts and thereby exclude them from our ethical 
                                                          
7 This was later translated by the Latin term ‘natura’. The word nature is derived from the Latin ‘nasci’, 
which means ‘to be born’, ‘to develop’, ‘to emerge’. 
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 questioning because they did not emerge from themselves, because their 
beginning was not fully ‘natural’?’ 
I paused and looked around me. No one made any move to speak. So I 
continued. 
‘But we hesitate to accept these reservations. Stringent and rigorous 
though they may appear, these arguments comprise something that is hard to 
stomach. And although this something is not more than an unarticulated intuition 
to begin with, we may slowly begin to recognize the serious limitations that an 
‘ethics of nature’ imposes on our entire discourse. As was the term 
‘environmental ethics’, ‘ethics of nature’ too is discriminating in a way that 
would be unfortunate at the outset of any form of philosophical questioning, 
because it chops up the unity of the world into a strictly “human” and a strictly 
“natural” realm. Yet how can we willingly limit ourselves in this way and at the 
same time defend the principle that any conclusion we draw from any question 
we ask will have to be taken into consideration, and not only those that we may 
be fond of, and that make us feel secure?’ 
No one answered. I suggested therefore that we do not to speak of ‘ethics 
of nature’, either. Then I added: 
‘Both the conventional name ‘environmental ethics’ and ‘ethics of nature’ 
uphold the same and most fundamental problem: They discriminate a purely 
human realm from a specific other realm. In one case, this external realm is 
called ‘environment’, in another, it is called ‘nature’. But the problem remains: 
Humans are defined outside of, and in opposition to, this realm. And all entailing 
arguments are dyed by this dualistic ontology.’ 
Both Gorke and v.d. Pfordten nodded in agreement. They suggested that 
our discipline be called ‘ecological ethics’. Neither elaborated much on their 
choice. But from the way Gorke phrased the central hypothesis of his work, I 
could deduce his motivation: “An ecological ethic which takes seriously the 
current knowledge about the place of humans in the cosmos, as well as the 
universal character of morals, cannot avoid abandoning the anthropocentric 
perspective and admitting inherent value also to the natural Mitwelt.” (1999:19; 
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 own translation) In contrast to Krebs, Gorke used the term ‘nature’ not in a local 
way. To him, humans are included in nature: ‘Nature’ is Mitwelt to humans; 
humans are with in this world. Humans are within the world. And the term 
‘ecological’ simply presented the most neutral alternative available. Throughout 
his work, Gorke cautioned our expedition against an ideological monopolizing of 
the scientific discipline ecology. Ecology per se cannot justify directly why we 
ought to do this or that. The role it can take, however, is to act as a “trailblazer of 
a change of attitude” (106; own translation) It was in this tentative and cautious 
way that Gorke spoke of ‘ecological ethics.’ 
Of course this debate did not find a neat solution. Yet after we all had 
spoken, I determined to side with v.d. Pfordten and Gorke and to speak of 
‘ecological ethics’ henceforth. The name strengthens the role of ecology, and it 
successfully avoids the discriminating presuppositions of an ‘environmental’ 
ethics or an ‘ethics of nature’. But what secured my decision above all was the 
idea that an eco-logical ethics, understood in the most comprehensive way – 
remembering its semantic roots in the Greek word oikos –, is one which tries to 
get a clearer understanding of what it means to be in our house, in our home. 
 
The way of power 
Among those who were skeptical about the development of the discussion so far, 
Anna L. Peterson (2001) argued extensively that first, any idea of what it means 
to be human has ethical implications, and second, that all ethical systems lean 
upon an idea of what it means to be human. I agreed: 
‘At the root of the project of the expanding circle lies a descriptive layer, 
one that shares a common idea of how humanness is to be understood. What all 
positions so far discussed share is that they are expansive. In its core, the moral 
circle – regardless of how much it is expanded – remains human-centered. This 
is a dualistic world view. It sees humans as the sole center of being. It subjects 
everything else to this center: All the rest becomes what can be so conveniently 
abridged – or should I rather say: segregated – by this Sword of Damocles known 
to us as ‘the environment’.’ 
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 Next, it was Val Plumwood’s turn to speak. She attacked these expansive 
ethics for remaining bound by their dualistic world view. She said that it “does 
not really dispel speciesism, it just extends and disguises it” (2002:148). From its 
outset, expansive ethics had followed a path that Gorke called so fittingly the 
“way of power” (1999:254). 
 
The main problem with the way of power had been firmly established at this 
stage of our journey: The way of power is arbitrary. Criteria for direct moral 
consideration are chosen arbitrarily and always from the standpoint of human 
judgment alone. Anthony Weston, who called expansive ethics con-centric ethics 
or, alternatively, uni-centrisms, commented on this problem as follows: 
 
Uni-centrism extends and disguises a kind of uni-lateralism in ethics as well. If there is but one 
circle of moral consideration with ourselves at the centre, it is natural to suppose that we can and 
perhaps must make moral decisions by our own lights. One kind of consideration remains, 
though perhaps operating over a wider sphere. One kind of actor—ourselves—remains essential 
and central, even if our deliberations must take account of more-than-human others as well. 
(2006:76) 
 
I added to this: ‘Another profound problem with the ‘way of power’ is that it is 
so inconspicuous. It is so quiet. It follows silently, and without causing a great 
stir, from the dualistic world view. This worked fine as long as our expedition 
remained within its own monolithic, con-centric structure. But after we have seen 
that the land we inhabit is but a small island in a vast ocean, and that our vision 
of the entire ocean is always bound by our own horizon, the dualistic world view 
and its con-centric way of power have become questionable.’ 
A very real quietness enwrapped the party momentarily. Eyes found one 
another. The fire cast dancing figures of rosy glow and pale darkness onto 
immobile faces. An owl hooted somewhere in the dark. 
It was Weston who broke the silence: “We must resist the dynamic of 
assimilation and marginalization that ecofeminists identify so clearly, and thus 
recognize a world of multiple voices and beings that do not reduce to a single 
type and do not naturally fall into the orbit of one single sort of being’s centre.” 
(2006:74) 
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 Competition of cooperation? 
A turmoil ensued. Other approaches formed out of the criticism against con-
centric approaches. Quite obviously, these approaches also proliferated vastly 
and differed greatly with regard to specific lines of questioning and of reasoning. 
I did not initially participate in the turmoil myself. I had again gotten side-
tracked by what might have seemed like another marginal problem. To me, 
however, it held the essence of the discourse as such veiled within itself. The 
proceedings of this expedition so far – composed entirely of learned women and 
men at home in academia – had brought back to me words spoken by Arthur 
Evans:  
 
Modern schools and universities push students into habits of depersonalized learning, alienation 
from nature and sexuality, obedience to hierarchy, fear of authority, self-objectification, and 
chilling competitiveness. These character traits are the essence of the twisted personality-type of 
modern industrialism. They are precisely the character traits needed to maintain a social system 
that is utterly out of touch with nature, sexuality, and real human needs.  
(in: Jensen, Derrick. Walking on Water. p. 85. Emphasis mine.) 
 
No matter how much I tried to silence Evans’ words, they laid themselves over 
my hearing like a transparent coat of varnish hugs a newly painted log cabin. I 
listened to the discussion, but every comment was colored with the same tinge: 
competition. So I asked myself: Is there perhaps another way to go? Is it 
possible to attempt something unheard-of, something quite brave within our 
discourse? Is it possible to  c o m b i n e  efforts of various approaches under a 
common header, a header that vanquishes open competition and instead makes 
these approaches  c o l l a b o r a t e  c r i t i c a l l y ? 
 
Thus the night wore away. Finally, as patches of dark orange were beginning to 
peel off the heavy shroud of darkness in the East, layer by layer by layer, I had 
formed an idea of how to unite the energies of a number of positions under a 
common header: unifying holistic positions. That was when I began to speak. 
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 Part II. Unifying holistic positions 
‘EVER SINCE WE ARRIVED UP HERE ON THE SUMMIT YESTERDAY, OUR DISCUSSION 
has been drawn in by the vast horizon around our vision. The horizon has made 
us ponder a number of ways in which to bring the con-centric project of 
ecological ethics to its most far-reaching conclusion, which we may call holistic 
positions. We have begun to speak of holistic positions when we mean to expand 
the moral circle to its outermost limits, to include everything, or the whole of 
being. 
‘It was Bryan Norton (1987:177) among us who has subdivided these 
holistic positions into two opposing fields, monistic holism, and pluralistic 
holism. To monistic holism, only the system as a whole possesses direct ethical 
relevance. The value of individual parts arises solely from their relation to the 
greater system; their interest is subordinated to the functionality of the whole 
system. Eric Katz has marked himself as a representative of this position when he 
called individual interest a “secondary moral principle” (2003:91) to the interests 
of wholes. Pluralistic holism, on the other hand, reconciles monistic holism with 
strictly individualistic positions. To pluralistic holism, moral relevance is not 
only something possessed by individuals, but it is also something inherent in 
wholes as such. Both wholes and parts are loci or places of value for the 
pluralistic holist. 
‘May I further make the suggestion that we give a new name to the group 
of pluralistic holism? I suggest calling this group unifying holistic positions from 
now on, or simply unifying positions. 
‘You will ask, of course, why I find it necessary to use a different name 
than the one Norton has suggested. 
‘Two interconnected reasons inspired this name. The first is a theoretical 
reason. Only unifying holistic positions can truly unify individual interest with its 
relationship to wholes, and only these positions are able to ask about the vibrant 
and ever-shifting relationships between us humans and our home, which now 
includes not only the island we have believed to constitute everything, but also 
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 what lies beyond our horizon. The second is a pragmatic reason. Unifying 
holistic positions contain the dormant potential to unite their forces in the single-
most important aspect that they share: the dynamic unity of being. The name 
‘unifying holistic positions’ protects us against getting entangled in short-sighted 
battles where competition prevails and determines the course of our arguments. It 
hones our senses for the essence of all these positions: They cooperate on the 
level of their most fundamental premise. 
‘In what follows, I will revisit three different positions. They all converge 
on the basic principle of the unity of being, yet still they all retain a critical 
distance to one another. A basic assumption that underlies the entire presentation 
I am about to unfold is that cooperation needs not exclude critical questioning. 
Critical cooperation, in other words, is not simply an opposing pole to 
competition. It is sooner a more considerate, more elegant, and more rigid way of 
arguing. 
 ‘The three unifying positions I will talk about are Martin Gorke’s holism, 
Arne Næss’s Ecosophy T, and multicentrism. I personally share this third position 
with Anthony Weston.8 
 
The radical chasm between concentrisms and unifying holistic positions 
 ‘To speak to you about the way in which holism, Ecosophy T, and multicentrism 
can unite forces, I must first show you that unifying positions contrast radically 
from the entire concentric project of ecological ethics. All of us have overseen 
this radical divide until now. But the potency of unifying holistic positions lies 
just in this divide. 
‘What is it that separates unifying holistic ethics most sharply from 
concentric ecological ethics? To answer this question, let us look at how the 
entirety of ecological ethics has been portrayed so far. Peter Singer’s image of 
the ‘expanding circle’ has invited some members of our expedition to render the 
                                                          
8 Let me add that my choice of terminology brings a minor risk with it: the first of the unifying positions I 
will discuss in the light of their joint cooperative power, the approach developed by Gorke, is simply 
called ‘holism’. This might be confusing alright, but, well, Gorke has simply chosen to call his position 
holism. ‘Holism’, by which I henceforth mean strictly the position of Gorke, is but one of three very 
different unifying holistic positions. 
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 project of ecological ethics graphically9. In the chart I am about to draw in the 
sand for you, there is no divide between the concentric project and unifying 
holistic positions. What’s more, unifying positions (remember, Norton has called 
them ‘pluralistic holism’) are merged with ‘monistic holism’ and simply called: 
holistic positions. This chart is the most common way to illustrate the project of 
our expedition: 
 
 
 
 
 
       Hol     bio  path anthrop 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The common way of illustrating ecological ethics 
 
‘So far, so good. This is common wisdom: Each of the spheres represents the 
respective circle of direct moral responsibility, with the innermost sphere limiting 
humans’ direct moral responsibility to themselves, the next one also including all 
sentient beings, the next one also including all living beings. According to this 
depiction, unifying holistic positions would be those that argue for a direct moral 
responsibility for all that is (as, in fact, they do!). If seen exclusively in this way, 
the portrayal of unifying holistic positions as the outermost sphere is 
understandable, simple, and, why, correct. 
‘But it is unfortunate to display unifying holistic positions in this way. 
Even though they are being presented correctly, something is being lost. What is 
being lost is the essence of unifying holistic positions. 
‘The reason may be obvious by now. Still we must spell it out: Unifying 
holistic positions cannot be considered within the concentric paradigm. To do so 
clouds their most essential feature. Unifying holistic positions reverse the burden 
of proof. They begin from all that is, rather than heading towards such an all-
                                                          
9 Cf. for example v.d. Pfordten (2000) or Gorke (1999). 
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 embracing view. That is why they cannot be counted simply as the most far-
reaching concentrism. Unifying holistic positions must be seen outside of that 
paradigm, and opposed to it. Therefore, let me suggest making the sharp and 
essential divide between the concentric project and unifying holistic positions as 
palpable as possible. We will draw two separate diagrams: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Concentrisms vs. Unifying holistic positions 
 
‘But, you may ask, is this not making a rather simple point unnecessarily 
complicated? What do we gain by displaying unifying positions separately, and 
outside the concentric paradigm? What we gain is a clearer view of the most 
important dividing feature between concentrisms and unifying holistic positions, 
a feature that cannot be seen in Fig. 1. What we gain is a lucid understanding that 
essentially, there is a chasm between unifying holistic positions on the one hand, 
and concentrisms on the other. We see more clearly than before that a cavernous 
breach is gaping throughout our discourse field, a breach torn by two 
incommensurable world views.  
‘According to the first world view, humans still make up the sole center of 
being. It is from that center alone that direct moral responsibility towards the 
‘environment’ is negotiated. The permissibility of evidence in favor of – or 
against – widening the moral circle towards such a perceived ‘environment’ is 
negotiated exclusively within that center, according to rules authorized by the 
single fact that they are derived from that center. 
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 ‘According to the other view of the world, such a single-centered 
perception of reality has become anachronistic, and with it, the very notion of 
‘environment’ is crumbling. This other view of the world does not ask how much 
the moral circle can be expanded. It reverses the burden of proof: It begins by 
asking what reasons we have for limiting the moral community. In this, that 
second vision of the world reveals that the world-shattering breakthroughs of 
Copernicus and of Darwin have successfully sunken under its skin. It expresses 
that it has liberated itself from the ancient Western paradigm that humans are the 
sole center of the universe, or that man has been created to dominate all the rest 
of creation, respectively. This vision demonstrates that it has learned to embrace 
and to breathe the freedom bestowed on men when they finally shook off the 
unbearable burden of a reality that is only in relation to them. This vision is 
curious to see beyond the horizon of our island. 
‘For this reason, the common way of illustrating our project (cf. Fig 1.) is 
inopportune. It carries along the imminent risk of being misinterpreted in the way 
that even unifying holistic positions retain humans as the center of being. But 
because such an interpretation runs counter to the common project of all unifying 
holistic positions, we had better made this as clear as we can. While all 
approaches to ecological ethics necessarily question the role of humans, and try 
to find answers regarding good human conduct, it is this difference in the world 
views, rather than the shift from individualistic to super-individualistic positions, 
that cuts the sharpest divide through the discourse field of ecological ethics. 
‘In his overview over ecological ethics, Ott (2000:23) has verged upon 
that same chasm, although he has not drawn the same conclusions that we have 
now drawn. Ott admits that a number of dissenting approaches are 
incommensurate, and that they cannot possibly be united because their basic 
premises are just too different. He calls this an “unattractive consequence”, 
because ecological ethics in general claims to be a rigorous discipline.  
‘This may be unattractive indeed. But what’s more, it seems to be an 
unavoidable consequence. If we draw these two observations together, then 
another question poses itself: Is any scientific undertaking actually possible 
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 without being rooted in a particular world view? It is probably not. Therefore, 
ecological ethics will benefit greatly from carrying more torches into the faint 
realm of world views.10 Our move to unite three positions under a single header 
does just that. 
‘It is time we lend our ears to each of the three unifying positions in turn, 
and to ask how they can come together to create a critical collaboration.’ 
 
Gorke’s holism 
‘As we are well aware of by now, Gorke distances himself against concentrisms 
because their arguments have grown from an unarticulated and arbitrary way of 
power. And while all three of the following positions reverse the burden of proof, 
it is Gorke who articulates most overtly a philosophical argument for this 
reversal. Let us bear in mind that the other two positions, Ecosophy T and multi-
centrism, do not depend on the soundness of Gorke’s argument for their own 
cause. It is not necessary that all accept the way he deduces the argument. The 
three positions may collaborate. But we remember: They collaborate critically. 
 
Reversing the burden of proof 
‘Gorke’s reversal of the burden of proof rests on the notion of altruism. Altruism 
is, of course, a very ambiguous philosophical term. It is co-informed by other 
ambiguous words such as ‘selfhood’ or ‘otherness’11. Gorke’s reversal of the 
burden of proof rests on one particular way of using the word. He writes: 
“Altruism [is] the willingness to sacrifice a superficial advantage in favor of 
nature or future generations, [driven by] free understanding and goodwill.” 
(1999:178; own translation). ‘Nature’ is a critical term here. As we discussed 
earlier, Gorke speaks of ‘nature’ not in a local way. ‘Nature’, for him, does not 
constitute an opposition to humans. It includes them. There are three reasons for 
this: First, social communities are not isolated, but they are embedded in open 
                                                          
10 Potthast (2000) develops an analogous proposition. 
11 Cf. Jon Wetlesen (2002) for a carefully worked-out discussion of different forms of altruism. 
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 ecological communities. Second, humans and all other living beings together 
form a phylogenetic community. All life, in other words, has a common origin. 
Third, humans form a community of being with all that is (1999:248 ff.). With 
this in mind, we may be able to grasp Gorke’s altruism a little better. Altruism, 
for Gorke, is an attitude we ourselves have – as biological beings with the 
capacity to reflect on our own actions, and to adapt our actions to these 
reflections – towards the rest of these various layers of the open community of 
being. This form of altruism becomes not so much a definite dogma that 
prescribes all actions for every conceivable situation. As we shall see shortly, it 
rather becomes a point of reference that helps us judge every actual situation 
anew through ongoing and open-ended exchanges.’ 
After this brief introduction I took a breath. Then I went on: 
‘Gorke arrives at this form of altruism through a look at interhuman morals. 
More specifically, Gorke discusses a formal analysis of the notion of ‘morals’ 
that Ernst Tugendhat (1994) has undertaken. According to Tugendhat, any 
person stands principally before an elemental choice between egoism on the one 
hand, and altruism on the other. Tugendhat’s decisive point is that if a person 
chooses the path of altruism, then she cannot be selective as regards the scope of 
her altruistic stance. He says: 
 
To the degree that it is you who determines whom of your fellow humans you will respect, and 
whom you won’t, you would mold the circle of those who must be respected at your own 
discretion, from your egoistic perspective, from the standpoint of absolute power. Therefore, the 
alternative to egoism can only be: indiscriminate respect for anyone. (in: Gorke 1999:248; own 
translation) 
 
‘According to Tugendhat, you cannot first decide to be an altruist, and then 
decide whom your altruism will apply to, and whom it won’t. Once you have 
chosen to be an altruist, you will have to be an unconditional altruist. For if you 
begin to choose whom you will respect, and whom you won’t, you have fallen 
back onto the path of power again. Either you are an egoist. Or you are an 
unconditional altruist. For Tugendhat, there cannot be a middle ground. 
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 ‘This observation brings Tugendhat into close proximity with Immanuel 
Kant. His formal analysis of morals, which has uncovered the radical nature of 
altruism, must lead toward Kant’s Categorical Imperative. 
‘Gorke accepts the radical nature of altruism. But he observes an 
inconsistency in Tugendhat’s further line of reasoning. For Tugendhat takes up 
his own observation of the radical nature of altruism to argue that (merely) all 
beings ‘who can cooperate’ must be included into the moral community (and 
hence no others). 
‘Gorke distances himself from Tugendhat at this point, which means that 
he also distances himself from Kant. He points out that while both Kant and 
Tugendhat claim to be working out a mere formal analysis, their work is actually 
preceded by a decision as regards the content of the moral community. In the 
case of Kant, it includes only rational beings; in the case of Tugendhat it 
includes only beings who can cooperate. Yet these decisions are incompatible 
with the results of Tugendhat’s own analysis. If morals possess the universal 
character that Tugendhat says they do, on what grounds, then, can one justify 
limiting the moral circle to rational beings, or to beings who can cooperate 
alone? On no grounds, says Gorke. It is therefore that he argues that once we 
have accepted the universal character of altruism, our only tenable conclusion 
can be: a holistic standpoint. We cannot, in other words, decide to have an 
altruistic attitude towards humans and, perhaps, a number of higher animals, but 
have a not-so-altruistic attitude towards, say, plants, rivers, or entire species. 
Because as soon as we introduce some sort of gradation of altruism, we are 
actually – and principally – acting as egoists. If it is we who define the criteria 
for when to be altruistic and when not, we are not actually being altruistic at all. 
‘This formal analysis of the normative layer is very closely coupled with 
the descriptive layer: There is no radical split between ourselves and the world. 
We inhabit a multilayered, shifting, and open community of being. And if we 
acknowledge this close connection, then it becomes impossible to set up any 
single definite line around our morals. The universal character of morals, 
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 especially seen in light of the latest ecological knowledge, would necessarily 
have to lead to a holistic moral standpoint (1999:248 ff.). 
‘To reconcile his view with the analysis of Tugendhat, Gorke develops a 
broadened form of Kant’s Categorical Imperative: “Act in such a way that you 
treat all being always at the same time as an end, and never merely as a means.” 
(Ibid. 250; own translation) This expansion sets up the crucial point of holism: 
the reversal of the burden of proof. In dissolving the dualism means vs. ends, 
holism regards nothing only as a means for others, but rather acknowledges that 
everything also exists in itself, and for itself. For this reason, everything must in 
principle be regarded as a moral object. From the holistic standpoint, one no 
longer has to argue why this or that should be protected against invasion, 
unnecessary change, or destruction. The moral standpoint – the renunciation of 
egoism in favor of unconditional altruism – entails that one has to argue instead 
why this or that should not be regarded morally. 
 
A problem and its possible remedy 
‘As Gorke indicates towards the end of his book, a crucial problem of holism lies 
in the fact that the decision in favor of the moral standpoint – which we now 
know means unconditional altruism – cannot be derived from a normative 
obligation (‘I ought to’). The only path that will lead to the attitude of altruism 
sets out from personal engagement (‘I want to’). A person who does not 
recognize the meaning in adjusting their behavior towards the wants and needs of 
others cannot be forced onto the altruistic path. 
What enhances the problem still is the fact that holism brings with it an 
unforeseeable array of moral conflicts. Such conflicts are, according to Gorke, 
nothing else than stronger or weaker forms of guilt. We simply cannot be 
altruistic all the time. Any action we engage in – even something as simple as 
walking along a sandy trail – piles guilt onto our shoulders. Occupied as we 
might be by swaying poppies, we do not notice how our feet crush some busy 
ants underneath their enormous weight. A tiny fly might accidentally come so 
close to our mouth that as we take a deep breath, the creature is sucked deep into 
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 our lungs and killed in an instant. When we pick some sorrel blades to taste their 
sour freshness, a plant dies. It is a simple fact: In living, we impair others. 
Because of that simple fact, altruism cannot be a definite dogma. Because of that 
fact, altruism can be no more than a point of reference. It can be no more than an 
ideal that educates us to be more alert, and to accept responsibility for our own 
actions. But again, altruism can only become a point of reference when we decide 
that we want it to be. This is a pragmatic problem, most of all. So if we wish to 
face it, we must look for pragmatic remedies. 
‘Schurz has pointed out rightly that the possibility of personal 
engagement, and of direct experience, plays a central role in the emotional 
anchoring of moral values, and therefore in energizing motivational potentials. 
According to him, most people need “… a direct mental-emotional underpinning 
of ecological values, given that their ecological conscience shall become 
effective in practice.” (in: Gorke 1999:181; own translation) 
‘Schurz’s idea is hardly surprising, but its momentous implications are 
disquieting indeed. They help us realize that almost without our noticing,          
an uncanny silence has been throbbing throughout the discourse of ecological 
ethics: the silence of others. But have not those others been here all along alright? 
Have they not been there in such notions as ‘the environment’ or ‘nature’? That 
may be so – but let me ask you: How have they been there?’ 
I looked around me. No one spoke. After some time I continued: 
‘Throughout the dominating part of our discourse, others have been nearly 
entirely muted, stacked onto one another in neat piles, packed away in boxes that 
may not have permitted us to hear them, let alone to listen to them. But they did 
allow us to keep them in check, observable from the corner of our eyes, 
quantifiable for easy access and undemanding processing. Despite the simple and 
quite obvious fact that each of us is amidst others at all times (now and now and 
now), the discourse has made the appearance of looking at what is immediately 
there through a telescope – but the wrong way round. We have labeled others 
into very few and very general categories. This way, we have severed others 
artificially from their immediacy, and encapsulated them in the diameter of a 
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 very limited set of lenses. However, if we were to take Schurz’s comment to 
heart – and we do – then this severity has to cause us to muse over this silence. If 
personal engagement and direct experience do play the central role in the healing 
of emotional estrangement that Schurz suggests, then it is startling that we have 
given the subject so little attention in our discourse so far.’ 
Still no one spoke. I took it as an invitation to pursue. 
‘Holism merely points towards this problem, but it does not give us any 
clues for how to tackle it. The second unifying holistic position, Arne Næss’s 
Ecosophy T, attempts to give greater attention to the problem. The question we 
will keep in mind is this: Are others being made sufficiently audible in Næss’s 
position? 
 
Ecosophy T 
‘Even more explicitly than Gorke, Næss frequently emphasizes the importance 
and interrelatedness of both individual and holistic thinking. In this, he stands 
firm in a Norwegian tradition that dates back at least as far as the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century-philosopher Niels Treschow12. But let us be careful when we 
draw Næss into the group of unifying holistic positions. For Næss himself shies 
away from any kind of definite tagging. He does not speak of wholes or holism, 
but rather of “lower- and higher-order gestalts”. Gestalt-thinking, says Næss, 
“induces people to think more strenuously about the relations between wholes 
and parts.” (Næss 1989:58) This said, we may continue to speak of Næss’s 
philosophy as a unifying holistic position, but with a sharpened sensitivity. Let us 
think of the name ‘unifying holistic positions’ only as a tentative variant, not as a 
definite finale. It is the name of a prospecting course; it is a formula which may 
assist us in sketching out an alternative to the concentric project. But it is no 
more than that. Næss teaches us that all formulae carry a certain slumbering 
danger within them, and that we must always be on our guard when we confront 
them. We can learn from Næss to always be skeptical in the face of our own 
                                                          
12 cf. Witoszek 1999:459 ff. 
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 conclusions. Let us bear this thought in mind, inconspicuous though it may still 
be at this point.’ 
I sought eye contact with Arne Næss, who was fidgeting on his knees vis-
à-vis to where I sat. The mischievous grin he gave me urged me to go on: 
‘Næss is considered to be the father of deep ecology. However, our 
interest here shall lie merely in what Næss has come to call Ecosophy T, his 
personal philosophical underpinning of deep ecology proper13. This said, I must 
qualify further that I will commence this critique of Ecosophy T by looking 
briefly at the article “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology 
Movement. A Summary“ (Næss 1973/1999). Not only was this article destined to 
become the founding paper of the deep ecology movement. It also presents 
Næss’s first direct reaction to the ecological crisis, and as such it is the earliest 
indication of where he was to head subsequently. The article is important for 
Ecosophy T in that it contains at least three elemental theoretical ideas that Næss 
later transcribed over to Ecosophy T. The first two of those can be found in 
points one and two of the seven points which Næss listed to contrast a ‘deep 
ecology movement’ from a ‘shallow ecology movement’. Point one reads: 
 
Rejection of the man-in-environment image in favor of the relational, total-field image. 
Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation 
between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic 
constitutions of A and B, so that without the relation, A and B are no longer the same thing. The 
total-field model dissolves not only the man-in-environment concept, but every compact thing-
in-milieu concept – except when talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication. 
(Ibid.:3) 
 
‘In this founding statement Næss invigorates the “total-field image”, which may 
be understood primarily as a fundamental ontological statement. As such it can 
hardly be limited only to the “biospherical net”. Hence, the “field of intrinsic 
relations” is much less a direct synonym of this biospherical net than rather its 
hyperonym, preceding and including it. This ontological base has been refined 
and transported into Ecosophy T as the concept of the ‘greater Self’. Point two 
reads: 
 
                                                          
13 The literature is frequently incoherent as regards what constitutes deep ecology as a movement, and 
how Næss’s own philosophy, Ecosophy T, fits into that. For a further discussion of the issue, cf. Glasser 
(1995), Seiler (2000), and Mueller (2006 b). 
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 Biospherical egalitarianism in principle. The ‘in principle’ clause is inserted because any 
realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression. The ecological field 
worker acquires a deep-seated respect, or even veneration, for ways and forms of life[14]. He 
reaches an understanding from within, a kind of understanding that others reserve for fellow men 
and for a narrow section of ways and forms of life. To the ecological field-worker, the equal 
right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to 
humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans 
themselves. The quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from 
close partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish 
a master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from himself.  (Ibid.:4) 
 
‘This point represents the first instance of Næss’s observation that man has 
become ‘alienated’ from himself. It forms the background against which 
Ecosophy T’s principle of ‘identification’ was developed15. Without a preceding 
alienation, the necessity of a subsequent identification would be incompre-
hensible and superfluous. 
‘The third elemental idea of this article is Næss’s coining of the term 
‘ecosophy’. Originally, this term simply denoted “a philosophy of ecological 
harmony or equilibrium” (Ibid.:6). This meaning has been expanded considerably 
since. Ecosophy T – representative of all other actual and possible ecosophies – 
presents a total view which combines philosophical reasoning with action. The 
idea behind calling it a total view is that people should be made aware not only 
that philosophical questioning in the face of the ecological crisis cannot be an 
end in itself, but also that people always act as if they were following systematic 
structures, even though “a total view cannot be completely articulated by any 
person or group” (1989:38). Yet despite this irresolvable difficulty, the attempt to 
articulate one’s own total view in a more comprehensive and coherent way is 
never futile. Quite the opposite, Næss argues: It is actually demanded of us. For 
“as humans, we are responsible in our actions as to motivations and premises 
relative to any question that can be asked of us.” (Ibid.) That is why, in his 
exposition of Ecosophy T, Næss is not so much interested in delivering a fully 
coherent philosophical framework that may hold against all assaults, as he is in 
encouraging others “to try to articulate the necessary parts of fragments of his or 
                                                          
14 The similarity of expression may hint at an indirect influence by Schweitzer, although no reference is 
given. 
15 ’Identification‘ is also a term referred to by Sigmund Freud (in: Einstein & Freud 1932/2005 p. 42), the 
works of whom Næss was familiar with due to his own study period in Vienna during the 1930s. Whether 
there are any connections between the two, Næss has, to my knowledge, not mentioned. 
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 her own implicit views, in the hope that it will lead to clarification of the difficult 
process of facing and responding to the challenges of life in our ecosphere.” 
(Ibid. 1989:38).16 Næss carries on the tradition first introduced by Socrates, who 
provoked his disciples to go on questioning their own views until they could 
express themselves more clearly on the most fundamental issues. 
‘Let me make it clear beyond doubt that during the criticism I am about to 
raise against Ecosophy T, I take its personal character to heart. My criticism 
cannot leave the standpoint of the observer, and it can therefore not truly 
penetrate Ecosophy T. In fact, it does not even intend to do so. Its aim is more 
humble: To pick up a point which can be interpreted as a weak point, and which 
can provoke further questioning of others, questioning which will lead away 
from Ecosophy T. In this, it is just the form of criticism that Næss invites each of 
us to pursue. It is the kind of criticism that grows from viewing unifying holistic 
positions as a collaborative project.’ 
I looked over at him again. Still his merry grin drew long and undulating 
curves across his face. But behind these there was another expression now. Was 
it a tinge of excitement? 
‘Næss developed Ecosophy T as a system of norms and hypotheses. The 
one ultimate norm from which all ensuing ones are derived is “Self-realization!”. 
The ‘Self’ (with a capital S) has a large and comprehensive meaning, embracing 
the entirety of life17. It stands in opposition to the much narrower ‘self’, by which 
is meant the individual ‘ego’. The exclamation mark, together with the active use 
of the word ‘realize’, hint at the open-ended process-character of ‘Self-
realization!’. It is a process headed toward “maximizing the manifestations of 
life” (Ibid. 1986/2003:272), where each narrow ‘self’ gradually attains higher 
and higher levels of Self-realization.18 In a systematic adaptation, Næss puts it as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
16 For further comments cf. also Rothenberg 1986, in: Næss 1989:7 ff.; Seiler 2000:153 f. 
17 Which, as I will discuss in Chapter Two, in itself is a large, comprehensive, and rich word. 
18 Whether or not we can call Næss an altruist, is surely – again – a matter of how we understand altruism. 
Perhaps we can find a good clue in Wetlesen’s (2002) discussion of different forms of altruism, even 
through he does not refer to Næss directly. Wetlesen proposes to call such a (Næssian) transcendence of 
the ego and the alter: generosity. This does, indeed, seem to be a fitting term for Næss. 
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 N1: Self-realisation! 
H1:  The higher the Self-realisation attained by anyone, the broader and deeper the 
identification with others. 
H2:  The higher the level of Self-realisation attained by anyone, the more its further 
increase depends upon the Self-realisation of others. 
H3:  Complete Self-realisation of anyone depends on that of all 
N2:  Self-realisation for all living beings! (Ibid. 1989:197 f.) 
 
‘From the ultimate norm are derived three hypotheses, which together lead to a 
slightly more precise second norm. The derivation of N2 through the hypotheses 
qualifying N1 is called loose derivation. This means that not all premises leading 
from one to another are actually articulated. ‘Loose’ here means that more 
precise norms and hypotheses do not derive directly from more basic premises. 
They also depend on additional norms and hypotheses, each of which is more 
particular than the preceding ones. 
‘Næss calls all formulations at this ultimate level of his ecosophy T0-
formulations, which means they are expressed at the lowest level of preciseness, 
and that they allow for many parallel interpretations at higher levels. ‘Self-
realization!’ is one such formulation. Another one that appears for the first time 
in H1 is ‘identification’19. Although the semantic vagueness of these terms is 
intended, they also leave ample room for diverging interpretations. They do so 
especially because semantically spacious concepts are interrelated through loose 
derivation. 
‘Let us look at how Næss illustrates the T0-formulation ‘identification’: 
“Increased self-identity involves increased identification with others.” In turn, 
“we increasingly see ourselves in other beings, and others see themselves in us.” 
This is how “the self is extended and deepened as a natural process of the 
realization of its potentialities in others.” (1986/2003:272) While Næss 
intentionally omits greater specification, saying this would be “of greater interest 
to the logician than to the ecosopher” (Ibid. 1989:198), I disagree in this 
particular point. The reason is that this designation of ‘identification’ creates an 
epistemological problem: identification presupposes alienation. Although the 
term ‘self’ is used to denote every center of forces (‘gestalts’), it seems 
                                                          
19 This term has since flourished throughout the deep-ecology literature (i.e., Fox 2003; Rothenberg 1995; 
Sale 1999), and often quite disconnected from its origin in Ecosophy T. 
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 reasonably justified to say that alienation is a purely human phenomenon. Næss 
himself has said this, actually. It is only humans who need to (re)identify with 
other selves (including but also transcending humans), as no other forms of life 
have become alienated to begin with. Owing to the vagueness of the term, we 
cannot say that Næss is being logically incoherent. We can say, however, that 
Næss’s vagueness confuses two distinctive concepts of ‘others’ too hurriedly. 
The narrow concept considers only other humans. The broader one considers all 
centers of force, or gestalts (other than the ego). Weston has shown that he finds 
such blending of sameness and otherness troublesome:  
 
The suggestion is that what we have in common, even with tigers and trees and probably even 
with rocks and bacteria, is more important than that which divides us. And there are surely 
commonalities to be found, ‘identifications’ that, apart from this procedure, we would no doubt 
overlook. The implicit monism, though—arranging our argument so that the commonalities 
alone ground the ethic—is more troublesome. (2006:72)  
 
Similarly, Plumwood agrees with the view that Næss leaves the problem of 
sameness and otherness insufficiently addressed. She argues that “the idea of the 
extended self in deep ecology suggests that the whole world becomes a kind of 
extended individual ego incorporating everything that is. It thus fails to 
acknowledge in any real sense the ‘otherness’ of what is in the world; since 
everything is viewed as being part of oneself, there is no space for difference.” 
(in: Palmer 2003:31). On another occasion, Plumwood (1999:210) has 
commented on the same problem: “We need a concept of the other as 
interconnected with the self, but as a separate being in their own right, accepting 
the ‘uncontrollable, tenaciousness otherness’ of the world as a condition of 
freedom and identity for both self and other.”’ 
 
As I looked into the faces of my fellow travel companions, I suddenly realized 
that it would be unjust to end my discussion of Ecosophy T on this rather rigid 
critical note, regardless its significance for the further development of my 
exposition. Because as it stood, it would have failed to acknowledge the 
continuing importance that Næss plays for our discourse. So I added:  
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 ‘A quarter of a century after Aldo Leopold understood that the (then not yet fully 
recognized) ecological crisis cannot only be fought through a change of action, 
but that it must also be addressed through a change of attitude, Næss came to the 
same conclusion. Both share this view with Martin Heidegger, who understands 
the crisis that we are in the midst of in the way ‘crisis’ was understood in ancient 
Greek. Krisis denoted a ‘judgment’, a ‘deciding’, or a ‘sentence’. For Heidegger, 
the judgment humans are faced with is our very relationship to the earth. 
Furthermore, the term ‘ethics’ is related to ‘ethos’, both of which are also derived 
from Greek (ethos), meaning ‘character’ or ‘manners’. What does this imply? 
That the full range of ethics cannot be limited to a ‘rational’ discourse whose aim 
it is to filter out tenable normative statements, prescribing what the ‘right’ moral 
actions are20. Rather, ethics transcends a purely normative realm to include 
questions such as: What does our being-in-the-world mean to us? What stirs us, 
what makes us act the way we do? The insight that the ecological krisis demands 
of us to ask ourselves who we wish to be, entails also to ask what character, what 
manners we wish to develop to deal with this krisis. In order to ask who we wish 
to be, we must also ask: Who are we? That implies the question: Who are we 
not? Which in turn means that we ask about the relationships into which we 
constantly interweave, and which our being-in-the-world is co-constitutive of. It 
is mostly in this latter connection that the works of Næss have contributed most 
strongly to ecological ethics, and that they present both a challenge and a vivid 
source of inspiration to our ongoing discourse. Næss has been teaching and also 
living a profoundly positive and activating outlook and life, and on humans’ 
relationship with others.’ 
At long last, Næss himself seized the opportunity to whisper: 
“The meaningfulness inherent in even the tiniest living beings makes the 
amateur naturalist quiver with emotion. There is no communication: the ‘things’ 
express, talk, proclaim – without words. Within a few yards from the gnarled 
wooden walls of the cottage Tvergastein there are rich and diverse changing 
worlds big enough to be entirely unsurveyable“ (in: Seiler 2000:176) 
                                                          
20 Seiler (2000:177) remarks that all rationality is fundamentally shaped by particular world views and 
self-understandings. 
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 Multicentrism 
This brings me to the final missing link of my recollection, and to the decisive 
deliberations that led to my embarking. I continued: 
‘Multicentrism as the third alternative to the dominating concentrisms 
developed most recently among the unifying holistic positions. But it is hardly 
fair to speak of multicentrism as a single position.’ 
My companions looked up. What could I have meant by that? 
‘Early in 2006, after undertaking a critical study of Næss’s Ecosophy T 
and Peter Reed’s ecosophy Man Apart, I coined the term ‘multicentrism’ for a 
future philosophy that would take into account both sameness and otherness, and 
that would have freed itself from the dominating concentric paradigm of 
ecological ethics (cf. Mueller 2006 a). I then called multicentrism my ‘personal 
ecosophy’, my own attempt to take a stance towards the judgments of our times. 
I was unaware at the time that Anthony Weston had published the article 
“Multicentrism. A Manifesto” some two years prior in the journal Environmental 
Ethics (No. 26/2004), coming to strikingly similar conclusions, and further 
underlying the importance of this novel perspective on the problem. In this 
manifesto Weston draws on a large variety of authors that do not use the name 
‘multicentrism’ themselves for their work, but that nevertheless contribute to 
developing just that: multicentrism. Hence, when I speak of multicentrism as a 
single position here, I do so knowing that its boundaries are difficult to delineate. 
Once again, it will be helpful if we all bear in mind that what I call multicentrism 
is above all the attempt to cast a different and more nuanced light at the contested 
field of world views. Multicentrism as an explicit position is still too young to be 
able to offer much more than that. 
‘You may ask, of course, why multicentrism is even important when all 
that is has already been included in the moral circle by Gorke’s holism. Does not 
holism render multicentrism redundant? 
‘That I have resolved to strengthen multicentrism even so, is largely 
inspired by pragmatic deliberations. Earlier I mentioned the problem of 
motivation. The adoption of the altruistic standpoint, which according to Gorke 
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 leads inevitably to the holistic standpoint, must be preceded by a deliberate ‘I 
want’. This thought leads us to consider more closely the roles of personal 
engagement and direct experience. It is here that multicentrism may help set us in 
motion to open doors, gates, and windows on all sides, and to let a fresh breeze 
inside. What also keeps me from halting already is the thought that more voices 
can prevent a discourse from receding into a static state. Various positions can 
refine one another through the open-ended friction they generate. They will keep 
each other attentive to imminent methodological inconsistencies, and they will be 
able to hone the similarities they share. All this cannot only strengthen each 
position in itself. It can also consolidate their combined, polyphonic voice in this 
critical process of judgment that our home is faced with at the moment. 
‘At this point, a further reservation has become overdue. So far I have 
spoken of ‘multicentrism’ without going much into detail about what this 
position actually entails. Yet even so, what ought to have become clear already is 
that multicentrism stands in stark contrast not only to all concentrisms, but also 
to holism as developed by Gorke. Therefore, the graphic depiction of Fig. 2, 
which claimed to contrast concentrisms sharply from unifying holistic positions 
(including multicentrism), must be amended. While that graphic depiction was 
useful above to help develop the deep chasm between all concentrisms on the 
one hand, and all unifying holistic positions on the other, it is no longer 
acceptable that we subsume multicentrism under Fig. 2. We must distinguish 
more closely between holism, for which Fig. 2.2 continues to be a suitable 
illustration, and multicentrism. Have a look at the following image. It is a rough 
graphic portrayal of multicentrism:21 
 
 
 
 
Fig.. 3 Multicentrism 
                                                          
21 One may ask of course where in this the third holistic position, Ecosophy T, finds its proper place. I 
deem it best to leave the question open, and I do so bearing in mind the thought that introduced the 
exposition of Ecosophy T – it continues to defy all classification. 
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 ‘All the graphic depictions we are pondering this morning are best considered 
with a watchful eye, and with reasonable and skeptical detachment, for they 
entail some serious curbs. Their use is very local, in that they enhance the 
legibility of the various approaches to ecological ethics by drawing them together 
to their essential components, and by showing how the approaches can be 
grouped. But especially with regards to holism and multicentrism (cf. Fig. 2 & 
3), one cannot but notice that the neat line which convenience must draw around 
the shared intuition of all unifying holistic positions – that of ‘unified being’ – is 
contradictory to their agenda. It would be more accurate, or rather less 
misleading, not to draw that line. Yet if nothing else, one would at length run into 
the neat and rectangular margin of the paper, a boundary which is in no way less 
unfortunate; and gluing more paper onto either side of this one would only 
postpone the inevitable. Thus, although my depiction of ‘unified being’ as an 
unbroken circle offers itself as the least disadvantageous alternative available, 
we must caution ourselves of its function as an abstracting tool; and as such, we 
must become and remain cautious of its drawbacks. As regards multicentrism, 
you may notice that not only is the outer margin a disadvantage of our graphic 
rendition, but also its two-dimensionality is at best regrettable. Though it might 
succeed to satisfy the theorists among us whose interest reaches merely out 
toward forming a detached, hypothetical ‘notion’ of ‘the multicentric approach’ 
(“I see where this is going!”), multicentrism itself can hardly be contained in this 
way. If anything, multicentrism takes this depiction as a stepping stone. But we 
can illustrate multicentrism in a much simpler and more auspicious way. Let me 
recall the morning of the day we first set out on our expedition. 
‘I had just awoken. I set the kettle on the iron oven, then went outside to 
leave the confines of the cabin in which I had been so comfortably sheltered from 
the creeping late-autumn chill. I went to stick my nose into the wind, and to see 
what weather this first day of the trip would bring. 
‘At first there were the cars. So few cars frequented this back road that my 
ears could make out each of them distinctly, despite my inability to see them 
through the thick shrubs that line the edge of the brook between the cabin and the 
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 road. Now a cargo truck, laden with heaviness, was laboring up the small hill. 
Now two smaller cars were whooshing round the bend in close succession. Now 
I sensed that distant tickle through my soles. The hourly bus was approaching. 
From the way the bus was slowing down carefully before the curve, I inferred 
that the bus was steered by that ever-weary driver with hair white as flour. The 
usual array of a handful of smaller children was likely to be scattered throughout 
the large vehicle, looking sleepily out the large glass windows. Now the bus had 
passed, leaving silence. But silence? Had there not been a raven’s muffled 
croaking all along? Yes! He carried on imperviously, unseen behind a host of 
shadowy spruces. And there was more. As my ears were tuning in to what had 
merely been silence a moment earlier, they became aware of the multitude of 
layers of voices around them. From above, the high-pitched, jolly twitter of a 
nameless songbird spilled through heavy banks of clouds. In the east, somewhere 
beyond the dark forest line, a buck was barking with that unmistakable, throaty 
voice. An annoyed dog answered him from the far south. How far sounds could 
carry on such sober mornings! There was more still. The chill on my cheeks 
brought tidings that winter was skulking in from the high north. The smell of 
burning wood was fondling my nose, whispering that the neighbor had awoken. 
The dim, yellow lamp in the kitchen window of the farm house nearby was 
telling a story of warmth, and of breakfast. Two deer were grazing by the large 
red barn. It was the doe with her tiny fawn. Both had been insatiable for weeks 
on end, so utterly engrossed by their gnawing that they often made only reluctant 
attempts at flight. Their white tails shone like two stray lights, forgotten and left 
behind after a nocturnal lantern procession. At last, a rare visitor came 
scampering into the open. The red fox, oblivious to everything but the trace of a 
smell. His nose submerged amongst leaves worn down by heavy morning dew, 
amongst clover and dandelion, he scurried onwards through the meadow, 
sniffing, sniffing. 
‘I see it on your faces, dear companions: “What has all this got to do with 
multicentrism,” you ask. It is simple. Was not that white-haired bus driver a 
center in himself? Each of the children on the bus, were they not centers in 
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 themselves? Centers that experienced this world through pairs of small blinking 
eyes and through breathing bodies? Or the raven. Was he not fully absorbed in 
the center of his ravenworld when he browsed through the compost by the shed 
in search of something edible? Might not his world have contracted entirely into 
the discovery of that half-shriveled carrot, at last undug from the heap of 
leftovers? And will not the center of the doe’s world have been filled to the rim 
with concern for her fawn, and did she not subdue her own urgent impulse to flee 
until the fawn had safely leapt into the sheltering bushes? Is it not the case that 
“[e]ach of a thousand human and more-than-human presences organizes a certain 
part of the world around itself, forms a distinctive local pattern, a certain organic 
completeness and cohesion” (Weston 2006:74)? And, finally, is not the attempt 
to contain all this, and more, in a two-dimensional illustration a very poor 
contraction indeed?’ 
 
Unity and otherness 
‘On the highest level of abstraction, multicentrism shares with the rest of the 
unifying holistic positions aspect of ‘unity’. What it addresses more explicitly 
and more openly than has been done previously, is the ‘otherness’-aspect. In his 
Manifesto, Weston said that multicentrism “envisions a world of irreducibly 
diverse and multiple centres of being and value—not one single circle, of 
whatever size or growth rate, but many circles, partially overlapping, each with 
its own centre.” (2006:69) In this, multicentrism relates closely to what Næss 
calls the ‘relational, total-field image’. However, Næss went on to develop his 
metaphysical interpretation of this relational total field, the ‘greater Self’. If we 
trace Ecosophy T back to its original beginning from the relational total field, 
then we find a multicentric interpretation of Næss’s thought rather 
straightforward. We can see it clearly through multicentric glasses. It is not until 
Ecosophy T is further developed around the gravitational field of the ‘greater 
Self’ that those glasses will be somewhat stained. Here, Ecosophy T shows a 
rather low level of metaphysical prudence. Multicentrism, in its current tentative 
state, is more sparing with metaphysical interpretations. One needs not speak of a 
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 ‘greater Self’ to invigorate a relational, total-field image. In dropping the ‘Self’, 
one is spared the problematic concept of ‘identification with other selves’, again 
in favor of scrutinizing the less laden notion of the relationality of being – and all 
its multifaceted implications. From this relational unity, one may then set out to 
explore both sameness and otherness. Weston sums this up as follows: 
 
[Multicentrism is a] vision according to which more-than-human others enter the moral realm on 
their own terms, rather than by expansion from a single centre—a vision according to which 
there are diverse centres, shifting and overlapping but still each with its own distinctive starting-
point. For a multi-centred ethic, then, the growth of moral sensitivity and consideration does not 
proceed through an expanding series of con-centric realms, each neatly assimilating or 
incorporating the previous stage within a larger and more inclusive whole. No: instead we 
discover a world of separate though mutually implicated centres. Moral growth consists in 
experiencing more and more deeply the texture of multiplicity in the world, not in tracing the 
wider and wider circles set off from one single centre. (2006:70) 
 
‘In the Manifesto, Weston has summarized the multicentric project in these four 
broad themes: (1) decentering the human; (2) a diversity of centers; (3) the 
multiverse calls forth etiquette; and (4) ethics as a co-constituted process. 
‘The first point has been largely charted by now. It says that any form of 
uni-centrism is rejected. By opening ourselves to the stories that others have to 
tell – which are “not to be measured by man” – we may “honour our 
distinctiveness as essential to our particular mode of being and (in part) to what 
we take to be our consequent moral standing”. Yet in doing so, we need not 
“impose ourselves as models for everyone and everything else’s being and 
standing.” (2006:73) 
‘The second point takes this decentering one level up and places it into a 
larger context. As such, it is an extension of my anecdotal illustration of 
multicentrism from above. Weston: “Around us are not merely a multitude of 
humans or of conscious centres, and not merely a multitude of other midsized 
and discrete “force-fields” like rocks and trees, but a multitude of other kinds of 
“force-fields”—rhizomes, tectonic plates, bacteria, nebulae—at many different 
levels of organization too, from species and ecosystems to individual cells.” 
(2006:75) 
‘The third point refers to that strategy which, as I mentioned in the 
beginning, is constitutive of all unifying holistic positions, even though not all 
 
 
46
 mention it explicitly: the reversal of the burden of proof. The so-called 
‘demarcation problem’ – the problem of who should be acknowledged into the 
moral community – no longer poses itself as such. Others are, so-to-speak, 
innocent until proven otherwise. They are inherently valuable to begin with, and 
if anyone disagrees, the burden of proof lies with them. 
‘Finally, also the fourth point is one that multicentrism shares with holism 
and Ecosophy T. Ethics is not understood in its narrow sense as a “normative 
critique and justification of morals and of rights, insofar as they concern action 
toward the nonhuman nature.” (cf. v.d. Pfordten). With the words of feminist 
philosopher Margaret Walker, ethics is rather understood much more 
comprehensively as “a collection of perceptive, imaginative, appreciative, and 
expressive skills and capacities which put us and keep us in contact with the 
realities of ourselves and specific others.” (1989:21). Underlying this view of 
ethics is a meta-ethical assessment that rejects viewing ethics as a formalistic 
discipline unmoved by contexts, seeking normative prescriptions for all possible 
or probable dilemmas. Wilhelm Vossenkuhl shares this view: “Seeing the things 
through the hierarchical structure of the commandments and obligations does not 
only weaken the powers of moral discernment, but it also creates a deceptive 
security in the act of judging itself.” (1993:145; own translation) 
‘Ethics seen in the broader sense does not claim to give succinct 
normative prescriptions, but it challenges every actor to assess every situation 
anew, again and again. It challenges each of us to acknowledge others in their 
self-centeredness. It challenges us to “work things out together” (Weston 
2006:77). In this, ethics is by no means only an (academic) discipline of a 
privileged crowd that scampers up and down the mountain of the human island. 
It is also – perhaps even predominantly – a communicative practice. Ethics seen 
in this way is a driving force, much in the way in which Schweitzer has described 
his own ethics, the Reverence for Life, with the beautiful words: “As the screw 
that burrows through the waters propels the ship, so the Reverence for Life 
propels the human creature.” (2003:38; own translation). 
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 ‘At long last, multicentrism creates opportunities for others to re-emerge 
from their silences. It opens up spaces for unforeseen encounters; it yields 
dialogue; it invites others to enter into mutual exchanges through open-ended 
negotiation and intricate attentiveness. Rather than scrambling dangerously close 
to the pitfalls of dogmatism, multicentrism, as Ecosophy T and holism, dares to 
endure the inspiring voids of skepticism.’ 
 
I exhaled. I was finished. I had expressed to them why it is possible to unite the 
forces of holism, Ecosophy T, and multicentrism in critical collaboration. 
This novel angle took time to settle. So we called it a day. 
 
 
 
IT DID NOT TAKE LONG TO EXTINGUISH THE FIRE AND TO GATHER OUR SPARSE 
belongings. Even so it was midday before we were ready to set out for the long 
march back down. 
 
The little girl 
Long after the sun had set that evening, our trek came down the mountain again. 
Everyone was still engaged in lively discussion when we entered the outskirts of 
the first human settlement. Suddenly we halted. A child stood on the path before 
us. It was a little girl; she was perhaps twelve or thirteen. She looked at each of 
us intensely. Then she spoke: 
‘The world is very sick. What is it that you are doing to heal it?’ 
I looked at my fellow holistic thinkers around me. They nodded. So I went 
to the girl, kneeled in front of her, and spoke: 
‘Some of us have come to agree that thought patterns of separation are 
making our Earth sick. So we are trying to undo them. But this is not easy, 
because even in our own discipline – philosophy – a world view is quietly at 
work that continues to separate us humans from the Earth. This world view 
continues to believe that we humans are the center of all being.’ 
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 Her eyes had me fixed. In a matter-of-fact voice she said: 
‘That’s silly.’ 
Still she looked at me. As the moments passed, I noticed that she did not 
blink. Then I added: 
‘What we are trying to do is to understand actions of destruction for what 
they are, and to replace them by acts of healing. And this means, first of all: to 
remember that ‘to heal’ originally means ‘to make whole again’. To heal means, 
in other words, to try to overcome separation.’ 
 
At that moment a decision came to me. I closed my eyes and thought: What 
better way to overcome separation than to throw myself into the world? What 
better way to start than trying to see what lies beyond our horizon? 
 
When I reopened my eyes, the little girl no longer stood there in front of us. I 
looked around, perplexed. Ah, there she was! Skipping up the trail behind us, her 
hair caught momentarily by a breeze, it sounded as if she was – indeed – 
giggling. 
 
The journey ahead 
It is time to move on. But before we do, let us tie together the loose ends of this 
long chapter and ask what we are taking with us on the journey ahead. 
Dietmar v.d. Pfordten identified the point of greatest abstraction in ethics, 
its point of departure, as being “the relationship between the acting human being 
and others who restrain his actions and decisions through normative 
obligations…” (2000:43; own translation). From this point of view, ethics is an 
analysis of the relationship between “Actor” and “Other” (Ibid.). Can we now 
unite this point of greatest abstraction with two additional aspects of ethics that 
we introduced earlier in the chapter? In the beginning, we presented ecological 
ethics as an interdisciplinary project that touches on ecological, socio-
psychological, political, and ontological questions. Towards the end, we added 
that we understand ethics in general as a communicative practice. If we 
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 interweave these two views with that of v.d. Pfordten, we come to realize that 
there is one aspect of ecological ethics which the dominating discourse has not 
given sufficient attention to: language. 
With this realization in mind, one observation from the preceding chapter 
imprints itself lastingly on this journey. It is the seeming paradox that while still 
on land, we were surrounded by absences. We were so comfortably at home in 
our self-centeredness that the very fact that we were living among absences lay 
hidden perfectly behind static and nondescript language, language that 
anesthetized us, that did not challenge us to even begin to eavesdrop on those 
uncanny silences. 
If I now steer away from this land, I wish to leave behind my human 
hermitage. What I am steering into is this vast, communicative realm. But of 
course I am taking my own center with me. In a multicentric world, none can 
leave their own self-centeredness behind. But each of us can set our own 
horizons in motion, and in moving, we can seek contact. And while we are 
moving, the unfolding and shifting contacts will protect us from falling all too 
easily back into beholding our own center as the only center. I have come to 
recognize that in living, we always move among other centers. That I have set 
sail simply means that I wish to wake up – a little more, and a little at a time – to 
reality22. What I wish to ask is simple: What could it mean to live in a 
communicative realm? 
 
 
The lantern tinkles on 
At last, I become aware again of the throbbing tinkling that makes my body 
quiver quietly. I blink, and I cast another look around myself. My vessel is 
gulped into a thick, foggy soup. I close my eyes and strain my ears. Without my 
noticing, the tinkling of the lantern has stopped. The sea has fallen silent. The 
                                                          
22 This admirable expression was suggested by Spaemann (1990:116). David Abram finds similar words: 
“A genuinely ecological approach … strives to become ever more awake to the other lives, the other 
forms of sentience and sensibility that surround us in the open field of the present moment.” (in: Between 
the Body and the Breathing Earth: A Reply to Ted Toadvine).. 
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 ocean is holding its breath. Suddenly the clink of a raindrop breaks the velvet 
skin of the water. A single drop has tumbled out of invisible clouds. Now I hear 
another drop. Now another. Now the heavens break, pouring down streams of 
sweet rain. I blink, and I see the fog being washed away from before my eyes 
like dust from a window. I blink again, and I look around. As far as my eyes can 
reach, in every direction, the ocean stretches out toward the horizon. Little pearls 
of falling water burst through the smooth ocean surface, and tiny rings expand 
from every center of eruption, interweaving with one another, whispering to each 
other tales, spoken in tongues that do not resonate in my ears, but make my body 
sway. And as my boat rocks gently over the tiny mounds and vales of these tales, 
my ears are drawn in, once more, by the tinkling of the lantern. 
 
 
51
  
Barriers to relationship 
 
 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make a word mean so many different things.” 
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.” 
 
- Lewis Carroll - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE RAIN HAS STOPPED. NIGHT HAS FALLEN ONCE AGAIN. THE OCEAN IS CALM. 
No clouds obscure the view onto the starry, starry night above. The dim beam of 
my lantern looks as if one such star has descended to give us light, and be our 
guide. 
Our journey away from the human-centered island permits us not only to 
draw nearer others. It also enables us to cast an ec-centric look at the place we 
steer away from (and is not eccentricity perhaps just another word for 
multicentrism?). Old habits and points of view suddenly appear odd, similar to 
the way in which an organic, meaningful word will sometimes dissipate into 
random sounds if only we hum the word over and over again, like a ritual chant. 
Hum hum hum hum hum hum hum hum. 
This chapter casts such an eccentric look at a number of speaking habits 
that we are of custom bringing along as luggage on this voyage. The rationale is 
simple: Our vessel is small, and we must travel light. We must not risk drowning 
because we have laden our vessel with too heavy a load. 
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 The chapter has a twofold design.  
 
Part I argues that the practice of definition acts as a barrier to experiencing 
relationship. The act of defining is inadequate and arbitrary when definitions are 
taken out of context, as often happens. Such de-contextualized defining 
perpetuates acts of power over and coercion of others, because in being defined 
into certain categories, others are robbed of the possibility to show themselves in 
their otherness. 
This argument is not new, of course. Already Aristotle (Book I/Ethics) 
observed that our understanding of ourselves is limited by our own definitions of 
who we are. Hence, it would not seem worthwhile to spend much time on the 
argument. But the reader will find that novelty is not the issue in our case. What 
is actually the issue here is the pervasiveness of the disease: Some of the basic 
vocabulary of our Western culture is now being held under the spell of 
unwarranted acts of definition. Scrutinizing two terms central to the discourse of 
ecological ethics – life and humanness –, I show that the most effective tool to 
detect this pervasiveness is repetition. The entire discussion of life and 
humanness serves as a means to diagnose the disease of definition, and hence as 
a direct illustration of Aristotle’s argument. 
 
Diagnosis only serves a purpose when it inspires suggestions on how to treat our 
ailments. The treatment I appeal to in Part II of this chapter can be condensed 
into the formula relational language use. I argue that relational language use may 
break patterns of coercion of others, and seek creative relationships with them. 
The conversation at the end of this chapter, that about love, illustrates the 
lengths relational language use can go. It also shows that relational language is 
already being practiced by nearly each one of us.  
 
The chapter culminates in a new luminosity of our guiding question. 
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 Part I. Exposing the barriers 
THE WORD ‘DEFINITION’ STEMS FROM THE LATIN FORM DEFINIRE, WHICH MEANS 
‘to bring to an end’, ‘to determine the boundaries of’, and ‘to restrict’. The 
danger of definitions, I claim, is that they can easily bring the questioning 
process to an end, and that they are believed to be the only ‘truth’ conceivable. If 
that happens, a barrier is erected between the one who defines and the one who is 
being defined. Open-ended communion that permits either side to inform the 
other becomes more difficult and will be, at worst, fully interrupted. 
 
Defining Life 
What is life? 
To avoid confusion from the start: The ambition here will not and cannot 
be to answer this question once and for all. The question is invoked for the sole 
purpose of establishing a common platform from which to study and evaluate 
varying answers to that question. 
The philosopher Angelika Krebs (2000:67ff.) points out correctly that the 
term ‘life’ is central to the moral tradition of Western thinking. She suggests that 
its central position bespeaks the importance of carefully pondering its 
connotations. Let us follow her suggestion. 
What is life? 
Krebs herself suggests that living beings be described functionally, on par 
with such machines as thermostats or chess computers, as most living beings do 
not pursue practical ends. She hypothesizes that it is not unlikely that a machine 
can be built which fulfills what to Krebs are the four basic components of life: 
metabolism, reproduction, mutation, and sensitivity. However, such a machine 
being – a machine –, Krebs would not consider it to be alive23. She suggests 
therefore that next to a biological definition of life, there be another, a lifeworldly 
                                                          
23 Unfortunately, Krebs does not elaborate on why she would not do so. She merely presumes that this 
verdict would be commonly agreed upon by all sides. If, however, it is not commonly agreed upon, then 
her subsequent introduction of a second definition of ‘life’ becomes superfluous. 
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 definition of life. Krebs thinks this definition is necessary because the former 
biological one is unable to account for a qualitative leap in nature (2000:77). 
What she means by that becomes clearer when we look at how she qualifies her 
lifeworldly definition of life: She links it to the attribute of perception, or 
sensing. It is with sensing, according to Krebs, that the first essential leap in 
nature beyond mere functional organization can be recorded. It is a leap from 
functional nature that lacks all forms of perception or sensing to life with an 
inside perspective. Picking a flower, Krebs says, would not kill it (per definition) 
– it never lived in the first place. ‘Lower’ animals would not be killed, either.  
They would be “destroyed” (Ibid.:78). Irrecoverable coma patients would be 
“destroyed”, too, not killed. As would fetuses early on during a woman’s 
pregnancy (Ibid.). 
Dietmar v.d. Pfordten claims that biologists find it relatively simple to 
distinguish between living and nonliving bodies. His claim leans on these two 
definitions of life: 
 
1. Living beings are those bodies of nature that possess nucleic acids and proteins, and that are 
capable of synthesizing such molecules themselves. 
2. Living systems are such that are able to actively maintain their state of a high order in a milieu of 
a low degree of organization, and to replicate. (2000; own translation) 
 
The criticism that none of the preceding definitions can refute is the same one 
which has already been drawn upon to reject the concentric project in ecological 
ethics: arbitrariness. Krebs cannot account for why it is this leap from 
‘functional organization’ to ‘sensing’ that ought to be the deciding factor of 
‘life’, and consequently, of ethical considerability. What about v.d. Pfordten’s 
first definition? Most people in our culture, myself included, would agree that 
trees are alive. This general agreement is founded on little more than a shared 
intuition, an intuition that is nourished by our preconceptual, everyday 
involvement with actual trees. The intuition, however, runs into trouble when it is 
confronted with the expert definition of life (‘those bodies of nature that possess 
and synthesize nucleic acids and proteins’): 
‘Is everything about trees alive?’, the definition seems to whisper 
seductively, only to hiss triumphantly: 
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 ‘It is not. A mere thin layer of living tissue (synthesizing nucleic acids and 
proteins) enwraps an ever-thickening carcass of dead hardwood (synthesizing 
nothing), clinging to it for support and protection as it sprouts into the heights, 
withstanding the hardships of winter that force most woodless plants 
underground and into their roots, to await the thaw and blossoming as spring 
begins to rub its sleepy eyes. On the outside, too, this thin layer of life is shielded 
by essentially dead bark.’ 
If we combined this definition of life with the observation that there are 
parts of the tree which quite obviously are dead, we would be forced to say that 
in reality, a tree is not simply alive, but it is more exactly an assembly of three 
neatly defined parts. We would be forced to say that in reality, trees are actually 
dead-living-dead. But who would seriously do so – and end up believing in such 
a strict ontological divide? Who would do the same for vertebrates? All 
vertebrates share the trees’ principle, only in their cases we are used to calling it 
spine, not wood! For that matter: Who would do so for ourselves? Try to abstract 
the dead parts of your own body from the living parts. Obliterate the nails. 
Abstract the body hair, the beard, the lashes. Define away the teeth. Then try to 
believe in the sharp division between the remaining living parts and their dead 
counterparts. Is this in any way conceivable? 
The inadequacies of all preceding attempts to define life are most forcibly 
and most successfully exposed by James Lovelock. According to his Gaia 
Theory, our planet Earth’s atmosphere, oceans, climate, and its crust (upon which 
the continents move) are not simply a neatly defined ‘environment’ for life. They 
sooner constitute an inseparable part of the very process of life. Lovelock writes: 
 
The evolution of the rocks and the air and the evolution of the biota are not to be separated. … 
There is no clear distinction anywhere on the earth’s surface between living and non-living 
matter. There is merely a hierarchy of intensity going from the ‘material’ environment of the 
rocks and the atmosphere to the living cells. But at great depths below the surface, the effects of 
life’s presence fade. It may be that the core of our planet is unchanged by the presence of life, 
but it would be unwise to assume it. (1988:33-4; 40; emphasis mine) 
 
The intricate gravity of this core tenet of Gaia Theory, the well from which 
springs the strongest case against the definitions of life presented above, lies in 
the observation that between what we call living and what we call non-living, a 
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 continuum spans its streaming wings, an impossibly vast and dynamic hierarchy 
of intensity, engrossing rocks and cottonwood, tectonic plates and dragonflies 
alike, seeping into Gaia’s every filament the way specter-gray wafts of mist 
saturate dewy autumn lowlands. This tree that we have such difficulties in 
defining into dead-living-dead – does it exist in an ontological vacuum? Can we 
define it without paying heed to the very structure of its life cycle, and to the very 
texture of its particular home? I remember a particular day early last summer. As 
I strolled through the forest by my cabin home, I came upon a particular birch. 
This particular birch that I was looking at right then had negotiated its terms of 
growth through an enduring intercourse with a moss-covered rock-formation that 
slumbered beside it. The rock-formation, in turn, had been split in half by one of 
the birch’s stronger root limbs. The chickadee chicks, nestled in a shelter of 
downs and twigs, close by the stem, high above the ground, craning their bare 
necks upwards with beaks gaping open, were as much part of this tree as was that 
line of ants that transpired from a moist hollow down by the ground. Its bark and 
tender branches showed that this tree fed the moose through harsh winters. It 
drew minerals from the soil. It was an active participant in the carbon cycle, and 
the oxygen cycle … What ontological aberrations would we ask of ourselves if 
we tried to define any of this away from the tree? Every attempt to define the tree 
effectively isolates what is organic and alive into a stiff abstraction. Every such 
abstraction effectively sets up a barrier between ourselves and the living earth. 
Every such barrier encapsulates us a little more, and a little more, in our solitary 
modes of hearing, and of speaking. 
 
As does Krebs, Arne Næss views life as a central term of our cultures. But he 
draws different conclusions from his view: 
 
Among […] enormous processes in time and space, one is nearest to us: the unfolding of life. 
Human beings who wish to attain a maximum perspective in the comprehension of their cosmic 
condition can scarcely refrain from a proud feeling of genuine participation in something 
immensely greater than their individual and social career. […] all life on earth as an integrated 
process, despite the steadily increasing diversity and complexity. The nature and limitation of 
this unity can be debated. Still, this is something basic: ‘Life is fundamentally one’.  
(1989:165-6). 
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 Næss’s view is in line with that of Lovelock. Like Lovelock, Næss actively 
rejects a narrow definition of this mysterious phenomenon, life. He uses it “in a 
more comprehensive non-technical way also to refer to what biologists classify 
as ‘non-living’: rivers (watersheds), landscapes, ecosystems.” To Næss, “slogans 
such as ‘let the river live’ illustrate this broader usage so common in many 
cultures.” (1986/2003:265). Such a broader usage of the term ‘life’ is of course 
incompatible with definitions such as the ones given above. And that is just its 
strength: It erects no barriers that hinder us from relating one aspect of the living 
continuum to another. It enables us, for example, to ask about the relationship 
between the occurrence of life on a planet and the movements of tectonic plates, 
as Lovelock has done.24 It also enables us to evoke this powerful metaphor of 
health that Næss has evoked in the latter quote (‘let the river live’), and that 
Lovelock, incidentally, has recently come to evoke on a planetary scale as well 
(‘Gaia has fever’). The metaphor is powerful for two reasons. First, as we 
mentioned in the previous chapter, health and healing share their etymological 
origin with the word whole. Far from being a romantic stereotype, the metaphor 
of health helps us ask more accurately about life as a whole, and about our own 
relationship to this whole. Second, the metaphor is powerful for a very pragmatic 
reason: It can be easily related to. Both Næss and Lovelock recognize that our 
ability to relate is a very direct and very decisive factor to be reckoned with. 
 
Defining Humanness 
This section argues that confusing the world of humans with – the world – is an 
ontological dead-end. But such confusion is just what happens when we allow 
definitions to overpower us. 
 
What are humans? 
Let us be on our guard again: We will not and cannot attempt to give a single, 
comprehensive answer to the problem. The question serves a single purpose: to 
                                                          
24 Interestingly, this phenomenon has not been observed on any other planet besides our Earth 
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 create a point of reference from which to view, and to evaluate, a number of 
different answers. 
 
Some answers 
The attempts to define humanness are uncounted, and they are neither restricted 
to ecological ethics nor to philosophy in general. So let us begin simply by listing 
a few different answers to the same question. 
Sigmund Freud, in a letter to Albert Einstein, tries to give an answer: 
“Conflicts of interest among humans are principally decided through the use of 
violence. This applies to the entire animal kingdom, of which man should not 
exclude himself; humans, however, add to this conflicts of opinion that reach to 
the highest heights of abstraction and that seem to demand another technique of 
decision-making.” (1932/2005:27; own translation & emphasis added). Helmut 
Mayer, in an article discussing bio-social access to autobiographical memory, 
tries: “It is true that we share simple forms of memory with animals, but the 
episodical-autobiographical memory ought to count among the things 
constitutive of an accelerated cultural evolution typical of humans.” (2006; own 
translation) Political commentator Theo Sommer navigates the fairway of H.G. 
Wells and gives it a go: “‘Our speculations about the future and all political 
guesswork are mere burlesque’, said Frederick the Great. Experience teaches that 
he is right. But man cannot help to live in foresight. This above all separates him 
from animals: he tries forever to anticipate, to predict, why – presumptuously 
enough –, to plan, the shape of things to come (H.G. Wells).” (2008; own 
translation) It is not uncommon to view the use of technology as the decisive 
defining factor for what it means to be human in contrast to others. Thus, Hal 
Wilhite says that “the defining element of becoming human is when we use 
technologies.” (2006) Martin Gorke defines humans against others with regard to 
morals: “Although some mammals (i.e., dolphins) show behavior astonishingly 
analogous to morals, it is generally accepted that only humans act morally, and 
that therefore only humans can be moral agents. For only with humans we may 
assume the necessary ability to reflect their actions, and at least a partial freedom 
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 of will.“ (1999:119; own translation) This latter definition is a favorite among 
philosophers, shared, for example, by Holmes Rolston and Thomas Seiler. 
Rolston writes: “[H]umans are the only valuators who can reflect about what is 
going on at this global scale, who can deliberate about what they ought to do 
conserving it. When humans do this, they must set up the scales; and humans are 
the measurers of things. Animals, organisms, species, ecosystems, Earth, cannot 
teach us how to do this evaluating. But they can display what it is that is to be 
valued.“ (2003:153). Seiler drills his definition of humanness into the same 
notch: “What appears especially significant is that man is the only living being 
who is able to reflect the miracle of existence, the genesis and being of the 
universe and the process of life on Earth, and who is able to position himself 
morally.” (2000:184; own translation) There are also ways of defining 
humanness indirectly through a close definition of other concepts, such as culture 
or personhood. Clifford Geertz coined a classical definition of culture as a 
semiotic concept in which man is “an animal suspended in webs of significance 
he himself has spun,” which means that Geertz takes “culture to be those webs, 
and the analysis of it to be therefore […] an interpretive [science] in search of 
meaning.” (1973:5). A second definition of culture by Daniel Bell, different 
though it may be, has a similar effect: “[Culture is] a sum of society’s symbolic 
ways to answer the persistent questions of humanity.” (cf. Witoszek 2007). Both 
definitions declare culture to be the exclusive province of human affairs. The 
final example on our list comes from Michael Esfeld, specialist in the discipline 
philosophy of nature. Esfeld defines humans indirectly via defining animals: 
“Animals are not persons. They form no thoughts with a particular conceptional 
content, and they do not act – they do not develop self-conscious intentions, nor 
are their actions something that they can be accounted for. Hence, although 
animals have no intentional disposition, they are very well in emotional states, 
and they possess interest. Most of all, animals are capable of suffering.” 
(2002:137; own translation)25 
 
                                                          
25 Cf. Jon Wetlesen (1999) for a similar definition. 
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 What happens when definitions encounter the world 
Even though we have not yet looked at any of the above definitions more closely, 
one thing will have become obvious already: there are just so many of them. But 
let us remember that ‘to define’ means ‘to bring to an end’, or ‘to determine the 
boundaries of’: Is there not a paradox here? How can each author claim to 
determine the boundaries of humanness when those boundaries are clearly as 
diverse as the number of authors themselves? How, in other words, can any of 
these definitions raise a claim to universal validity, why, to truth, when each 
picks out a different aspect and stakes its entire view of humans and their 
relationship to the world on their own, isolated model? Even before we have 
looked at some of the definitions more closely, the main problem they all share 
becomes obvious: Each of them artificially erects walls around what is ever-
shifting, and what is radically continuous with the world. 
 
Our observation only grows stronger when we invite some of these definitions to 
encounter the living world. 
Take the last definition on our list, for example. The view that personhood 
is the defining element of humanness is being frequently falsified by behavior 
biologists. Thus, the Department of Behavioural Biology at the University of 
Vienna presents itself to the online community with the words: 
 
A place where it has been shown that fish listen and speak, that birds think, have specific 
character types from hatch on, and their hearts throb in the presence of loved ones, that guinea 
pigs choose mates carefully to get along with stress in their lives, ground squirrels and hamsters 
organize development hibernation and reproduction to fit in! (to the environment), [and] 
primates use sexuality to organize their social lives …26 
 
An exemplary case of the institute’s recent studies involves the social behavior of 
ravens (Corvus corax). This study of Bygnar et al. (2007) could not have been 
pursued had the team not departed from the basic assumption that “[c]omplex 
social behavior builds on the mutual judgment of individuals as cooperation 
partners and competitors” (2007:1). This, of course, opposes starkly to Esfeld’s 
definition of personhood. Bygnar et al studied the ravens’ social behavior in 
                                                          
26 cf. http://www.behaviour. univie.ac.at/ 
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 hiding both food and inedible objects. They found that ravens, these most 
widespread birds of our planet, rapidly learned to distinguish between situations 
when a formerly unknown individual was acting competitively, and when it was 
acting cooperatively. Ravens were observed allowing humans to pilfer from them 
when they were hiding inedibles, but clearly avoiding all interactions when they 
were caching food. Bygnar et al. argue that this difference in behavior suggests 
that the caching of objects is “a form of social play, providing birds with an 
opportunity to learn about others’ responses … without the costs of potentially 
losing valuable food.” (Ibid.) At times the birds even placed object caches near 
the experimenters, an act likely to test these potential competitors’ form of 
intervention. Furthermore, their play with hiding inedible objects directly 
influenced their hiding of edibles: “ravens proactively used the acquired 
information about the others’ pilfering behaviour to modify their caching 
behavior in the food context only.” (Ibid.) In essence, the authors argue that 
being able to predict others’ behavior is one key element of recurrent social 
interaction, providing as it does “the basis for any form of cooperation, 
competition, and culture in human and nonhuman societies.” 
 
The last citation rattles at the bars of another favorite definition of humanness – 
culture, this heavily laden and heavily contested word-tumbrel. The way Bygnar 
et al. use it here is incompatible with the definitions that Geertz and Bell gave of 
the word. Quite clearly, the biologists indicate that man is not the only animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. Quite clearly, ‘culture’ 
here does not denote exclusively a society’s symbolic ways to answer humanity’s 
persistent questions. Yet while the natural sciences, too, continue to struggle with 
a clear definition of culture (cf. Laland & Hoppit 2003), evidence that other 
species have culture cannot be denied. One of the most compelling stories about 
animal cultures can be told of humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae), who 
are known in Hawaii also as great winged angels. Male humpback whales, 
spread across entire ocean basins, are known to all share the same song at any 
one time (cf. Rendell and Whitehead 2001:312). This song is not static but 
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 changes throughout the season. While humpback whales singing in Bermuda 
were observed to change 37 per cent of their song every season, and after a 
period of 15 years, the entire song had changed (cf. Payne & Payne 1985), other 
humpback whales off the Australian east coast were observed to change their 
entire song after only two seasons to match that of humpbacks from the west 
coast. Noad, Michael J. et al. (2001:537) ascribe this to the migration of a few 
‘foreign’ individuals to the east. According to the authors, such revolutionary 
changes are unprecedented in animals’ cultural vocal traditions, which suggests 
that novelty might be a driving stimulant in the great winged angels’ songs. 
When we hold this example of an animal culture against Geertz’s or Bell’s 
definition, the arbitrariness and the serious inadequacies of their definitions 
becomes evident. 
The same accounts for a second example of an animal culture, a culture, in 
fact, that has recently become seriously threatened: elephant culture. Before 
man’s intrusion, elephants were accustomed to rearing their young in an intricate 
web of extended family that allowed them to become slowly acculturated into 
elephant societies. Elephant societies, similar to those of wild boars or killer 
whales, are organized around an experienced matriarch and a number of other 
older female caretakers. Decades of poaching, culls, and habitat loss have 
seriously disrupted these supportive strata, leaving them nearly fully 
disintegrated. The effects of this social breakdown are now rapidly accumulating. 
Incidences of elephant aggression include literally hundreds of encounters with 
humans that ended fatally for humans in the Indian states Jharkhand and Assam 
between the years 2000 and 2006; rapings and killings of rhinoceroses, 
unprecedented in their number, in Pilanesberg National Park and the Hluhluwe-
Umfolozi Game Reserve in South Africa since the early 1990's; and up to 90 per 
cent of male elephants deaths now attributable to other male elephants in Addo 
Elephant National Park in South Africa, a number that only gains significance 
when compared to an average rate of 6 per cent of such casualties in more stable 
elephant communities (cf. Siebert 2006). Bradshaw et al. (2005:807) have taken 
up these developments to suggest that today’s elephants are experiencing a form 
 
 
63
 of species-wide trauma. With trauma, the psychologists write, “an enduring right-
brain dysfunction can develop, creating a vulnerability to PTSD [post-traumatic 
stress disorder] and a predisposition to violence in adulthood.” (Ibid.)27 These 
incidences, brief though their presentation here can be, show how very little we 
know. The reality of these developments ought to caution us against any attempt 
to define culture as the exclusive cradle and playground of humans. 
Summing up their own discussion of culture, Laland and Hoppit hit the 
nail on the head: “Culture is as rare or as common among animals as it is defined 
to be.” (2006:151) 
 
Tuning in on just one more of the definitions – that of technology as the 
determining factor of humanness –, we find a bounty of instances that weaken 
the definition, and we need merely to list a few of them to show how arbitrary the 
definition is: Otters are known for their mastery of using tools, such as rocks, to 
loosen shells from the ground, and to crack them open subsequently on the water 
surface. Using comparable gear under quite incomparable circumstances, 
Egyptian vultures have a habit of dropping stones onto ostrich eggs, whose shells 
would be too strong for the birds to crack otherwise. Chimpanzees even prepare 
their own tools, breaking off branches, stripping them off twigs and leaves, 
before they carry them to a termite burrow, poke them in, and pull out an 
exquisite treat of termites-on-a-stick, ready to be relished. There are crabs that 
pick up anemones which sting when disturbed and hold them in their claws to 
fend off aggressors (there are people who ward off pickpockets with umbrellas in 
a likewise fashion), or that hold them so close to their exoskeletons that the 
anemones attach themselves and form a protective armor (mosquito spray serves 
an analogous purpose for anglers). Green-backed herons use bait to attract fish. 
The list continues.28 The definition disbands. Leaving what? Startled termites 
and filled stomachs. If only we let them.29 
                                                          
27 Originally, the term PTSD was used by psychologists to describe traumatic experiences among humans 
alone, such as those of post-war children. 
28 cf. Griffin 1992:117ff. 
29 This could of course lead to a more rigid distinction between technology on the one hand, and tools on 
the other. But this could not solve the actual problem – arbitrariness. It would only relocate it. 
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 Acts of defining are barriers to relationship 
The single-most critical problem that these preceding pages have uncovered is 
this: The practice of definition acts as a barrier to experiencing relationship. 
Only humans can form intentional thoughts? Well, then the ravens’ ability 
to observe feeding competitors and to adapt their own behavior accordingly 
really must be an illusion. Culture is an exclusive human domain? Well, then the 
changing songs of the great winged angels must be a terrific coincidence. And 
why, the rapings of rhinoceroses and the deaths of hundreds of Indians by 
confused and violent elephants must be – well, perhaps – a rotten vintage? 
Having previously defined elephants into categories such as ‘raw material’ or 
‘trophy’, we not only denied them the possibility to continue to live in their 
inconceivable yet adjacent otherness. We also denied ourselves the chance to 
relate to this otherness, and to attune our concepts in a living exchange. The 
elephants have now begun to cry out: Listen to us!30 
What all those definitions cause us to oversee is that just as there is an 
unbroken continuum going from nonliving to living and back, there is no radical 
discontinuity between humans and the more-than-human world, either. A 
growing number of influential writers and scholars from a variety of disciplines 
and backgrounds now expresses this view in their work. Some have already been 
mentioned. Others include such prominent figures as biologist and Nobel-
laureate Barbara McClintock, poet and small-scale farmer Wendell Berry, 
theologian Anna L. Peterson, novelist Barbara Kingsolver, philosopher Neil 
Evernden, writer and activist Derrick Jensen, or the sociologist Ulrich Beck, to 
name but a few. John R. Searle (1995) condenses the view these people share 
into a formula that would seem to be too obvious to be worth the repetition: We 
live in exactly one world, not five or nine or seventeen. And all subdivisions we 
make through this one world must remain provisional. 
Neither of these thinkers denies that there will always be differences. 
Their importance lies elsewhere. They all invite us to also pay close heed to the 
                                                          
30 Some will be inclined to protest at this point and accuse me of anthropomorphizing. I answer by 
referring them to the further development of this thesis, especially to the argument I develop in The 
Poetry of Leisure. 
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 many overlapping continuities and exchanges. We will not find it hard to hear 
these exchanges. We only need to listen. 
 
Listening is the key here. Because it is just what is being most strongly 
compromised in isolated acts of defining. In being defined, the living other – 
with its inexhaustible immersion into the land, the sea, and the sky, into the 
moods and stories and histories of the places it inhabits – becomes replaced by a 
model. This model, then, takes over our thinking. No longer do we experience the 
other as that other; no longer are we open to the very peculiar skills it has 
developed in its very peculiar place within Gaia. We know it only in relation to 
our preconceived model. Suddenly, the notion of ‘normal’ forms in our thinking. 
Suddenly, (awe-inspiring) difference turns into (pitiful) abnormality. And our 
position as the measurers of the one world is once more secured a little more. 
Listening withers. Conversing becomes shouting. And the symphony goes silent. 
 
A very subtle definition 
Before we move on to explore how to face isolated acts of defining in Part II of 
this chapter, let us linger with the problem just a little longer. For there is a very 
subtle way of defining humanness that has been given too little attention in the 
discourse of ecological ethics, despite its great frequency. 
 
Just how subtle this particular act of defining really is can be seen in the 
following quote, which is taken from the final paragraph of Anna L. Peterson’s 
Being Human (2001), a work that so forcibly and so successfully debunks the 
myth of an ontological dualism between humans and their living home: “Our 
world is full of wounds, human and nonhuman. The point, however, is precisely 
that we are not alone in it. We are not alone because we are connected to the 
wounded. That is why we care about the wounds or even notice them in the first 
place.” (2001:239) The definition that takes place here is so subtle, and so 
common, that it will hardly raise suspicion. The literature abounds by its 
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 appearance. It appears frequently in Midgley’s Science and Poetry, a book 
similarly successful in debunking dualism, and further in making pellucid the 
tremendous appeal and influence of imaginative visions: “Individualism is 
bankrupt of suggestions for dealing with … non-human entities.“ (2001:257) 
This act of definition can be found in the deep ecology platform: “Richness and 
diversity of life forms are values in themselves and contribute to the flourishing 
of human and nonhuman life on earth.” (Næss & Sessions 1999:8). This 
formulation is as common in the wider discourse of ecological ethics as it is in 
other disciplines and outside of academia. 
In each of these instances, a definition is being set up of a dualistic 
ontology in which humans stand on one side, and all the rest – so-called “non-
humans” – stand on the other side.31 This very subtle linguistic act of defining is 
often diametrically opposed to the intention of the statement. On the one hand, 
the above quotes proactively debunk dualism. On the other hand, they covertly 
uphold what they are overtly discrediting. In this way, these authors create an 
inadvertent and unnecessary internal dilemma, a paradox between content and 
form whose undermining effect, inconspicuous and gradual though it may be, is 
real. This quote by Stephan Harding cannot eschew the effect either: 
 
Arne Naess emphasizes the importance of such spontaneous experience. A key aspect of these 
experiences is the perception of gestalts, or networks of relationships. We see that there are no 
isolated objects, but that objects are nodes in a vast web of interconnections. When such deep 
experience occurs, we feel a strong sense of wide identification with what we are sensing. This 
identification involves a heightened sense of empathy and an expansion of our concern with  
non-human life.  
(www.resurgence.org/resurgence/185/harding185.htm; emphases added) 
 
It might be thought as an act of hypercritical polemics to single out slips of 
authors that quite clearly share a vision of a unified world with a multiplicity of 
different actors, voices, and purposes. But such polemicizing is not the intention 
here. The intention is to lend strength to one of the core arguments of this thesis: 
It matters how we speak. The transitions in our conversing are delicate, and they 
are gradual. All too easily do we quietly domesticate others into the scales and 
                                                          
31 I have compared this definition elsewhere (Mueller 2007) with the attempt to create a dualistic 
ontology based on the (quite ludicrous) distinction “mosquito – non-mosquito world”. 
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 visions of our own making. All too easily do we nourish the concentric, dualistic 
world view that many are working against. Neil Evernden is aware of this 
dilemma. And while he, too, upholds it unconsciously, let us try now to listen 
again to the essence of what he himself wrote into the following sentences: 
 
Once defined, the nonhuman other disappears into its new description: it is drawn into a 
symbolic system which orders and explains, interprets and assigns value. In short, the creation 
becomes ours as it is made ‘real’ by this assimilation. The wild other disappears the instant it is 
demystified and saved as a managed resource. (1992:131) 
 
And because humans cannot help but try to make sense of the one world by 
clothing it into words, suggestions have been made to overcome this very subtle 
act of coercion. David Abram’s (1996) suggestion to speak of a more-than-
human world has already quietly found its way into these pages. Anthony 
Weston (2006) writes of both human and other-than-human. James Lovelock 
makes the related suggestion “that theologians shared with scientists their 
wonderful word, ‘ineffable’; a word that expresses the thought that God is 
immanent but unknowable.” (Lovelock 2006:177; emphasis added) Finally, 
Evernden himself offers, next to the (very technical) term ultrahuman, the (far 
less technical) term wildness. Not to be confused with this myth of North 
American conservation jargon, wilderness, wildness “is the quality of this divine 
other, and it is wildness that is destroyed in the very act of ‘saving’ it. Wildness 
is not ‘ours’, indeed, it is the one thing that can never be ours. It is self-willed, 
independent, and indifferent to our dictates and judgments. An entity with the 
quality of wildness is its own, and no other’s. When domestication begins, 
wildness ends.” (Ibid:120) 
‘When definition begins’, we may add, ‘wildness ends.’ 
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 Part II. Breaking the barriers 
IT HAS BECOME APPARENT BY NOW THAT THE ACT OF DEFINING POSES A THREAT 
to continued asking. This has led, throughout the chapter, to a revaluing of 
skepticism. 
In his book by the same title, Scepticism, Arne Næss describes skepticism 
– or more specifically the Pyrrhonian skepticism of Sextus that Næss’s book 
interprets – with the words: 
 
[T]hose who claim that they have found at least one truth [are called Dogmatists], those who 
claim that truth cannot be found in any matter [are called Academians], and those who neither 
claim that they have found at least one truth nor claim to know that truth cannot be found, but 
persist in their seeking [are called Skeptics]. (1968:4)  
 
Næss describes the skeptic as a person who carries on seeking truths, and who 
tries to acquire knowledge through posing questions, but also as a person who by 
no means expects to find answers to her questions. The skeptic rather more 
tentatively “assumes” that she might find such answers, or that she will “at least 
[find] the possibility of getting answers” (1982:182). But to the (Næssian) 
skeptic, posing the questions is more important than finding the answers. 
It was such a skeptical stance that led us to provoke questions vis-à-vis 
received notions of what constitutes ‘life’ or ‘humanness’, and vis-à-vis some of 
the speaking practices that tend to accompany such notions. This skeptical stance 
has induced a careful but persistent hesitation towards assertions that may not 
always be intended to be isolating, but that often have just that effect through the 
way they are being used. In cautiously rejecting such formulations as ‘there are x 
constituents to life’, or ‘man is the only animal that x’, or ‘humans and non-
humans’, we simply wish to induce a watchful attitude that does not assert such 
formulations to be definitely true. Our skeptical attitude does not, in the first 
instance, wish to refute such claims once and for all. The more elemental 
incentive has been to carry the question marks back into our exchanges. It has 
been to add force to a principle argument of this thesis: 
There is merit in seeking. 
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 The divide between refuting a formulation and avoiding it in favor of continued 
seeking may be small, but it is by no means trivial. At no point throughout this 
chapter have we argued that acts of definitions ought to be completely avoided, 
even though we have come across several instances where such acts cause 
unforeseeable and even harmful effects. Acts of defining have been diagnosed as 
a treacherous disease, but their complete refutation has not been the intention. 
What we have worked towards is a more scrupulous, and more realistic, 
treatment for the disease. 
 
Wedding skepticism with acts of defining 
Whenever we speak, we make assertions about a certain state of affairs. Every 
speech act we utter raises a claim to a propositional truth. Every assertion stakes 
out a certain field within our boundless and fluid experiencing. Everything we 
say is, in this way, an act of defining. Such methodological reductionism is an 
epistemological tool that we cannot do without. It is often very useful. 
Sometimes it is indispensable. And we all make use of it. It only becomes 
hazardous when it turns quietly into ontological reductionism. When, in other 
words, the tentative outlining that our words undertake turns into a dogmatic 
doctrine. When we begin to take our words to be the direct and only ambassador 
of truth. When possibilities are denied that there might be other variants of truth. 
This is where skepticism comes in. It is this concession to the utter 
uncertainties of what we deem to be ‘true’, and to the temporary character of all 
our knowledge, which provides us with just the counterbalance we need to go on 
using definitions as an effective and benign epistemological tool. Skepticism 
wedded with acts of defining is just what we need to strengthen this inherently 
dynamic and creative process called ‘language’ – namely by allowing it to be just 
that: dynamic and creative. 
 
But let us go slowly and choose our words with care. Is there not a contradiction 
in these last two paragraphs? First we stated that every time we speak we commit 
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 an act of defining, only to add that language is inherently dynamic. Do these two 
observations not contradict one another? 
 
The newly-wed help us regain the vibrant balance of language 
Ferdinand de Saussure, who is commonly regarded as the architect of modern 
linguistics for his posthumously published Course de Linguistique Générale 
(1916/1964), has depicted language by distinguishing between langue and 
parole. For Saussure, langue describes a formalized system of phonetic, 
morphological, semantic, syntactical, and grammatical rules, while parole 
describes the act of speech itself. Saussure does not describe langue, this 
formalized system, as a static, unmoving mass, but rather as a dynamic web, an 
organic mesh in which every single part is related to all the rest. No sign within 
this moving whole ‘possesses’ any significance by itself. Rather, each sign only 
gains meaning through its ongoing contrasting with other signs. The word 
‘feeling’, for example, contrasts with phonetically similar words such as 
‘peeling’, ‘reeling’, ‘ceiling’, ‘falling’, or ‘fooling’, but it also contrasts with 
semantically related words such as ‘emotion’, ‘passion’, ‘anger’, ‘lust’, 
‘indifference’, or ‘apathy’. The same word also engages in a living exchange 
with more loosely participating words such as ‘numb’, ‘electric’, ‘song’, or 
‘reason’, each of which again forms a living node that bonds with other nodes in 
this shifting system, langue, and so on. The dynamic structure of langue is 
assured through its multicentric composition. 
Saussure teaches us that what appeared like a contradiction at first, is not 
really one at a second glance. It is very well possible to say that we commit at act 
of defining every time we speak and that our language is a dynamic process at 
the same time. We learn from Saussure that langue is a creative system which 
nevertheless has an inherent tendency to define (provisional) fields within the 
web. 
 
We can now come to see how this relates back to our decision to wed acts of 
defining with a skeptical stance. We will keep in mind that Saussure’s langue 
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 describes the strictly structural aspects of language. Langue is a creative system, 
a system that has a tendency to define provisional fields within its own web. We 
will now add that what we have called ‘acts of defining’ or ‘practice of 
definition’ throughout this chapter belongs to that other mode of language, to 
parole, or the performative aspect of language. 
Our criticism has not, in the first place, been directed at the words, insofar 
as they are signs within langue. It has sooner been directed at the concrete use of 
these words, hence, at parole. But we have also found out that the structure as a 
whole is not left untouched by this use. We have learned how parole and langue 
are complementary modes of a single dynamic stream, modes that constantly 
influence one another. We have seen that where acts of definition prevail, they 
will also impact the structure of language: The more we define, the more rigid 
our language will become. The more rigid our language is, the more 
impoverished our perceptions will be. And the more impoverished our 
perceptions are, the less informed our actions can be. 
So, finally, to draw a skeptical stance into this dance simply means to 
create a counterweight. With skepticism as our ally, we find that we have 
regained a vibrant balance: No longer does the vitalizing pair of creative and 
defining tendencies reside in langue alone. It has now come to dwell in parole as 
well. 
 
 
THIS MAY LOOK LIKE AN INCONSPICUOUS MOVE. BUT IT MAY TURN OUT TO BE 
able to give great force to our journey as a whole. For we have now created a 
brisk tension, and one that touches the whole of language, not just either of its 
modes. 
If we were to name this tension, what would we call it? Let us find a 
simple and clear name. A telling name. Let us call this promising tension 
relational language. 
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 Relational Language 
What is relational language? 
Some might consider this bad news, so we will come forth with it right 
away: There can be no paradigmatic relational language. Still we cannot help but 
ask again: 
What is relational language? 
The most basic aspect of relational language will have become clear even 
before we introduced it under this tentative name: Relational language is not 
simply an opposing force to definitions. It cannot be. The two inhabit wholly 
distinct strata. The previous section ought to have shown that definitions are one 
subordinate mode of the superordinate relational language, a partial mode woven 
into a fluctuating overall fabric. Relational language is the arena where skepti-
cism loosens the deadlock-strategy of defining and mobilizes its energies for an 
indefinite attuning to the world. 
 
Relational language is less a thing than it is a style. As such, it cannot be nearly 
as effectively described as it can be practiced. So I will try to keep the 
descriptions here at a minimum and ask the reader rather to acknowledge that this 
thesis in its entirety and on all levels is an ongoing search for what relational 
language can be. And it being a search, I will further ask the reader to take none 
of the ‘answers’ as definite or final. They are merely my provisional 
understanding at this point of time, and at this place. 
 
Relational language orbits watchfully around the relational unity of being. Along 
its path, it tries to clothe areas of the more-than-human world with provisional 
names, in an unending hermeneutical spiral of viewing and reviewing a problem. 
It draws nearer contextual meanings through a continued exchange between the 
questioner and the questioned. In this way, relational language tentatively maps 
out horizons. It does so tentatively because in the relational field of being that the 
one world is, the mapping out never stops. It is a mapping out because even 
though it is we who draw the maps, we must orient ourselves by the outlines of 
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 the horizons we are bounded by. Finally, it is horizons we map out tentatively 
because as humans we are always restricted by the horizons of our own ability to 
experience the world. Like the rolling seashore washes up the beach, patiently 
grinding rocks to pebbles, setting about change in the landscape with slow 
persistence, we may continue to run up against these horizons. Which is just what 
I decided to do when I first set sail, and which is just what I am going to do for 
the remainder of this journey. What use has this? It lets us become aware that 
there are boundaries. Furthermore, we may foster a sensitivity for their 
topography – our orientation will be enriched through our deepened awareness 
and sensitivity. We will begin to sense the permeability of our horizons. For 
horizons are no definite borders. My horizon moves as I move, shifting my vision 
ever so slightly as I continue to immerse myself in the terrain through which I 
journey. 
But does relational language only lead us into arbitrariness again, this 
stalwart ally of definitions? 
The contrary is more likely: That it prepares us against arbitrariness. By 
constantly running up against our own horizons, we are setting them in motion. 
Yet never will we bring about their full dissolution. We will refine our sensing. 
We will sharpen our wit. Ultimately, we will be better prepared to orient 
ourselves in the relational field of being of the one living world, of Gaia. 
Relational language arouses a vivid way of speaking that is as much a vivid way 
of thinking. It stirs forms of speaking that are as much informed by listening to 
human words as they are by listening to the land, the rivers, the mountains, and 
to the inscrutable cadences of all their inhabitants. We mentioned this earlier: 
Listening is the key here. 
 
Let us eavesdrop only on a single instance in literature where such relational 
language is being practiced, and on the controversy that this oft-quoted text has 
stirred. Now that we have been given this phrase to taste, relational language, – 
now that we sense the weak pull of that little center of gravity hitherto inactive – 
we will not find it difficult to side with one of the two camps of the controversy. 
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 The text we are speaking about is Aldo Leopold’s essay Thinking like a 
Mountain from his beautiful book A Sand County Almanac. In the essay, Leopold 
recalls an episode when he, working as a so-called ‘game manager’, shot and 
killed a wolf. He writes: “[T]here was something new to me in those eyes, 
something known only to her and to the mountain. I thought that because fewer 
wolves meant more deer, that no wolves would mean hunter's paradise. But after 
seeing the green fire die, I sensed that neither the wolf nor the mountain agreed 
with such a view.” (1949/2005:130) It is the very name of Leopold’s essay that 
has caused the controversy. What does it mean to think like a mountain, exactly? 
What does Leopold mean when he says the mountain disagreed with the death of 
the wolf? 
The first camp has decided simply to dismiss such talk because of its 
alleged impreciseness. Philosopher Richard A. Watson writes: “What would it be 
[…] to think like a mountain, as Aldo Leopold is said to have recommended? It 
would be anthropocentric [sic]32 because mountains do not think, but also 
because mountains are imagined to be thinking about which human interests in 
their preservation or development they prefer.” (1983/1999:117). 
But the other camp finds that such analytical rigidity does no justice to the 
full scope of meaning carried in Leopold’s words. The alleged impreciseness is 
rather the recognition that different contexts require different levels of 
preciseness. Leopold does not actually suggest that a mountain can think in 
human terms, nor that he himself is able to think like a mountain. The ecologist 
and teacher of Gaian science, Stephan Harding, sees this clearly. In the following 
quote, Harding smiles away the clouds of analytical inflexibility that block 
Leopold’s luminous words. In doing so, Harding stumbles upon relational 
language: “Clearly, [Leopold] used the word ‘mountain’ as shorthand for the 
wild ecosystem in which the incident took place, for the ecosystem as an entirety, 
as a living presence with its deer, its wolves and other animals, its clouds, soils 
and streams.” (2006:43) 
                                                          
32 It is likely that Watson actually meant to say ‘anthropomorphic’, not ‘anthropocentric’. 
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 What does it mean to think like a mountain, exactly? Why not ask 
Leopold himself what he means by that in this particular case? 
 
Since then I have lived to see state after state extirpate its wolves. I have watched the face of 
many a newly wolfless mountain, and seen the south-facing slopes wrinkle with a maze of deer 
trails. I have seen every edible bush and seedling browsed, first to anaemic desuetude, and then 
to death. I have seen every edible tree defoliated to the height of a saddlehorn. Such a mountain 
looks as if someone had given God a new pruning shears, and forbidden Him all other exercise. 
In the end the starved bones of the hoped-for deer herd, dead of its own too-much, bleach with 
the bones of the dead sage, or molder under the high-lined junipers. 
I now suspect that just as a deer herd lives in mortal fear of its wolves, so does a mountain live in 
mortal fear of its deer. And perhaps with better cause, for while a buck pulled down by wolves 
can be replaced in two or three years, a range pulled down by too many deer may frail of 
replacement in as many decades. (1949/2005:131-2) 
 
 
 
RELATIONAL LANGUAGE IS AS OLD AS IS ARISTOTLE’S OBSERVATION OF THE 
danger of definitions as barriers to relationship. It may not have been called just 
that. But what is more important, it was being enacted all the same. We just saw 
one such enactment. In the conversation that follows, we will see a few more. We 
will see that relational language use can be vastly liberating, and that it has the 
power to unleash us from our own confinement in a world of definition. This 
conversation will also locate our discussion of relational language use more 
precisely within our overall journey. 
We will speak about love. 
 
Defining Love? 
The pattern we use is familiar by now. We start by asking a straightforward 
question: 
What is love? 
Lacking sufficient material from the discourse of ecological ethics to 
confront this question, let us do what might be the most obvious thing: Let us 
consult a dictionary. What do we find? The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, authoritative voice in the philosophical landscape though it may be, 
has no entry on love. So let us do what might be the second most obvious thing: 
Consult a non-specialist dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary is the definite 
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 guide and guard of the English language. That’s something, at least. Then why 
not begin there? So, OED: What is love? 
 
[Love is] That disposition or state of feeling with regard to a person which (arising from 
recognition of attractive qualities, from instincts of natural relationship, or from sympathy) 
manifests itself in solicitude for the welfare of the object, and usually also in delight in his or her 
presence and desire for his or her approval; warm affection, attachment. ... 
[Love is] That feeling of attachment which is based upon difference of sex; the affection which 
subsists between lover and sweetheart and is the normal basis of marriage. ... 
 
These are but two of fifteen subcategories of love according to the dictionary. 
But can these answers satisfy us? Why not? 
No matter how many definitions of love we seek, or how long they are – 
they will not quench our thirst for a satisfactory answer. They do just the 
opposite: They are like salt water on our tongues, leaving us ailing, wanting. 
Thirsty. 
What is love? 
Emily Dickinson has asked the question, and her answer, austere though it 
may be, has the taste of freshness: “That Love is all there is / Is all we know of 
Love; / It is enough, the freight should be / Proportioned to the groove.” (poem 
1765; 1890/1960:714). The same freshness – albeit tinged in sorrow – flowed 
from another poet’s quill some two hundred and seventy-five years earlier: “For 
we, which now behold these present days, Have eyes to wonder, but lack tongues 
to praise,” wrote William Shakespeare in 1609 (Sonnet 106; 1999:129). Let us 
for a moment hold on to the taste of salt that still lingers on our tongues, and 
while we do, let us trace this new apprehension of freshness a little longer. Let us 
suppose that these poets were after something. Are we then to take to heart the 
counsel of yet another poet, Fyodor Tyutchev, who wrote: 
 
 
How can your heart itself express? 
Can others understand or guess 
exactly what life means to you? 
A thought you’ve spoken is untrue. 
You only cloud the streams you’ve stirred. 
Be fed by them. Don’t say a word.33 
 
                                                          
33 Tyutchev, Fyodor. Silentium! Translated from Russian by F. Jude. 
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 We know the problem by now. It is simple, and it is terrific: No attempt to define 
love can ever be successful. The only thing that logos is able to determine about 
love is that love cannot be determined: Love ‘is’ something that continually 
evades encroachment; love eludes every form of imprisonment; love corrodes all 
logical caging. Are we then to be satisfied with being fed only by our own 
silence, as Tyutchev suggests? A person can survive three weeks without being 
fed. A person can survive three days without drinking fresh water. We cannot 
help but ask again: 
What is love? 
Love penetrates religion. Albert Schweitzer, not only eminent for his 
ethics of the Reverence for Life, but also for his theological writings, writes of 
the historical Jesus: “Jesus introduced into the late Jewish Messianic expectation 
[of the end of the world and a supernatural Kingdom of God] the powerful idea 
... that we may come to know God and belong to him through love. Jesus is not 
interested in spiritualizing realistic ideas of the Kingdom of God and blessedness. 
But the spirituality that is the life of this religion of love purifies like a flame all 
ideas that come into contact with it. It is the destiny of Christianity to develop 
through a constant process of spiritualization.” (1933/1998:56. my italics) It is in 
this long tradition of the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth that Pope Benedict XVI 
interprets his own pontificate. In the first encyclical of his pontificate, published 
on Christmas 2005, Benedict XVI describes God as love: “Deus caritas est“. 
Love is strong in Buddhism, too. Love springs from compassion, this heart of 
Buddhist ethics. Buddhist compassion far exceeds mere emotion: Such 
compassion is a force in itself, anchored in experiencing shunya, the existential 
wholeness of all being, which according to Buddha was “not born, not made, not 
created” (Weber, Renée, in: Dalai Lama 1997:68; my translation). It is against 
this backdrop of existential compassion that the 14th Dalai Lama speaks of love. 
Love, the monk says, is “what you can also possess for someone who has done 
you harm” (1997:69)34. 
                                                          
34 It is impossible not to hear the conflict between China and Tibet, which so recently has been rekindled, 
in these words. It is perhaps fair to say that the Dalai Lama’s life-long practice of compassion towards the 
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 There is freshness in this. Still, and strangely, our thirst persists: 
What is love? 
Love lives in the Greek tragedies. Love roams in woods through changing 
seasons, breathing, seeing, writing, sucking the marrow out of life. Love dances 
with the daffodils; love grows in eternal lines to time; loves teaches us with her 
looks such art of eyes we never read in books. Love echoes throughout every 
ancient and modern art form – from the silent film to folk songs, from oral 
traditions to photography, from letters to inscriptions on rune stones. In fact, love 
echoes throughout every form of human expression. Love – together with life and 
with death – is central to all human endeavors. Grasping life and love and death 
are the eternal quests of mankind. Love flickers in the eyes of aged siblings at 
last reunited; love lets the graves of the deceased explode with colorful blossoms 
every spring; love covers these same graves with sprigs of fir at the eve of every 
winter. Love builds homes and hospitals; love hoisters flags on white, quivering 
flag pulls; love reverberates through the mountains as the echo of the wanderer’s 
song; love brushes the newborn infant’s auburn hair with trembling fingertips. 
Love rumbles in the stomach like an insatiable hunger; love is kept in jars and 
boxes and cupboards and envelopes to shelter it from time’s decay; love drips in 
thick, wet drops from the child’s crusted fingers onto the tower of a sand castle; 
love hums wordless tunes to the round belly in which life is once more 
rehearsing its greatest play; love lights lamps in creepy darkness to shine for the 
vagrant; love paints a single streak of yellow onto a brown, muddy canvas; love 
tends to the tomato plant seedlings in early summer; love waters the wilting 
plants in the oppressive August heat; love picks ripe, juicy fruits at the end of a 
prodigal summer. Love is sometimes called blindness, and sometimes called 
hatred … Love has uncountable names. And here is what is eerie about each of 
them: Each of love’s names is a full expression of love. Still, none may say fully 
just what love is. This inability to ‘say’ what love is has escorted children, 
women and men throughout the ages. But has it blemished their travels? Have 
their backs been crumbled by this impossible burden? Quite the opposite. Their 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Chinese, even in the face of the terrific cruelties they have been inflicting on his peoples, is the best 
illustration of his own words. 
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 inability to say what love is has not stopped generation after generation to 
embark on the grand adventure of seeking its essence. The evidently and 
inevitably tragic outcome of their quest has not hindered mankind’s children to 
engage on their Sisyphean task with the most awesome enthusiasm, time after 
time. The quest for love shatters every logical imprisonment, and every final 
definition: Its force is greater, its achievements dwarf the moralizing undertone 
of logos (“But you simply cannot do it!”). The old story has a tacit twist: Love 
says to Logos: “Let’s try to find out what Love is”. Logos replies: “But Love, we 
simply can’t.” To which Love says, with a philandering smirk: “Indeed – and that 
is why you and I will do it again, and again, and again!” This, in fact, is more 
than a comical episode, more than a faint smell filtered out of bypassing air 
currents by quivering hair inside our nostrils. This is the distilled essence of the 
fragrance we are after. Even though our logical formulae cannot ultimately split 
up this one world and herd its scattered remains into definite and isolating pens, 
we are bound to try to define. We are bound to try to make sense of the one 
world. But these definitions need not – and in fact often do not – stop us from 
continuing our search all the same. 
Love cannot be defined. Still, love ridicules the self-admiring dominance 
of logos with play: Logos becomes love’s tool, a toy in the hands of love. The 
perpetual play that unfolds between them is both of utter earnestness and of 
tender bravery. 
 
 
 
SHAKESPEARE ASKED: WHAT IS LOVE? SHAKESPEARE WAS PAINFULLY AWARE OF 
his inabilities to find a single, universal answer. Shakespeare composed as many 
as one hundred and fifty-four sonnets in the attempt. Even so. Where did he 
arrive, in the very end? Where could he arrive, but here: 
“I, my mistress’ thrall, Came there for cure, and this by that I prove: 
Love’s fire heats water, water cools not love.” 
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 Towards a new reading of the question at the base of the lantern 
Each attempt to define either life , humanness, or love, contains the threat that it 
might hinder us from further investigating, and worse still, that we may come to 
believe we really do inhabit these abstractions. Each such attempt potentially 
turns what was originally a tool into a dictator, overpowering and coercing that 
which is being defined as well as those who are defining it. This is not too strong 
a metaphor. ‘Dictation’, before its political connotations, primordially denotes an 
‘authoritative utterance or command’, but also an ‘arbitrary command’. 
Such dictators may then provide a seemingly rational soil on which to 
plant not only ontological distinctions between humans and ‘x’, or living and 
nonliving, but also moral distinctions. The concentric project of ecological ethics 
is spellbound by precisely this problem. We got a taste of how such silent 
definitions dictate their own translation into moral gradations in the first chapter, 
when we looked at some of the ongoing discussions regarding notions such as 
‘consciousness’ (cf. sentientists) or ‘interest’ (cf. biocentrists). Seen in light of 
this second chapter, however, such discussions lead us far astray, for they miss 
the essence of our problem: That in continuing to define ourselves as being 
essentially different from x, we continue to estrange ourselves from the breathing 
earth that spawns and envelopes each of our thoughts and sensations. The same 
holds true for the way in which our discourses tacitly buttress the dictatorship of 
definitions. It is blatantly dangerous to continue to speak of an ‘environment’ 
made up of ‘non-human’ ‘resources’, etc., and to think that all has been said. 
The conversation about love has opened up quite an extraordinary vista, 
though. We have seen that there are instances in the lives of each of us when we 
simply do not let our definitions stop us. No answer to the question what love is 
will ever be accepted as the one and only, especially not those answers that 
others have given. Regardless how many generations have given words and 
thoughts to love, we do not let them hinder us from continuing to ask anyway. 
No answer to the question what love is becomes our dictator. Every answer is but 
a playmate of the others. This is relational language incarnate. 
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 The question relevant for us then becomes: Can we channel this same 
attitude towards the question at the base of the lantern? 
Is it possible to speak about the way others experience in their own, 
particular ways? Thomas Nagel thinks it is not possible because we do not know 
what it is like to be them. Let us now add: 
But still we cannot help but ask, again and again – what it is like?  
Just like love cannot be suppressed, so our question cannot be silenced by 
Nagel’s answer. In asking, we caution ourselves against defining others into 
arbitrary categories of our own design. In asking, we continue to seek 
relationship with wildness, and to create a living and livable morality. In asking, 
we aspire to see our own lives enact a living communion with the one world and 
all its inhabitants. In asking, we enact relational language. 
 
It will not have gone unnoticed until now that two weighty terms of the guiding 
question – ‘others’ and ‘experience’ – have not yet been further specified in the 
course of the thesis. What does it mean to speak of others, exactly? And what 
can we possibly mean when we say that such others experience? Asking 
ourselves these questions is a fresh breeze that hugs the sail of our vessel. 
What I mean by ‘others’ exactly, I do not know. I simply wish to keep 
asking the question. In doing so, I wish to break free from a vicious circle that 
Evernden has so eloquently delineated: “Every question we ask, every solution 
we devise, bespeaks mastery, never mystery: they are incompatible. Yet 
wildness, otherness, is mystery incarnate.” (1992:121) Evernden goes an 
important step further even from this insight. He adds: “But perhaps even 
wildness is an inadequate term, for that essential core of otherness is inevitably 
nameless, and as such cannot be subsumed within our abstractions or made part 
of the domain of human willing.” (Ibid.) Rather than presenting a pre-digested 
definition of what I mean by the words, I wish to let myself be drawn into the 
questioning process itself. I wish to become immersed in uninterpreted events of 
creativity, events in which meaning is created in the process of the immersion 
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 itself. Events of creativity are opposed to events of destructivity. The latter deny 
immersion from the start. 
Arne Næss advocates that we identify with the more-than-human world, a 
world which he calls the greater Self. The echo of the need for such identification 
reverberates through ecological ethics until this day. In a way, I use otherness as 
a tentative opposite pole to identification. But my concern is not polar. I wish to 
let myself be enticed by a dynamic force-field in which both identification and 
otherness draw me into a moving nexus of relationship. 
With a multicentric vision of the one world, we simply cannot define 
otherness a priori. In the lifeworld of the magpie that liked to crown the spruce 
outside my cabin window before I set out on this journey, I was an other. In my 
own lifeworld, this magpie was an other. Both of us were others to a mouse who 
once discovered that my fridge had been thoughtlessly left ajar, and who had 
used a wooden ladle to climb in and out of a pot with leftover soup. We were all 
others to the lichen-covered rocks that languished ever so slowly atop shadowy 
marshes just north of the forest clearing where I lived. 
Otherness, just like identification, is not a universal category. Each is a 
vibrant presence that lingers in a particular place at a particular time, bidding us 
to attune our senses to its own rhythms. Each presence that we encounter – be it a 
ptarmigan that starts very suddenly from its boulder hideout as our heavy boots 
make the ground tremble, or a cloud that we watch being born from the emerald 
water of a glacier lake, or an adder that straitens itself up on the sun-soaked trail 
before us – arouses us in our bodily immersion, and bargains with us the precise 
sort of relationship that our encounter spins, now, here. Both identification and 
otherness are timbres of the same animated and improvised song. 
Again, we find that enactment gives a truer taste of the phenomenon than 
plain description. Freeman House, recalling a spontaneous encounter with 
salmon, writes: 
 
Each fish brought up from the deep carries with it implications of the Other, the great life of the 
sea that lies permanently beyond anyone’s feeble strivings to control or understand it. This is 
information received and stored in the body; it may or may not be available for mental 
deconstruction and articulation; it is reinforced by the memory of the muscles and nerves, which 
when one is on a boat are constantly working to maintain balance in response to the long, rolling 
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 swells of the ocean. True immersion in a system larger than oneself carries with it exposure to a 
vast complexity wherein joy and terror are complementary parts. Life and death are no longer 
opposite poles of individual existence but parts of a pattern so large that the only adequate 
response is surrender. (1999:70) 
 
Renée Askins has attained a strikingly similar attitude through her immersion 
with a young wolf, whom she called Natasha. 
 
For years I have tried to capture in words exactly how Natasha was different from my other 
animal words. The clearest description I can offer is that she had an essence of ‘other,’ rather 
than underling. I felt accompanied rather than ascendant. […] It is difficult to articulate how such 
a tiny being was capable of conveying such an independent presence, but it was distinctive and 
determinate in the nature of our relationship. […] One can feel one’s mind stretching to 
encompass and absorb the recognition, the idea of such a thing – of such an otherness. […] Her 
diminutive presence connects me, includes me, and I recognize that I am, like her, merely a pulse 
in the rhythm of the world. (2002:15) 
 
Both House and Askins engage in a book-long meditation about what this 
particular otherness that has drawn them into dialogue might mean. They ask 
how it can be spoken of. How it can be thought of. How the two are related. Both 
House and Askins seek understanding through continued asking; both remain 
wary of the enticing temptation to draw hasty conclusions. Both are an 
inspiration for this journey. The question at the base of the lantern simply opens 
up the possibility of thinking about others as experiencing in their own, 
particular ways. 
This might seem outrageous to a sentientist, to whom ‘experience’ is 
clearly defined by that other clearly defined notion, ‘consciousness’. But Mary 
Midgley has argued that consciousness, too, cannot possibly be defined by any 
specialist: 
 
Consciousness … is not just one more phenomenon. It is the scene of all phenomena … [It] is 
not one among a class of parallel instances as football is one among games. It is a term used to 
indicate the centre of the subjective aspect of life. Understanding such a word means relating that 
aspect fully to the other aspects. And this business of relating is ... inevitably an art rather than a 
science, though of course sciences can sometimes form a very important part of it. 
(2001:114/175; emphasis mine) 
 
In the same way, any attempt to define experience dissolves before the eyes. A 
promising way to grasp how experience can be understood is to look at its 
German equivalent, Erleben. Derived from the stem leben, Erleben simply links 
‘experiencing’ to ‘living’: In living, a living being experiences. Or, to put it 
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 differently: In experiencing, one lives. This is not an act of definition. It rather 
gives a good airing to the semantic scope of either term, opening vast 
possibilities for our relating to them. 
But is this sufficient? Is this not a tautological move? Does one not simply 
escape responsibility by framing one non-definable term (experience) through 
another (life)? Quite the contrary. To do so is the most responsible act we can 
commit: We become aware that it is impossible to take on such a stunningly 
large, diverse, and fluid part of the world – that which we call life; that which 
Lovelock calls Gaia – all by ourselves, or of handing it over to the razor-sharp 
blade of the specialist. Life experiences so many different facets that the attempt 
to shoulder all of them on our very small, very limited, very local flesh, would be 
devastating. 
 
The lantern tinkles on 
Our guiding question has not been left unaffected by the deliberations in this 
chapter. We can now rephrase it substantially: “Is it possible to bring our own 
layers of experience into consonance with the uncounted other layers of 
experience?” Mice experience. Fish experience. Trees experience. Humans 
experience. Algae experience. Life experiences. Gaia experiences. Each 
experiencing makes the one world vibrate in the tone pitch of its very own chord. 
Each strike of the chords chants a peculiar tune. Each tune is a single bar in the 
symphony of the one world. But to believe that a single tune could perform the 
entire symphony, is to fall deaf to its beauty. 
There are many silences environing us now. 
What can it mean to tune in to the symphony? 
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 Experiencing whales 
 
 
To see the Summer Sky / Is Poetry, though never in a Book it lie – / True Poems flee – 
 
- Emily Dickinson - 
 
 
 
THE WINDS AND THE LANTERN HAVE GUIDED MY VESSEL TOWARDS A CONCRETE 
communion. I have steered northwards. I have navigated beyond the Arctic 
Circle to traverse the unpredictable paths of a particular band of others. Swift and 
powerful creatures they are, black-and-white leviathans who spend their nomad 
lives off the Northern Norwegian coast. These enigmatic presences follow the 
great herring migrations throughout the sun’s cyclical progressions the way their 
ancestors have done for as long as human memory reaches back into the shadows 
of our shared history. 
 
Much have I spoken about direct experiencing. It was inevitable that at some 
point of this journey, I would have to leave these pages, and to throw myself into 
lived experiencing itself. At this junction of my voyage, what began as an 
allegory is metamorphosing into the lived chronicle of my sojourn in the home of 
killer whales, who are known to locals as bacon-tearers35. 
                                                          
35 The Norwegian word ‘spekkhogger’ has its origin in a long-standing acquaintance with the creature: 
people observed that the whales sometimes ripped out large chunks of flesh from the hides of seals or 
other whales. Such observations have also informed the English name. The name does not imply that 
killer whales are the bloodthirsty ‘killers’ that a melodramatic reading of the word might imply. Killer 
whales are known as such simply because they have been observed to kill other whales as prey. 
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 Part I. Looking 
IN THE DEEP OF NIGHT, SHELTERED FROM THE HOWLING BLASTS OF A 
southwestern gale that drove in from the open ocean, sensing air currents sigh 
chilly stories through the wooden cabin walls, in a faraway land, on a faraway 
island – my body awoke from its recent petrifaction. The stiffness that had 
gnawed itself into my flesh and bones let go quietly. My lungs breathed 
rhythmically again. In. Out. In. Out. Blood pounded in my ears. Blood returned 
to the capillaries in my fingertips. Made them tickle. My eyes sought firmness. 
They could not withdraw their stare from a knot-hole on the cabin ceiling. My 
stomach still knew the turbulences of the crossing. The final passage to the 
islands to which I had come to commune with killer whales had been a 
maddening ride through troubled waters. The iron-boat had thrown its massive 
body into whirling towers of waves. It had been hurtled about by gusts like a toy. 
The hull had creaked and moaned achingly. I had been a crumb in its belly. 
Helpless, irrelevant. 
But I had arrived. I had arrived on these islands amidst a furious sea. 
And as I was lying inside my cabin, comfortably covered by a duvet that 
safeguarded the warmth that my body produced, drifting slowly into sleep while 
the storm continued to toil the night outside, I tried to imagine what it must be 
like. Out there. For whale. 
 
Encounter 
It first happened a few days later. Our Zodiac rubber boat was steering out into 
the drowsy tranquility of Vestfjord, this vast and deep stretch of water that 
separates Lofoten from the mainland of Northern Norway. The fjord bore no 
semblance to the William Turner-kind of greeting it had given me upon my 
nocturnal arrival. The day was crystal clear. Few clouds dotted the sky. The 
mountains glared pink and pastel blue in the arctic light. As we were steering 
further out into the fjord, Lofoten shone in the West like a pallid band, a necklace 
of rugged snow piles strewn into the ocean by the hands of a giant. 
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 The first we saw of the killer whales were their blows. We approached 
slowly and turned off our engine. Then, suddenly, a large male broke away from 
the group, his back fin splitting the water as he dove. Even my untried eyes saw 
that he swam very swiftly. He came right towards us. Just before it would be too 
late to dodge collision, he sounded. As he flashed past us underneath the boat, the 
white of his eye patches shone light-blue through the shallow coat of water above 
him. He surfaced a few boat lengths away, sounded again, and disappeared in the 
distance … 
 
Another encounter 
It happened again. Heading away from Henningsvær, this archipelago at the foot 
of precipitous mountains which we called our home and base, and steering 
eastward into Vestfjord, we stopped for several look-arounds, scanning the 
horizon for disturbances on the water that might have indicated the presence of 
whales. During our first stop we caught no signs. The sea was glowing with 
placid calm. On we rode, and soon we stopped again to have another look. There 
was the hunch of a fountain rising from the water just below the horizon in the 
south-east. Then it was gone again. Eyes strained, fixed on a spot amidst a 
spotless vastness, we waited. The fountain rose again. Other fountains joined in. 
The day was crisp and clear. White sunlight radiated out of an unbroken cobalt 
sky. The rays struck the fountains and illuminated them momentarily. Even from 
this large distance we knew that the killer whales were keeping to the surface. 
We approached them slowly, then turned off the engine. The whales showed no 
signs of unease. They moved constantly, but they were not traveling. They kept 
to the same area, and at times they came within close proximity of our boat. They 
did not directly approach us, but neither did they shy away from us. Our leader 
recognized the group. She knew it had been in the area off and on for at least ten 
days and nights now … 
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 Yet another encounter 
It is comforting not to know which encounter will be your last. When it 
happened, I had not the slightest idea. As we rode swiftly across the fjord in our 
rubber boat, abreast with the water itself, shaken by too many cement crests to 
count, I shrank and shrank until I became a dwarf. I sensed in my limbs the 
proximity of the sky as gravity wedged my body between the heavy air and the 
heavier sea. My back hunched as Earth spread out her roundness around us, 
bending horizon and landmasses and clouds in unison. We rode on the roof of the 
globe, and nowhere else had this globe ever actually been so round. White-tailed 
sea eagles wafted on cushions of air as if gravity were but a fairy tale, and a lone 
golden eagle sought the commonality of his littler brethren. A fist-sized auk 
startled up with hectic flaps just split seconds before we thundered past her. A 
handful of arctic gulls floated in phlegmatic boredom on nearby waves. I began 
to stiffen from clutching at the ropes, from curling up into a ball so as to preserve 
as much body warmth as I could muster, and my cheeks and nose had long 
forsaken to lodge complaints about the biting frost. The mountains of the 
mainland in the east were closer now than those of Lofoten in the west, although 
either was a good stretch away. 
And suddenly her black fin rose out of the sea in front of us. And another. 
And yet another. An entire group of killer whales was traveling through the 
twilight … 
 
A methodological note 
When I first devised this chapter, I envisioned it to be an entirely 
phenomenological account of my experiences at sea. Killer whales would be the 
gravitational force of every nerve and word of the chapter. The prose that would 
flow out of my remembering body and through my interpreting pen would made 
for a proper haven for the thesis, I hoped (this chapter was originally designed to 
follow after all the others). The chapter’s purpose would have been simple: To 
behold killer whales in their home, closely, intimately, and to ask how they spend 
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 their time amongst their kin. Not to explain, but only to describe. And through 
the description to plant the seeds of a relationship. What better illustration could 
I have produced of language used relationally, of a tool that boosts and 
communicates communion, of a lens through which to perceive otherness, and 
through which others would be invited to become unveiled – a bit at a time, in 
part, and never fully – in the process? So I went to sea. My journey was made 
possible single-handedly through the generosity and trust of my mentor, the 
biologist Heike I. Vester, leader of the Ocean Sounds project that has developed 
a rare synthesis of science, art, and unconventional, small-scale eco-tourism. In 
the back of my mind were the words of Anthony Weston: 
 
[W]e can no longer think of ourselves as merely responding to a world considered to be given 
and fixed. If our very mode of approach shapes that world in turn, then ethics itself must be a 
form of invitation or welcoming, sometimes of ritual invocation and embodiment and sometimes 
of literally creating the settings in which new possibilities might emerge. On the usual view of 
other animals, for instance, we must first know what animals are capable of and then decide on 
that basis whether and how we are to consider them ethically. On a more open-ended view, we 
will have only inadequate ideas of what other animals are actually capable until we already have 
approached them ethically: that is, until we have offered them the space and time and occasion to 
enter into relationship. (Weston 2006:76) 
 
At sea I had the great fortune of encountering killer whales, time and time again. 
But I could not write the chapter that I had originally imagined. It was 
Shakespeare who whispered to me now: “and every fare from phare sometime 
declines”36. My phare – my light – was unchanged. I needed only to absorb with 
my ears and skull the steady tinkling of the lantern at the bow of my vessel to be 
reassured of that. Yet my fare had declined. I had fared off my original course.  
 
What had happened? To approach an answer, let us cast a second look at each of 
the three episodes. 
 
 
                                                          
36 This is, of course, merely a homophone variant of what Shakespeare actually wrote in line seven of 
sonnet no. XVIII. The original line goes: „And every fair from fair sometime declines“ It is Hans-Dieter 
Gelfert (2000:219) who speculates about the possibility that Shakespeare might have furnished this 
stratum of the famous sonnet with a double bottom. 
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 Part II. Looking again 
Encounter revisited 
… EVEN BEFORE WE ARRIVED AT THE SCENE, THERE HAD BEEN THREE OTHER 
boats with the killer whales – a veteran ferry, and old sailing ship, and a large 
and swift rubber boat. Each of these boats was laden with tourists. Every time the 
group of approximately seven killer whales surfaced after a dive of many 
minutes, three engines could be heard roaring. Next, three bows could be seen 
turning toward the whales, approaching them, closing in on them, beleaguering 
them. Each of the whales’ brief breathing period was followed by another 
lengthy dive, leaving three boats idling nervously. On it went, this sinister variant 
of hide and seek. One time the boats managed to wedge in the entire group of 
killer whales between them, leaving them no space to hide but the depths – 
which, evidently, is a poor hiding place if you and your family must drink from 
the salty surface air in regular intervals, lest all of your bodies would revolt, be 
forced to drink from the salty subsurface water in the last panic-driven moments 
of your consciousness, and ultimately, drown. So you are imprisoned in your 
own home. And the sentry at the only exit passes the waiting in glee, for they 
know that you must come out, sooner or later. 
Although we could not be sure of it, of course, the large male’s sudden 
and quick breaking away from the group was strikingly reminiscent of an attempt 
at flight. It might also have been that the male, in making his breakout so eye-
catching, was trying to distract attention from the rest of his family and onto 
himself, so as to disperse the besiegement and give some rest to his siblings, 
aunts, uncles, and his mother. 
 
Another encounter revisited 
… We began to discern a pattern: It did not take long until two more boats 
approached this group of killer whales. The first boat, an old whaling vessel 
turned into a whale watching boat, appeared satisfied with keeping a reverential 
distance between itself and the whales. It stayed around for some time, but left 
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 again before the whales were showing signs of disturbance. Not so the second 
boat. This rubber boat, filled to the rim with snorkelers, raced repeatedly to the 
whales. It stopped just in front of where the whales were swimming, and 
snorkelers dropped from the boat like the proverbial rats desert the sinking ship. 
Heads submerged, their black silhouettes drifted at the surface. They were too 
heavy and too unapt to swim around themselves. All they could manage was to 
stay afloat, and to wait. 
It might have taken as long as a heartbeat, or the length it takes for the eye 
to blink and open again: Black, indifferent shadows darted past them. Then there 
was only murkiness again. And embalmed in it, somewhere, out of the 
snorkelers’ sight, living bodies continued their communal ambulation. 
The whales were long out of sight by the time all snorkelers had been 
gathered in again by the boat. Yet off the boat went for its next noisy pursuit of 
the whales. Its speed made it simple to catch up again. Again snorkelers plunged 
off their rubber shell into an element that left them all but paralyzed. Again 
giants drifted past them without effort, and without paying heed. Again a human 
heart could not have beat more than once. 
 
Yet another encounter revisited 
… There were as many as seven boats this time. An eeriness volatilized from the 
toppling masts and droning engines as they stalked black phantoms through the 
waning light. Sounds and movements solemnized this slow-motion procession, 
this motley crew of vessels, this maritime carnival parade that lacked all 
drollness. Had it not been for the flashlights of cameras that sliced fissures into 
the bluish black of the Arctic afternoon-night, one could easily have been lured 
into believing one was witnessing a funeral cortege. The killer whales were 
nervous. They dove often and changed their course. We knew through a friend 
who had phoned us that the whales had been beleaguered for three and a half 
hours by the time we arrived. At that time and that place, three and a half hours 
equaled the better part of a day. It equaled the better part of the time the whales 
had to search for prey. This group had counted twenty-some animals when it had 
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 first been sighted in the morning. During the ongoing siege it had dispersed into a 
number of grouplets, the last of which was now trailing all seven boats behind it. 
We kept in the distance. We watched as the last whales were traveling 
southwards toward more open waters. Suddenly a male killer whale broke 
through the surface in an awkward fashion and slapped his fluke hard onto the 
water. Foam splashed behind him, then settled again. Then the reverberation of 
the splash reached our ears. He repeated this behavior a full six times. Seven 
boats took no notice of this obvious signal of distress. The parade continued. 
 
Part III. Scrutinizing 
THE QUESTION STILL HOVERS IN THE AIR: WHAT HAD HAPPENED? ON THE  
surface, I had made the simple observation that I was by far not the only one who 
sought the nearness of the whales. Yet underneath that, the focus of my chapter 
had slightly but decidedly shifted. My conversing with whales had been delayed 
by my observing my own kin. I soon realized that what may seem like a 
bothersome detour at first glance is actually an inevitable stage of this journey. 
Why? Because, as Weston has remarked, our very mode of approach shapes the 
world we approach in turn. Not until if we come to terms with our own part of 
the relationship can we freely approach others. So we must ask: How do we 
establish a relationship with whales? More specifically: What role does 
conventional tourism play in our attempt to establish relationships? 
The hypothesis I have drawn from my time spent close to the killer whales 
of Northern Norway is that as participants in conventional tourism, we define our 
relationship with whales in a very narrow way. As a result, each such contact 
must remain a mere feigning of a reciprocal, open-ended, multi-voiced 
communion. Conventional tourism defines our relationship with whales even 
before we allow ourselves to be drawn into mutually enriching exchanges. Such 
acts of definition pre-scribe the subsequent encounters into narrow, 
impoverished, and destructive patterns. 
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TO DELVE INTO THIS HYPOTHESIS MORE CLOSELY, IT WILL BE USEFUL TO   
rephrase it and elevate it – momentarily – to a level of greater abstraction: 
Conventional whale watching tourism is a striking example of how humans 
define themselves and others through the transformative powers of technology. 
There is an imminent codependence between ontology and technology. 
This hypothesis is rooted in the work of the phenomenologist Martin 
Heidegger. Heidegger showed that we must become fully aware of our 
relationship to technology if we wish to come within reach of a more attuned 
relationship to the world again. An excursion into Heidegger’s thought will 
therefore be invaluable to back up our hypothesis. 
 
The meaning of being 
As mentioned in Chapter One in the context of Ecosophy T, Martin Heidegger’s 
work offers an alternative viewpoint at the character of the ecological crisis. In 
ancient Greek, krisis denoted a ‘judgment’, a ‘deciding’, or a ‘sentence’. For 
Heidegger, the judgment we are faced with is our very relationship to the shifting 
nexus of being into which we are embedded. The question of how we relate to 
the earth has its origin in the far more comprehensive question of the sense or 
meaning of being as such. Heidegger first brought up this question in his famous 
(and famously massive) book Being and Time (1927), but it would nurture his 
thinking throughout his life. 
This sense or meaning of being that Heidegger asks for must not be 
misunderstood as the search for some sort of a-temporal, infinite, universal 
meaning of everything. Heidegger’s philosophy has nothing to do with a dinner-
talk-kind-of philosophy that babbles about some mystical, everlasting ‘meaning 
of life’. On the contrary: That being itself is radically temporal is his foremost, 
and perhaps most important, insight. 
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 Humans are temporal creatures themselves. Humans, like all else, shift 
and change through time; time is both the cause and course of their 
metamorphoses. And like all else, humans have their particular rhythms, their 
human pace. If these humans now set out to ask about the meaning of being, they 
must first acknowledge this full temporality of being, and they must recognize 
their own involvement in it. Their method of inquiry, and consequently their 
answers, depend on this: A scientific or theoretical method will be no good, 
according to Heidegger, simply because such a method idealizes the so-called 
objective viewpoint. It idealizes ideas that are derived from withdrawing the 
subject neatly and cleanly from its problem. But how can we withdraw ourselves 
from the problem if our only avenue to it leads through our very own 
involvement with it? How can we ask about the meaning of what is inherently 
temporal when we leave aside our very own temporality? It was Heidegger’s 
great merit that he acknowledged this problem, and that he honed his method 
appropriately: He adopted not a theoretical but a pragmatic method. The question 
about the meaning of being is inherently phenomenological. Those who ask 
about the meaning of being cannot withdraw themselves from being. There 
would be no question without the questioner. There can be no objectified theory 
of the meaning of being because it is impossible to stand outside such meaning. 
Heidegger’s phenomenology sought to de-construct what he called the 
“history of being”, by which he meant the history of our metaphysical tradition. 
He sought to clear away the various interpretations that have become attached to 
the meaning of being throughout the history of metaphysics, layer by layer, to 
draw nearer an originary, primordial experience of being. 
 
Constant presence vs. the full temporality of being 
The question of the meaning of being departed from the principal observation 
that throughout the history of metaphysics, even back to its first beginnings with 
the ancient Greeks, what has remained unthought all along was being as such. 
Instead, metaphysics thinks about entities. Being, then, is simply taken to be the 
ground on which entities are. Being, ‘on’ which these entities are, thus takes the 
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 form of a timeless and static presence-at-hand. This observation enabled 
Heidegger to reveal what traditional ontology has taken to be the most basic 
sense or meaning of being: constant presence. 
Throughout the history of being, this constant presence has become known 
as constant availability. Only what is constantly present can be studied in a way 
that forces it to become fully known. And only what is fully known can become 
constantly available. Only when we believe that it is principally possible for us to 
fully know all aspects of an entity can we believe that the entity is calculable and 
quantifiable. Only what we can quantify and calculate can be exploited, 
manipulated, dominated, or controlled. And if we believe the world to be 
constantly present, then the world becomes calculable, quantifiable. Knowable. 
Inside-out. This has of course great significance for our hypothesis that as 
participants in tourism, many of us define our relationships with whales even 
before we can be drawn into creative, meaning-giving exchanges. But before we 
lend our undivided attention to the hypothesis, let us look more closely at the 
positive alternative Heidegger uncovered to the ‘knowing’ of being as constant 
availability. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger shows how presence-at-hand 
(Vorhandenheit) is a derivative mode from a phenomenologically more direct 
presence-to-hand (Zuhandenheit). Let us not get confused by the unfamiliarity of 
Heidegger’s lingo37; let us see through it to grasp its meaning: Prior to subjecting 
the world to our objectifying gaze – through which everything is constantly 
present, available, and knowable –, our involvement with the world reveals itself 
as something that is always already meaningful. 
Presence is not constant, but it is an occurrence, or more accurately, a 
presencing. Discussing Heidegger’s later writings, Bruce V. Foltz remarks that 
“the true pace of being is not one of permanency or constant presence but rather 
of an abrupt or sudden emergence that lingers and abides for its own while.” 
                                                          
37 Which is an insoluble part of Heidegger’s project, because the metaphysical layers which he wishes to 
deconstruct are supported by our common ways of speaking. Heidegger must speak in an uncommon way 
precisely because of the close liaison between what we deem to be the truth, and the ways we speak about 
our ‘truths’. 
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 (1995:54) Presencing needs no solid ground from whence it can emerge. There is 
no prior origin from which being emerges. Being rather simply happens, 
abruptly, suddenly. The Greeks must have been more attuned to what this means 
than we are today, for they had a word for it: phusis. Phusis, which is related to 
the temporal phýein, has the basic meaning ‘emergence’. But it is an emergence 
that is connected to concealment. Phusis is “that which unfolds and emerges of 
and from itself, while continually returning back into itself” (Ibid.:10). It is 
decisive to consider this self-emergence as comprising presence in its interplay 
with absence.38 
I am holding a piece of wood in my hand right now. Its shaft is pear-
shaped and smooth to the touch. From it branch out three curved limbs like 
points of an antler. Yet I can only see this one side of the piece. Its other sides are 
concealed to me, withheld from my scrutiny by the shape of the wood itself. If I 
want to see another side, I have to turn the piece in my hands. From this new 
angle the antler is concealed to me, as is the pear shape at the bottom. Now shaft 
and limbs are all aligned before my eyes in a single form. A small stub has 
emerged into view. I brush my fingertip across and feel its chapped texture. Dim 
light falls through the window and illuminates miniscule filaments, making the 
whole piece of wood look like a twisted muscle fiber. And as this wooden 
strength of the piece emerges into my perception, its overall shape is withdrawn 
into concealment. Not only the entirety of the piece, but every single part of the 
wood resists being owned by my perception once and for all. It is never the same; 
I discover something new about it every time I look. I can try of course to cut and 
crumble the entire piece of wood into small shavings, hoping I will detect what 
stuff it is really made of. I can try to force its concealment out into 
unconcealment, to bring to light all aspects of it at once. But in doing so I would 
only destroy it. I would deny myself the chance to discover ever new expressions 
                                                          
38 As we mentioned briefly in Chapter One, phusis, or physei on, was later translated by the Latin term 
‘natura’. Interestingly, this translation to natura loses part of the original meaning of phusis. Although it 
succeeds in retaining the aspect of ‘emergence’ – as natura derives from the term ‘nasci’, which means 
‘to be born’, ‘to develop’, or ‘to emerge’ –, what is lost is the aspect of ‘self-concealment’, or ‘absence’. 
To present-day speakers, even the other fragment of the original meaning – emergence – is largely lost. 
The word nature has now become a favorite battleground of ideological tug-of-wars, a chief witness for 
either side of a convoluted ideological spectrum. 
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 of the piece; I would fragment it and deprive myself of being continually 
informed by its organic presencing. Whatever I do, I can never totally exhaust its 
phusis with my perception. The reason is that like myself, this piece of wood is a 
temporal being, and like myself it has its very own pace and rhythms, different 
though they may be from my own. The fibrous surface tells of a particular 
growth rhythm while the wood was alive, informed by solar eclipses and the 
shifting seasons. Its grayness tells of how its color fades in its very own pace. 
Even decay has its own pace, though I may be unable to experience it. Its casual 
pace may be withdrawn and concealed from my own rhythms. 
My ongoing involvement with this wood tells me of its ongoing phusis, 
and every glimpse I catch is fresh and new, for I cannot own what is not 
constantly present. 
 
Phusis is a mode of poiêsis, or of ‘bringing forth’ (Heidegger 1962/2002:11). 
Phusis is not the only kind of poiêsis. There is a twin. Its name is technê. In 
contrast to phusis, which is an emergence from and out of itself while continually 
returning back to itself, technê is that which is brought forth by the artisan or the 
artist (ibid.). What is decisive about the bringing forth of technê is not that 
something is made or utilized, but that an un-concealing is taking place. 
The same piece of wood rests in my hand again. I am holding a knife with 
my other hand. Chips fall to the ground. The antler-shape has intrigued me to 
search for something within the piece. As the chips are forming a small mound 
on the ground, a shape is being brought forth from within the wood. There are 
hollows for eyes. There is a hump for a nose. The pear shape takes the form of a 
body in motion. The body is all muscles. A stag emerges into being. Technê, like 
phusis, is a bringing forth. But as just mentioned, technê is a bringing forth not as 
making, but as un-concealing (Ibid. 13). The antler has been concealed inside the 
wood the all along. I did not make it. I only fostered its emergence. I was able to 
do so because I allowed myself to be drawn into a mutual relationship with the 
piece of wood. 
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 Clearly, the two twins are not identical. While both phusis and technê are 
modes of bringing forth, the latter, technê, is a subordinate mode to phusis 
because it requires someone to prompt the bringing forth. The former, in contrast, 
is the higher form of poiêsis because it is a bringing forth or emergence from and 
out of itself. 
 
All of this serves as a foundation to support the hypothesis that conventional 
forms of tourism define our relationships and feign actual communion with 
whales. The missing link between the above remarks and this hypothesis is, of 
course, modern technology. It is obvious simply by looking at it that modern 
technology must be related to the ancient Greek technê one way or another. Their 
etymological relatedness cannot be a coincidence. The question is simply: What 
is their relationship? 
What has Heidegger got to say about this? 
According to Heidegger, both technê and modern technology are forms of 
revealing. In this they are alike. But modern technology is essentially different 
from technê. Its essence bears no resemblance to the attuned bringing forth of 
technê. 
Modern technology is a ‘provoking’, a ‘forcing out’, a ‘challenging forth’ 
(Ibid.:14) of what lies concealed in the world to generate energies. What is 
constantly available becomes calculable and quantifiable. Our metaphysical 
tradition sees things or entities as constantly available, and as such it deems them 
fit to be provoked or forced out whenever demand calls for them. The forcing out 
of technology has become the most obvious way in which entities can be 
approached today; it has become the omnipresent way in which their being is 
manifested, leaving no more room for otherness, for difference, for primordial 
self-emergence. For phusis. 
That is why Heidegger calls technology “the completion of metaphysics.” 
(Foltz 1995:6) 
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 Technology as the culmination of metaphysics: nature as a standing reserve 
Heidegger understands technology not simply as the sum of technological tools 
or mechanical instruments. Technology much rather constitutes a metaphysics in 
its own right. Technology as a metaphysics gives our present age the very basis 
upon which our conceptions of truth are formed. As such generator of truth, 
technology is the completion of metaphysics. 
The move that Heidegger makes is familiar to us from Chapter One. There 
we established that it is correct alright to display unifying holistic positions as 
the outermost of the expanding circle. But still this display misses the essence of 
unifying positions, which is that they dissolve the human-centered vision of the 
world from the beginning. 
Likewise, Heidegger asks about the essence of technology. He departs 
from the two traditional answers to the question. The first answer says, 
“technology is a means to an end”. The second answer – familiar to us already 
from the previous chapter – says, “technology is a human undertaking” (cf. 
Ibid.:6). According to Heidegger, both of these answers are correct39. But “the 
mere correctness of something is not the same as its truth.” (Ibid.:7; own 
translation) Only through coming to terms with its relation to truth can we 
approach the essence of technology.40 
It was mentioned earlier that technê as a mode of un-concealment is 
before all a bringing forth, not a making of something. It is a bringing forth by 
the artisan or artist who is attuned to the material he is working with. Heidegger 
remarks that from early Greek thinking on until Plato’s time, technê was related 
to epistemê. Both technê and epistemê are designations for ‘knowing’ or 
‘becoming and being familiar with something’ (Heidegger 1962/2002:12f.). 
Thus, what was essential about the former mode of un-concealment, technê, was 
                                                          
39 Although we do know the limitations of the second answer by now, of course. 
40 Both technology and technê are modes of revealing or un-concealment. In ancient Greek, the word a-
letheia denoted ‘un-concealment’, ‘unhiddenness’, or ‘dis-closure’. It was later translated by the Romans 
into Latin veritas (Ibid.:11), a form that survived in Modern English as ‘verity’ until the late 19th century 
(cf. OED), and that still lingers today in the verb ‘verify’. Present-day English speaks of ‘truth’, whose 
origins lie in the Germanic languages, and whose original connotations digress both from veritas and a-
letheia, as it originally denoted “the character of being, or disposition to be, true to a person, principle, 
cause, etc.”, or the “faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, constancy, steadfast allegiance” (ibid.). 
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 the attunement, or the knowing. The essence of my carving the stag out of the 
piece of wood was my prior attunement to the wood. 
This essence is not shared by modern technology. The un-concealment 
brought forth by technology is not an attunement or knowing. It is a challenging 
forth. Modern technology drives out, provokes, and forces others into availability 
and calculability; it imposes upon the world the demand that it provide energy. 
The essence of technology is yet another way of defining. What is being 
defined is the way in which we can encounter the being of an entity, and hence 
the entity itself. What is further being defined is the way in which such entities – 
others – can manifest themselves. In defining the being of entities, technology 
manifests the concealed truth of our world. Foltz writes: 
 
‘[T]o be’ is ‘to be a resource,’ that is, to be ‘in stock,’ in supply, ready for delivery. It is through 
the constant availability of entities that are revealed solely as an ordered, regulated inventory 
firmly installed within the technological framework [Gestell] that the metaphysical quest for 
constant presence finds its final and perfect culmination. (1995:103) 
 
Our modern languages are now infested by this essence of technology. We have 
all at least heard of such an ominous thing as “conservation” of “natural 
resources”. Few of us flinch when “raw materials” such as fish are “harvested” 
from the seas, or when “calculations” of a “stock” have shown that a (careful) 
“population management” is possible, if not recommendable, for a “sustainable 
development plan”. The fact that such language has come to dwell in the midst of 
our lives, and that we continue to welcome it there, speaks volumes about the 
lasting sharpness of Heidegger’s insight, and about the lengths we still have to go 
to overcome being defined by technology. Once again, we environ ourselves with 
silence when we could play in a symphony. 
 
 
 
DURING MY STAY ON LOFOTEN, I DOCUMENTED AT LEAST TWO WAYS IN WHICH   
whales are being objectified through the transformative power of our 
technologies. First, whales are defined into being a monetary object. Second, 
whales are defined into being an object of our dreams. 
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 Whales as a monetary object 
A leading whale watching company from the northern part of the rugged 
Lofoten-Vesterålen archipelago distributes advertising brochures in which every 
visiting tourist is guaranteed that they will see whales! Now, it is a fact that a 
relatively stable population of male sperm whales, Physeter macrocephalus, 
resides in Bleik Canyon, a rich feeding ground along the continental shelf off the 
north-western shoreline of Lofoten-Vesterålen (cf. Whitehead 2003), so this 
guarantee is not entirely a castle in the air. But we must admit that it is at least a 
grand mansion in the air when we consider a minor geographical detail: Sperm 
whales live in the sea! Is this too obvious a claim? Perhaps. Perhaps not. The sea 
is the epitome of the non-definable; it is an elemental, moving mass. It is forever 
agitated by the moods of the winds; it is forever stirred by the cyclical 
progression of the sun and moon, and by the groaning of the shifting continents; 
its surf is forever licking at the sands and rocks and cliffs of the world’s coasts. 
The sea is a three-dimensional realm that knows no lines. And in this 
immeasurable realm, each of its dwellers is free to roam at will, and according to 
the rhythms and skills they are gifted with. Sperm whales, incidentally, are 
exceptionally gifted when it comes to their ability to move around, and male 
sperm whales, being larger by far than females, are superbly gifted. They are 
believed to be able to dive as deep as 3,000 meters, and they hold their breaths to 
stay underwater for an average of 30 – 45 minutes (Ibid.:79), two factors that 
greatly increase their home range. 
All this to say that there is a striking disparity between promise and fact. 
Tourists are guaranteed sperm whale sightings. But that is quite simply, and quite 
obviously, not possible. 
The authors of the brochure know this, of course, and no visitor will take 
the guarantee literally either. Behind the rhetoric of the promise lies a very 
pragmatic agreement between the whale watching company and the tourists, an 
agreement neatly covered up by this euphemism: That the customers will be 
allowed to go onto another trip another day, provided that a trip really will pass 
without a single sighting of a fluke or a curved back. Looking at this strictly as an 
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 economic transaction between customer and seller, this surely sounds like a clean 
deal. The seller offers a product, but because the product is – admittedly – 
somewhat difficult to control, why, even elusive to the point of being stubborn, 
the seller embroiders a delicate expense allowance guarantee into the contract, 
finely sewn with a golden thread: guaranteed! And in buying such a guarantee, 
the tourists not only comply with this atomistic clearance sale, but they patronize 
it, perpetuating the neat and shiny affair. 
But we all know: All that glisters is not gold, and not only because 
Shakespeare had the Prince of Morocco say so in The Merchant of Venice. The 
dirt sits in the pores. Heidegger suggests that we sniff at the pores, and we 
establish: Sperm whale is being reduced to being mere a commodity. She is 
defined into being an isolated good that is severed from the relational bonds into 
which she fluidly reassembles, and in which she is at home. Sperm whale is un-
concealed from her phusis, from her unending self-emergence and self-
concealment. Sperm whale is set to be constantly available, challenged forth to 
be constantly retrievable, forced out to be observable at demand. The humdrum 
lingo of the tourism industry becomes a stupefying clamor, a monotonous 
shrieking that monopolizes our perceptions, and that corners sperm whale into an 
ontological blind alley labeled ‘living resource’. As our perceptions line up 
behind the apathy of our droning, the very being of sperm whale is increasingly 
derived out of the essence of the mass tourism machinery. As our conversing 
assimilates and pauperizes, as we go blind to the nuances and variations of 
momentary encounters, we drive sperm whales into the clean equations of our 
economic jargon: guaranteed! 
 
Whales as an object of dreams 
A Dutch couple who has been traveling the world in pursuit of whale sightings 
for years now joined our team in the Zodiac one day. It was a good day, we saw 
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 killer whales.41 All day, the Dutch couple was busy taking photos and shooting 
videos of the killer whales. Back on land, as we were peeling off the many layers 
of protective clothing, they said to me, chuckling: “It is always the same. Every 
time we come back home from one of our excursions, the first thing we must do 
is look at our footage to find out what it was we actually saw out there.” Upon 
my question why they didn’t take some more time out at sea to look, they said: 
“We can’t let the chance pass us by to get a nice shot.” 
A photographer who had come to Lofoten to write an article about the 
scientific work of Ocean Sounds confided in me the evening after he had 
encountered killer whales for the first time: “Sometimes today I was wishing I 
could lay the camera aside. I felt as if I was not really being there by only seeing 
everything through the lenses of my cameras.” He also said that he hoped he 
would get the chance to just sit there and watch these animals, free from his gear, 
through his own eyes, before he had to leave. So I offered him that the next time 
we went out together, I would just take over his job for a day and let him get 
away from his lenses. He declined that offer. “No, no. I really appreciate that, but 
I might just miss a great picture.” 
The same late-afternoon on which the troubled male killer whale slapped 
his fluke hard onto the water surface six times, two guests from Germany had 
come out onto Vestfjord with us. As the sun was setting and we were packing up 
to steer our rubber boat back home to Henningsvær, one of our guests said: “It 
would be nice if we could see the killer whales just one last time before we have 
to leave.” To which the other replied, confidingly: “Yes, and if only one of them 
would jump up right in front of the sun for us. Think what a picture that would 
make!” 
The pattern was repetitive, it was predictable, and it never once failed 
during my stay in the Arctic: As soon as one or more black fins split the water, 
                                                          
41 In line with the vast majority of our encounters with them, these animals, too, were traveling. It was a 
behavior pattern most certainly impacted by the absence of the herring – the traditional prey of 
Norwegian killer whales –, who were keeping further up north for the time of year than the years before. 
The reason for this was most certainly that the seas were unusually warm for the season, and herring like 
it cool (cf. Heike I. Vester, personal conversation). The killer whales returned to what used to be plentiful 
feeding grounds, but, finding little to feed on, they did not linger the way they had done the years prior. 
 
 
104
 faces on the whale watching vessels hid behind the lenses of reflex cameras, 
video cameras, and underwater handy cams (“Oh, this is nothing fancy”, I was 
told once by a Danish photographer while we were waiting for the whales to 
resurface after a dive, “I left my real underwater camera at home because I 
couldn’t carry it.”). What connects these examples is that in each of them, whales 
are objectified into being a mere raw material. ‘Resource of luck’ we might call 
this raw material, or ‘the stuff from which dreams are made’. This ‘stuff’ is the 
solidified debris of what we are challenging forth: Forcing whales out of their 
continuous self-emergence and self-concealment, out of their ineffable otherness, 
we really do experience whales as photo icons in a primordial, elemental way; it 
is fair to say: in an ontological way. And what holds true for photography holds 
true for snorkeling just the same: A two to three-second adrenaline rush through 
the body, caused by the shadow of a giant black creature that slips past and away 
in the murky water, is indeed taken to be a communion. A rush unthinkable 
without an awesome array of gear is indeed taken to be the primordial way of 
involvement, the ‘real’ way of relationship. But it is not. In each of these cases, 
the very being of the whales is derived out of the essence of our gear. We define 
whales into being an inventory or stockpile of constantly available resources, 
readily available at all times. The full temporality of each of our encounters is 
overlooked and forgotten. Process is frozen into product; coming, lingering, and 
fading are all amalgamated into one; a momentary encounter between two fellow 
creatures in a particular place at a particular time – a meeting at the undulating 
seam of air and sea, one mild November afternoon in the Arctic, a few days 
before the full moon – is petrified into two-dimensional images. As our 
encounter with killer whales is stored for possession, duplication, and 
consumption, it is cast into molds designed by our technology, and stripped of its 
power to spawn relevant meaning, here and now. Tourism thus performed 
attempts to bring the living world in conjunction with the images we all know 
from books, magazines, computers, and flickering TV screens. It carries with it 
even to the remotest places its suitcases full of dreams, so large and thick that it 
can only be impossible for whale – and for all those others whom our lived 
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 stories interweave with along our way – to live up to these dreams. All of us who 
become a motor of such tourism help to generate the energies that tacitly bend 
the world into the schemes of their own, pre-defined expectations. Our hearts and 
minds are so stuffed by images that everything that is taking place now, here, 
must rebound from our sensing skins like a rubber ball off a concrete wall. 
“How cute”, one tourist exulted when she witnessed another distressed 
male slap his tale hard onto the water surface, “the whales are waving to us.” 
The very being of our relationship is indeed defined by the transformative 
power of our technology. 
 
The lantern tinkles on 
There is good news in all of this. A different reading of the signs permits us to 
find not only a testament of how far we have wandered astray. This different 
reading reveals to us also the testament of our unending search, of our deeply 
rooted longing for relationship. (Why else would anyone volunteer to cast 
themselves into a turbulent midwinter sea just degrees above the freezing point, 
and directly in front of the largest and least contested predator alive in any of our 
world’s oceans?) This search needs not lurk about nervously, unable to satisfy its 
own desires because there is always the hypothetical chance that next time, there 
will be an even greater moment to catch on camera; next time, the killer whale 
will hurtle its massive black body out of the water, in pursuit of a herring, 
directly in front of the setting sun; next time, a white-tailed sea eagle will snatch 
the terrified fish directly out of the gaping mouth of the jumping giant. Watching 
whales needs not be defined by the essence of technology. It needs not be a 
simple economic transaction. Real whales – creatures living, drifting, breathing, 
singing, loving, playing out here in the elements – need not be mere photo icons. 
We need not continue to condemn whales into such objectification, such 
ontological isolation. We need not continue to condemn ourselves to such 
loneliness, such deafness. The lantern tinkles on and on; the signs are plentiful. 
We want to tune in to the symphony. Our search continues: how? 
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 The poetry of leisure 
 
The philosopher … is a perpetual beginner, which means that he takes for granted nothing that men, 
learned or otherwise, believe they know. It means also that philosophy itself must not take itself for 
granted, in so far as it may have managed to say something true; that it is an ever-renewed experiment in 
making its own beginning; that it consists wholly in the description of this beginning, and finally, that 
radical reflection amounts to a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflective life which is its 
initial situation, unchanging, given once and for all. 
 
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 
 
 
The poetry of earth is never dead. 
 
- John Keats - 
 
 
 
 ‘THE GOAL OF THIS THESIS IS TO SEARCH FOR THE MEANING OF THE QUESTION.’ 
Thus began this journey. So, now. Have we found it? Have we found the 
meaning of asking it? 
We asked: Is it possible to speak about the way others experience in their 
own, particular ways? We had Thomas Nagel answer with what seemed the 
common-sensical answer: No! Why did we not simply stop there? 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945/2006:214) reminds us that all forms of 
communication “transform a certain kind of silence into speech.” This thesis set 
out to give speech to a silence so silent that we are collectively used to not even 
remembering it as silence. 
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 Chapter One showed how others continue to be silenced in the dominating, 
concentric discourse of ecological ethics. This silencing coincides with an 
unspoken perpetuation of a single-centered vision of the one world. But so long 
as we continue to see ourselves as the one and only center, and to define 
everything else from this center as a mere ‘environment’, so long will we 
continue to silence all those others with whom we inhabit the one earth. Is it 
possible to speak about the way others experience? It may not. But if we wish to 
dissolve our destructive, single-centered vision in favor of a more attuned, multi-
centered vision, then our question is a valuable starting point. 
Others are not only silenced through the concentric project. They are also, 
more generally, silenced through acts of definition. We uncovered a number of 
these acts in Chapter Two. We saw not only how such acts isolate ourselves, but 
also how, as in the case of the elephants, they isolate others in a world 
increasingly out of touch with its primordial and dynamic richness, thus causing 
unforeseeable horrors. Can we speak about the way others experience? Perhaps 
not. But if we continue to ask anyway, we caution ourselves from believing that 
our own way of experiencing is essentially the only one. We continue to ask 
precisely because we wish to remain aware that others experience, each in a 
peculiar, special way. And suddenly we are free to wonder in all earnestness even 
what this outrageous thought might mean: Gaia experiences. 
In Chapter Three I did what had become indispensable by then: I left the 
written page and ‘went out’ myself. Laden with no particular hypothesis but 
merely with an awkward question and the wish to immerse myself in the 
phenomena in the most direct and uninterpreted way, I sought to travel light. I 
ventured to the killer whales as they migrated in and out of an enormous body of 
water known in our own tongues as Vestfjord42. What I found there was both 
                                                          
42 Which, incidentally, is another act of defining: To call this very deep and very large body of sheltered 
sea ‘Vestfjord’ in ‘Northern Norway’ easily makes us oversee (and hence forget) that these are strictly 
human coordinates, determined as much by a political status quo as by our human way of seeking 
orientation in the more-than-human landscape: ‘Vestfjord’ – that is a fjord ‘west of something’. West of 
what? Of the mainland. We speak of a body of water not on its own terms, but we define it by our way of 
seeing. ‘Vestfjord’ – that tells us nothing of this water’s tastes, or of its sounds, or of its peculiar meaning 
to the few herring who survived the human-induced breakdown of their peoples, and who found shelter in 
the great, cold canyons that plunge down underneath the water surface, somewhere between steep walls 
of rock that rise abruptly out of the water, and into another world. 
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 disheartening and uplifting. I found a vibrant tourism industry to which whale is 
an abstract object, a defined ‘thing’ that is being robbed again and again of its 
unfathomable wildness. But amidst this dictatorship of technology I also found a 
concentrated accumulation of thirst, of yearning, of energy. We want to tune in to 
the symphony. That, indeed, is a promising beginning. 
 
The meaning of our question lies not so much in its precise wording as in its 
implicit methodological stance: The question educates us – and we understand 
education in its primordial meaning as ‘leading forth’, as ‘inducing’, as ‘being a 
midwife at the birth of something’ – to be more skeptical towards received 
‘truths’. Any question, persistently enough posed, can unfold our awareness 
toward a panorama of further questions, and of inconsistencies in old habits, 
and, yes, of new ways to go. 
 
 
 
SO THIS IS IT, THEN? CAN WE CALL IT A DAY? WRAP UP OUR BUNDLE, SHALL WE?    
….... Well actually, no. 
We are not quite there yet. We might have succeeded in setting ourselves 
in motion. But as we were traveling, another question has grown in importance. 
Now that we have succeeded in transforming an unheard silence into a heard 
silence, we ask ourselves: Dare we go one step further? Now that we are slowly 
beginning to hear silence, we wonder: Can we begin simply – to hear? 
‘The lantern tinkles on an on; the signs are plentiful. We want to tune in to 
the symphony. Our search continues: How?’ 
Indeed. How? 
 
All previous chapters have shared one mutual point of reference, the guiding 
question. But the orientation that the question has offered so far has at best been 
detached, vague. Until now, its only function has been to localize the horizon 
within which we can address the problem of others more directly. It has been 
instrumental in opening up a problem that was easy to overlook at the outset of 
 
 
109
 this journey. The question has merely served to create the resonance that would 
let the silence of others echo more palpably through these pages. In this, it has 
been successful. It has induced us to develop a skeptical stance towards what 
appeared like a straightforward discourse in the beginning. When I first began 
asking the question, I believed that this was all there was to it. I believed that to 
kindle this skeptical stance was the furthest it would take me. I tacitly accepted 
Nagel’s ‘No!’ for want of evidence in favor of its negation. 
But in the course of my work, this midwife to skepticism has turned upon 
itself! 
As I was exploring the silencing of others in ecological ethics and our 
speaking practices, and as I found a kindred form of silencing in the tourism 
industry, the focus of my work shifted. What had started as advertising 
skepticism inevitably turned into practicing it. The methodological stance I was 
fleshing out throughout these chapters educated me to reassess this seemingly 
obvious intuition that I shared with Nagel, this definite ‘No!’. How may we begin 
to tune in on the silences? Perhaps our guiding question carries a key to this 
crucial ‘how’, after all. 
‘Can we speak about the way others experience?’ Let us try, tentatively, 
carefully, a different answer: 
 
Yes. 
 
 
THE SLEIGHT-OF-HAND MAGICIAN AND PHENOMENOLOGIST DAVID ABRAM 
recalls an episode from his stay with a Sherpa dzankri in the Khumbu region in 
Nepal. Abram had climbed onto a large boulder overlooking a dry Himalayan 
valley to look at red and white lichens that lived on the boulder, and to rest from 
a several day’s hike down from the higher yak pastures. Sitting there, he began to 
do a simple sleight-of-hand exercise with a silver coin, rolling it through his 
fingers repetitively. As the coin was dancing through Abram’s fingers, it 
reflected the sunlight into the valley. A lammergeier condor was infused with 
curiosity and drifted nearer. It came closer and closer until at last, the enormous 
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 bird was floating directly above Abram’s head, looking down onto the stranger. 
Abram writes: “My fingers were frozen, unable to move; the coin dropped out of 
my hand. And then I felt myself stripped naked by an alien gaze infinitely more 
lucid and precise than my own. I do not know for how long I was transfixed, only 
that I felt the air streaming past naked knees and heard the wind whispering in 
my feathers long after the Visitor had departed.“ (1996:24) 
What is happening here? 
A profound shift is taking place in very short citation. This shift happens 
with the speed of intuition; it passes so quickly and so smoothly that even as our 
eyes flow with the letters, even as our mind lags behind and gets caught up in 
what still seems to be an irrational contradiction, something in us is inclined to 
accept this transition. Even as alarm bells sound in our puzzled mind, even as 
Nagel’s ‘No!’ continues to dig its claws into the flesh of our mind and to fight 
hard against being washed away, our limbs are strangely stirred by this episode. 
What is happening here? 
It is easy to image a commentator who would attack Abram for cultivating 
‘mere idiosyncrasy’, for ‘anthropomorphizing’, or for letting his imagination ‘run 
riot’. This is, after all, what Nagel’s ‘No!’ lets us imply. But such critique would 
do no justice to Abram. For, as Abram expresses, the style of writing that he 
explores “is simply the most precise and parsimonious way to articulate the 
things as we spontaneously perceive them, prior to all our conceptualizations and 
definitions.” (1996:56) Precise and parsimonious. Let’s keep that in mind. 
 
The work of David Abram directs our attention to events of perception. Abram, 
in lively exchange with his predecessor and intellectual godfather, the French 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, shows how events of perception are 
deeply participatory encounters between a perceiver and its perceived. So if we 
wish to be able to say what is happening in the episode above – if we wish to find 
evidence in favor of our fumbling Yes –, then we must turn towards the event of 
perception. Neither Abram nor Merleau-Ponty have given us this Yes directly. So 
we must look at their work carefully in search of useful traces. 
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 Losing our minds 
The phenomenology of perception parts with the long tradition of dualistic 
thinking. It was Renée Descartes (in: Meditations, 1641) who introduced the 
ontological split between a res extensa, or a purely mechanical realm of 
‘extended stuff’, and the res cogitans, or a purely mental realm of ‘thinking 
stuff’. According to Descartes, the human intellect, or soul, is the dwelling of the 
res cogitans; all else, even our own bodies, is confined to – and defined by – the 
res extensa. Cartesian dualism sees the thinking mind as independent and fully 
isolated from all corporeal involvement. Likewise, it allows for no such thing as 
feeling, sensing, or knowing outside the human mind, for there is nothing ‘out 
there’ but the working of a great machine. The famous cogito ergo sum leaves no 
space for relationship or for context; it suggests that the human mind constitutes 
itself, and that all sense of interdependence with the more-than-human world is 
accidental. After Descartes, it has become normal to think of ourselves as 
thinking islands floating in a great, objectifiable, mindless ‘environment’. It has 
become normal today to depreciate the perception of others; ‘I’ is accessible only 
to itself; ‘I’ is that pre-defined and dematerialized thought which I have of 
myself. I am, in Hegel’s words, merely ‘a hole in being’. 
Or am I? To Hegel’s words, Merleau-Ponty replies: “I am not [a hole], but 
a hollow, a fold, which has been made and which can be unmade.” (2006:250) 
This is crucial: Merleau-Ponty shows that I am in the world, or more precisely 
still, I am of this world, tied to it, an inhabitant of it. I am the world, insofar as 
the world folds and unfolds in fortuitous and unending grace. What lets me 
inhabit this world is precisely this body of mine that has been so deflated in the 
aftermath of Descartes. “The body”, says Merleau-Ponty, “is our general medium 
for having a world.” (Ibid. 169) And it is in this body of ours that we may find 
the evidence we are looking for. One of the most prominent insights we received 
from Merleau-Ponty and from Abram is that the dissociation of mind and matter 
has disembodied our embodied minds. It is this ontological cut that bears 
responsibility for the stubborn intuition that there is a fundamental 
epistemological gap between ourselves and others. 
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 With the dissolution of an internal soul, Merleau-Ponty has returned the subject 
to where it had lingered all along, albeit in a state of exile, and oblivion: to its 
own body. Thought is no longer purely internal, and the body is no longer the 
mere sum of its parts that lacks all interior. Thought is in the body; and this same 
body thinks itself through its lively unfolding in the world it always already 
inhabits, prior to all  reflections43. “To be conscious or rather to be an 
experience”, writes Merleau-Ponty, “is to hold inner communication with the 
world, the body and other people, to be with them instead of being beside them. 
[It is] being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of the body” 
(2006:111/160) The thoughtful body of which Merleau-Ponty speaks is radically 
open, and an active participant in its own world. It is this most primordial 
phenomenon of our being-in-the-world that he has called perception. Perception 
is participation. Perception is the continuous and active participation of our 
bodies with the earth; it is the busy border traffic that flows to and fro; it is, in the 
words of Abram, a “dynamic blend between creativity and receptivity by which 
every animate organism necessarily orients itself to the world (and orients the 
world around itself).” (1996:50) 
David Abram traces the loss of our intimacy with this most immediate of 
phenomena, carnal perception as the interplay between ourselves and the 
breathing earth, even further back than to the Cartesian dissolution of mind and 
body. He picks up a scent that Merleau-Ponty had been on before him. Merleau-
Ponty had written: 
 
Thought … does not exist independently of the world and of words. What misleads us in this 
connection, and causes us to believe in a thought which exists for itself prior to expression, is 
thought already constituted and expressed, which we can silently recall to ourselves, and through 
which we acquire the illusion of an inner life. (2006/213). 
 
This ‘thought already constituted’ that creates the ‘illusion of an inner life’ is, as 
Abram so elegantly uncovers, the written word. Abram shows at great length 
how the emergence of writing, and especially of phonetic writing, was a major 
factor that shifted our perception, and subsequently our conceptualizations, from 
                                                          
43 Edmund Husserl coined the term ‘lifeworld‘ (Lebenswelt) for just this inherence of ourselves in the 
world. Towards the end of his life, Husserl foretold that the lifeworld was to become the central theme of 
phenomenology. 
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 direct carnal involvement to a participation increasingly occupied with ‘thoughts 
already constituted’. As we became more and more occupied by the accumu-
lating written accounts of our own kind, the speech of trees and mountains and 
rivers – animate powers who had spoken so vividly to our indigenous forebears – 
increasingly waned into silence. Abram shows, among other things, how this 
transition took place precisely at a time and place we now consider to be the 
advent of Western philosophy, namely in the Athens of Plato and his students. 
According to Abram, the new technology allowed Plato’s teacher Socrates to 
detach previously ephemeral qualities such as ‘justice’ or ‘goodness’ from their 
storied inherence in particular situations and places. Plato himself expanded this 
abstraction beyond such ephemeral qualities to all general terms: It was the new 
technology, writing, that gave way to Plato’s ‘pure Ideas’ (eidos)! One cannot, in 
Plato’s view, have true knowledge of this particular formation of clouds that 
drifts past these particular woodlands this overcast spring morning. Instead, one 
can only have true knowledge of the pure idea ‘cloud’. Pure ideas as such, eter-
nally unchanging as they are, are inaccessible to our senses. They inhabit a realm 
beyond our bodies. As Abram goes on to point out, this “capacity to view and 
even to dialogue with one’s own words after writing them down, or even in the 
process of writing them down, enables a new sense of autonomy and indepen-
dence from others.” (1996:112) This new autonomous self – which has gained a 
“timeless quality” (Ibid.)44 through its ability to reflect on pure, unchanging ideas 
– has been called psychê by Socrates. Abram concludes his deliberations: 
 
For Plato and for Socrates, the psychê is now that aspect of oneself that is refined and 
strengthened by turning away from the ordinary sensory world in order to contemplate the 
intelligible Ideas, the pure and eternal forms that, alone, truly exist. The Socratic-Platonic 
psychê, in other words, is none other than the literate intellect, that part of the self that is born 
and strengthened in relation to the written letters.  (Ibid.:113) 
 
Thus, eidos and psychê became the first two children of this new technology, 
phonetic writing. Together they inaugurated an escalating estrangement of our 
breathing bodies with their mutable moods from this one breathing earth and its 
mutable moods. 
                                                          
44 This crucial observation brings Abram strikingly close to the work of Martin Heidegger, who himself 
never did become aware of the importance of this one particular technology, writing, for the subsequent 
triumph of a static and constant presence over radically temporal being. 
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 Of a world that speaks 
Merleau-Ponty and Abram disclose the perceptual world as a deeply animate 
realm. In our most immediate experience of things, they show themselves as 
active and animate interlocutors that claim our attention, and that negotiate the 
terms of our mutual encounter together with us. Before technology begins to 
mediate our sensual reciprocity with the land – be it writing, photography, films, 
or any other form of technology –,  everything has the power of speech. Before 
these exclusively human-made animate powers dictate our reciprocal perception 
into their predictable patterns, every leaf and spider and scent in the air teases our 
animal senses. Before we reflect about it and abstract it, the world always 
already speaks to us. 
Throughout his book Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
whispers inconspicuously of this animate power of the earth. Things ‘summon’ 
our awareness; one part of the landscape ‘comes to life’ while others ‘recede’ 
into the periphery of my vision and ‘become dormant’; a lamp ‘shows’ one 
particular face to me and another to the chimney behind the lamp; our bodies 
respond to ‘the call’ of other bodies; colors ‘invade the eye’, ‘bring a peaceful 
state’, or ‘make no demands on us’. These events do not leave our sensing bodies 
unaltered. Their touching, their sighing, their susurration resounds in our bodies; 
we are being ‘filled with wonder’ by these animate powers; they let our bodies 
drink from their wells, they endow us with ever new sediments of experience 
which we may embed into our scorching flesh, and each communion 
reconstitutes the entirety of the participatory exchange between perceiver and 
perceived. Sensation is, as Merleau-Ponty shows us, a reconstitution. In beautiful 
prose, he illustrates this: 
 
Blue is that which prompts me to look in a certain way, that which allows my gaze to run over it 
in a specific manner. It is a certain field or atmosphere presented to the power of my eyes and 
my whole body. … Thus a sensible datum which is on the point of being felt sets a kind of 
muddled problem for my body to solve. I must find the attitude which will provide it with the 
means of becoming determinate, of showing up as blue; I must find the reply to a question which 
is obscurely expressed. And yet I do so only when I am invited by it, my attitude is never 
sufficient to make me really see blue or really touch a hard surface. The sensible gives back to 
me what I lent to it, but this is only what I took from it in the first place. As I contemplate the 
blue of the sky I am not set over against it as an acosmic subject; I do not possess it in thought 
… I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery, it ‘thinks itself within me’, I am the sky 
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 itself as it is drawn together and unified, and as it begins to exist for itself, my consciousness is 
saturated with this limitless blue. (2006:244/249) 
 
In a chapter called “The Flesh of Language”, Abram carries this new sensitivity 
for an animate earth into what may be the last stronghold of an ostensible human 
uniqueness – language. Abram deconstructs the now dominating view of 
language as something that merely represents the sensible world in a set of 
arbitrary and internal codes, codes that are essentially removed from the things 
they signify. Abram incorporates this view of language into that more physical 
layer of expression which is not commonly thought of as ‘language proper’, the 
layer of tones and gestures and rhythms and resonance. He argues at length that 
these sensuous and evocative qualities are the most primary dimension of our 
languages, and that it is at these layers where our languages are most directly 
being informed by the animate powers that dwell in our vicinity. To make this 
thought more immediately tactile, Abram adopts Merleau-Ponty’s image of the 
flesh of the world, an image that describes a “dynamic and interconnected reality 
that provokes and sustains all our speaking, lending something of its structure to 
all our various languages. The enigmatic nature of language echoes and 
‘prolongs unto the invisible’ the wild, interpenetrating, interdependent nature of 
the sensible landscape itself.” (1996:85) It is this richly animate and fleshly 
world, then, rather than our human body alone, that “provides the deep structure 
of our language” (Ibid.), because at every moment of our lives we are being 
drawn into conversation by those other animate powers that envelop us – by 
falcon, moon, or withering leaves. 
Abram acknowledges that any linguistic community does secrete a certain 
perceptual boundary between itself and the sensuous land. What is important, 
however, is that this boundary is not originally sealed and solidified, but that it is 
a porous and permeable membrane which enables rather than disables exchanges 
between the human community and the more-than-human land. Language does 
not reside in humans alone, and the entirety of human intercourse is, once more, 
but a brief melody in the great symphony of the living earth. Abram describes 
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 how this membrane is being kept open and alive – how our melodies are being 
kept in tune – by many oral, indigenous peoples even today: 
 
[T]he membrane enacted by their language is felt, and is acknowledged as a margin of danger 
and magic, a place where the relations between the human and more-than-human worlds must be 
continually negotiated. The shamans common to oral cultures dwell precisely on this margin or 
edge; the primary role of such magicians … is to act as intermediaries between the human and 
more-than-human realms. By regularly shedding the sensory constraints induced by a common 
language, periodically dissolving the perceptual boundary in order to directly encounter, 
converse, and bargain with various nonhuman intelligences – with otter, or owl, or eland – and 
then rejoining the common discourse, the shaman keeps the human discourse from rigidifying, 
and keeps the perceptual membrane fluid and porous, ensuring the greatest possible attunement 
between the human community and the animate earth, between the familiar and the fathomless. 
(Ibid.:256) 
 
It was not until the triumph of phonetic writing systems that our languages 
became what Abram admirably describes as “a hall of mirrors.” (Ibid.:257) 
Our embodied minds are always already speaking to the world. It is 
merely a belief of rather recent origin that we are only speaking about it. 
 
In the theater of the senses: Synaesthesia 
One frigid January afternoon, I went for a stroll along the frozen lakeshore by my 
cabin home, thinking of earlier visits to this place, thinking of what food I would 
prepare after I’d come back home, thinking a whole jolly succession of loosely 
coupled thoughts. As I scrambled through the undergrowth, I suddenly heard a 
faint squeaky sound. And again. My feet halted in their steps, my breathing 
quieted, and my wandering eyes searched the scrub. So high in pitch were the 
squeaks that I could barely sense them as sounds at all. Were they coming from 
inside of me, or were they the result of wood chafing on wood, or of the frozen 
air working the ice? Now all fell silent. Led by my biding ears, my whole posture 
became that of unfocused yet intent expectation. And since my ears had been 
spoken to most directly, it was my ears that congregated all other senses around 
themselves: My entire body was now listening. Nostrils widened, irises dilated, 
thoughts converged, and knees swayed gently to and fro. All was alert and out of 
focus, listening, listening. Until a soft swish down by the edge of the ice lured me 
into focus. Immediately my head and shoulder shifted their balance towards the 
sound. Even as my eyes were turning, they zoomed in and were captured by a 
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 tiny shadow that darted along underneath the ice. By now vision had taken the 
lead over the other senses, and receptive questioning shifted into animated 
tracking … 
Any ordinary event of perception, if only paid close enough attention to, 
will impress on us a fair understanding of what Merleau-Ponty and Abram mean 
when they describe perception not only as a participatory event between 
ourselves and other animate powers, but also as an synaesthetic event. While 
each of our senses – vision, hearing, smell, touch, or taste – is a distinct modality 
in its own right, these singular modalities are bound to let themselves be drawn 
into confluence by the thing we are perceiving. We do not, in unreflected 
everyday experience, separate sharply between these individual modalities. Our 
sensual involvement in the perceptual world much rather fluctuates from one 
state of synaesthetic coherence to another. My ears had been invaded by those 
squeaky sounds earliest, but almost immediately, all other senses tagged along. 
Not knowing exactly what to charge after, they queued behind my hearing, for 
here was the best – and only – trace. Food and earlier visits and the felt texture of 
the trail below my feet all evaporated, and only one thing remained in my 
mindful body: that sound, that mystery. Every nerve and fiber of me reached out 
into the unknown via a synaesthetic state of listening, and when that squeak 
returned, all my senses fell towards it like splinters of metal fall towards a strong 
magnet, meeting over there, completing my porous body, this “open circuit” 
(Ibid.:125), in what had now changed into a tiny squeaking shadow. Even as my 
senses commingled in that shadow, they reshuffled instantly, vision now 
reclaiming its habitual pre-eminence over the circuit, swinging myself into a 
synaesthetic state of watching. 
Synaesthetic experiences like this one let us see how we communicate 
with others through our sensory functions. Our perspective views are not 
independent of one another, but, with Merleau-Ponty, they “slip into each other 
and are brought together finally in the thing.” (2006:411) It is this ongoing 
communication that makes our mouths water when we see a child who digs its 
mouth into the red flesh of a ripe, juicy, sweet water melon, or that makes us feel 
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 a prickle in the soft flesh of our own elbow when we watch another blood 
donor’s vein being tapped by a long, thick, steely syringe. Or rather, in a strange 
way, we feel that trickle not in our own elbow, but over there, in the other’s 
flesh.45 
 
The problem of others is merely a problem of horizons 
To learn to speak with others in the way Abram speaks with the lammergeier is 
to grow deeper into the entirety of our embodied minds, and through our 
embodied minds to grow deeper into the textures of the living land. It is to 
rejuvenate our perceptions, to retrain our neglected and vestigial senses, and to 
allow the capricious moods of the land to inundate our porous skins. If I am a 
fold of this one world, why, then, should it be altogether impossible for me to 
speak meaningfully about other folds in this same world?  
Synaesthesia stretches beyond mere individual synaesthesia. “In reality”, 
writes Merleau-Ponty, “the other is not shut up inside my perspective of the 
world, because this perspective itself has no definite limits, because it slips 
spontaneously into the other’s, and because both are brought together in the one 
single world in which we all participate as anonymous subjects of perception.” 
(2006:411) Synaesthesia happens as much within my own body as it happens 
within the flesh of the world. Each synaesthetic event is a reaching out of flesh to 
flesh. We find more evidence in Abram’s writing still: 
 
It is thus that a raven’s soaring in the distance is not, for me, a mere visual image; as I follow it 
with my eyes, I inevitably feel the stretch and flex of its wings with my own muscles, and its 
sudden swoop toward the nearby tree is a visceral as well as visual experience for me. The 
raven’s loud, guttural cry, as it swerves overhead, is not circumscribed within a strictly audible 
field – it echoes through the visible, immediately animating the visible landscape with the 
reckless style or mood proper to that jet black shape. My various senses, diverging as they do 
from a single, coherent body, coherently converge, as well, in the perceived thing, just as the 
separate perspectives of my two eyes converge upon the raven and convene there into a single 
focus. My senses connect up with each other in the things I perceive, or rather each perceived 
                                                          
45 The same phenomenon also casts a new light onto our Lofoten adventure. Here we found a specific 
form of perception largely predefined by earlier images, and by the promises and expectations to retrieve 
such images from the deep, cold waters of Vestfjord at arbitrary demand. This predefinition of the entire 
perceptual circuit into a narrow frame within a single modality, vision, showed itself to be, if not all-
exclusive, then at least fiercely self-propelling. In other words, while I had no way of looking into every 
visitor and hearing how they actually experienced their visit, it was apparent that the very machinery 
called ‘conventional whale watching’, of which every visitor made themselves a motor through their mere 
presence, was designed around this singular perceptual modality. 
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 thing gathers my senses together in a coherent way, and it is this that enables me to experience 
the thing itself as a center of forces, as another nexus of experience, as an Other. (1996:62) 
 
Every external perception immediately resonates as a peculiar perception within 
my own body. Vice versa, every perception of my own body casts a peculiar 
expressiveness into the world, an expressiveness which communicates itself to 
other perceiving bodies. When we thus perceive another body, we re-enact that 
otherness in our own flesh. In the excerpt above, Abram does not reason by 
analogy. He sooner re-enacts the raven’s flight in his own flesh, much as he 
reenacted the gaze of the Himalayan lammergeier through his own body. 
Merleau-Ponty gives us a quite different example of the same event: 
 
A baby of fifteen months opens its mouth if I playfully take one of its fingers between my teeth and 
pretend to bite it. And yet it has scarcely looked at its face in a glass, and its teeth are not in any case 
like mine. The fact that its own mouth and teeth, as it feels them from the inside, are immediately, for 
it, an apparatus to bite with, and my jaws, as the baby sees it from the outside, is immediately, for it, 
capable of the same intentions. ‘Biting’ has immediately, for it, an intersubjective significance. It 
perceives its intentions in its body, and my body with its own, and thereby my intentions in its own 
body. (Ibid.:410) 
 
Phenomenology teaches us that the beginning and end of all knowledge is a 
horizon of meaning. Meaning is cultivated within this horizon through our 
agitated and tireless senses, who cannot help but set out into the world, return 
with tidings, and set out once more. All the while we live, and grow, and change, 
and all the while we reflect our changing meaning back onto the world. We act 
and reenact in endless succession. And the knowledge we thus gain of the world 
is a function both of our carnal experiencing and of external ‘reality’, at any one 
moment simultaneously limited and enabled by our horizons. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, in Wahrheit und Methode (1960), has coined the 
useful term ‘merging of horizons‘ (Horizontverschmelzung). To reenact others’ 
experience means to get to know those others. And to know others no longer 
means to fully leave behind my own experiencing. It no longer means that my 
mind or imagination slips out of my own skin and into the skin of that other. For 
such a thing has become impossible, now that phenomenology has helped the 
mind back into its own flesh. To get to know others rather means that we bring 
our own horizons into proximity to those of others in an open-ended 
hermeneutical spiral. It means that we enter into a world of difference which is 
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 not entirely alien from our own. It means that we cause a mutual friction that 
may assist us in merging, ever so tentatively, ever so partially, our own horizons 
with others, and that we awaken to the rich meanings that travel towards us via 
the tail slaps of the killer whale, or the song of the mockingbird, or the amber 
waves of wind-touched grain. Merleau-Ponty: 
 
 [O]ur body is … a grouping of lived-through meanings which moves towards its equilibrium. 
Sometimes a new cluster of meanings is formed; our former movements are integrated into a 
fresh motor entity, the first visual data into a fresh sensory entity, our natural powers suddenly 
come together in a richer meaning, which hitherto has been merely foreshadowed in our 
perceptual or practical field, and which has made itself felt in our experience by no more than a 
certain lack … (2006:177). 
 
We have felt such a certain lack throughout all these pages. We called it silence. 
But as we are slowly beginning to get a taste of our new answer to the old 
question, we will let this word go. May it dissolve amidst croaking toads and 
quacking ducks, gushing streams and rumbling thunders. We no longer need to 
strain the word, for in its place we are beginning to hear our own heartbeat, and 
snowflakes as they settle onto sleeping willows. We no longer know the word, for 
in its place we are beginning to know of other things. We are beginning to know 
that to see is to be seen, to touch is to be touched, to hear to be heard, and to 
speak to be spoken to. 
 
… That frigid January afternoon by the lake, my watching body caught sight of 
two mice who were chasing one another underneath the ice. I stood a few feet 
away and dared not move. Gulliver had arrived in the land of Lilliput and found 
that he really was a colossus. One mouse found a hole in the ice and emerged to 
the other world above. Up the slope he scurried. But what was all flat and even 
ground from my towering height was a terrain for the little creature, perforated 
with crevices and tunnels between twigs and pebbles or underneath last autumn’s 
decaying leaves, a terrain through which mouse drifted with the confidence of the 
somnambulist. Until he resurfaced from one such passageway – and stumbled 
right upon my left boot. Mouse halted in his step. Tiny whiskers twitched in 
frozen air. The giant visitor did not move. Wind lamented in spruces above our 
heads. A breeze of cold stroked the tail and made it shiver. Somewhere in the 
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 middle of lake, the built-up tension in the ice could bear no more and released 
itself in a profound, reverberating boom. I awoke. He awoke. We scurried apart. 
The last I remember were the distant and dreamlike peeps and chirps as they 
ebbed away into the many-voiced afternoon. 
 
Inconsistency? 
Some readers might still be uncomfortable with this provisional Yes. These 
readers will be inclined to accuse me of inconsistency, and, having made the 
effort to seek, they will find evidence for their cause (which was bound to 
happen, as the Bible knows already). They will say: ‘Your relational language 
use is truly trying our patience at times. First you likened “experiencing” to 
“living”, then you said that “Gaia experiences”, then you went on to say that 
“Yes, through our sensing bodies we may reenact the way others experience”. 
But you oversaw that all these assertions combined make for a resplendent 
inconsistency: It would simply be stretching the words beyond recognition to say 
something like “I can sense how Gaia experiences”, for there are endlessly more 
differences between the two ways of experiencing than there are similarities, or 
are there not?’ This would be a valuable observation indeed, but alas, it would be 
unsound, were it brought forth as an accusation. The reader’s comment would be 
valuable insofar as it reveals how relational language use cannot avoid creating 
contradictions, ambiguities, paradoxes. But the problem with the critique above 
is that it draws one arbitrary line through a maze, then looks only at that line to 
criticize the maze in its entirety. Relational language creates gravitational fields 
of meaning, fields that pulse stronger in the center and grow fainter towards the 
edges. Of course our own empathy with another node of experiencing will be less 
and less focused, the further that other experience is removed from our own. Of 
course our mindful bodies will not be able to reenact Gaia’s experiencing in the 
same way in which it reenacts another human’s experiencing, or a whale’s, or a 
bat’s. Yet to say the opposite has never been the intention. I simply wished to 
show that there is no principal epistemological chasm between ourselves and 
others, but, once again, that there are merely horizons. 
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 But when we have accepted these horizons, then, indeed, we are free once 
more to wonder what it can mean to say: ‘Gaia experiences’. We are free once 
more to let our sensing bodies weave webs of meaning with the unfolding earth 
itself. But we will keep Abram’s warning in mind: let us be parsimonious, and let 
us be precise. 
 
The tinkling subsides 
In the previous chapter we saw how the Old Greek word poiêsis had two distinct 
modes, phusis, or that which emerges from itself while at the same time 
withdrawing back into concealment, and technê, or that which is brought forth by 
the artisan or artist. We have pondered closely these semantic differences and 
their implications for the role of modern technology. What we have largely left 
aside, though, is that aspect which unites the two, namely poiêsis. As this thesis 
is coming to an end, we will now close this gap. We will return to poiêsis. 
Heidegger has reminded us that poiêsis means ‘bringing forth’, and he has 
also shown us where the most worthy heir of this bringing forth resides: Poiêsis 
lives on in our modern word ‘poetry’. Now, if we may leave aside for a moment 
all our modern assumptions of what poetry means to us – if we ignore such 
things as rhyme, meter, verse, stanza, figures of speech, the question of taste, or 
of what constitutes ‘good poetry’ –, if we clear our senses of all these later 
amendments, then we may begin to sense the rich and veritable heritage that has 
been carried to us through the changing epochs by this small word, poetry. 
In its most primordial sense, poetry is simply a bringing forth. Poetry is a 
midwife of being; it is that which attunes our senses to the events taking place 
here and now. Vice versa, poetry is also that which emerges from our attuned 
involvement with those events. Such poetry is no individual oddity; it is no 
random curiosity; it is neither ‘style’ nor ‘genre’; it is by no means limited to the 
written page, nor is it more generally limited to human conversing. Attitude we 
may call it, or method. Poetry is a particular state of bodily mind, a corporeal 
attunement to the unfolding events in which we live our lives. But perhaps this is 
still not accurate enough: Poetry is not a state, but a process of embodied mind; it 
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 is not an attunement, but a corporeal attuning to the unfolding events of this 
animate earth in which we live our lives. It is that which we may still hear in the 
direct German translation of the word, Dichten: Poetry is the attitude which 
condenses fleeting fragments of this one world into temporary centers. It is what 
summons haphazard forces into meaningful nodes – nodes that are filled to the 
rim with meaning. The poetic attitude is, in short, another form of synaesthesia:   
We allow our sensing bodies and the sensing earth to converge, and together to 
join into the unending and inexhaustible creation of this multicentric symphony. 
 
We have asked ourselves, on and on again, how can we tune in to the symphony?  
How do we tap those energies clogged up inside of us, that yearning that 
expressed itself so clearly in the untamed events off the Lofoten coastline? 
Nothing less than a profound change of attitude will do. The attitude we strive for 
has relinquished the ancient reverie of human specialness and its ferocious child, 
human dominion. This attitude expresses itself in humility, in curiosity, in 
skepticism. It resonates in Arne Næss’s beautifully simple words ‘stans og 
iakkta’, or pause and pay heed. If we were to name this attitude, we would once 
more choose a simple name, a telling name that can tell its very own story. What 
would we call it? The poetry of leisure. For ‘leisure’ is the ‘freedom or 
opportunity to do something’. And the poetry of leisure is an attitude which 
actively invites opportunities to let things be themselves. It creates the freedom 
of communing with others on terms not preconceived, but harmonized anew 
during each singular and inimitable encounter. The poetry of leisure practices 
relational language, and in doing so remains wary of the powerful agency of our 
languages. It listens, and it hears voices everywhere. It hones our animal senses; 
it rejuvenates our fluid and carnal involvement; it connects us to this vast 
communicate realm in which we are at home. And it finds elation in the thought 
that all our knowledge of this one world will always remain partial, temporary, 
imperfect. 
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 Postscript 
Becoming indigenous 
We shall not cease from exploration  
And the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time. 
 
- T.S. Eliot - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WHEN WE SPEAK OF ‘INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ WE WILL MOST OFTEN THINK OF 
peoples outside our own sphere, outside this ‘Western civilization’. We will think 
of the First Nations of North America, or of the Sami who inhabit the 
northernmost tundra plains of the Scandinavian peninsula. We will think of the 
Aborigines, of course, or of the tribal peoples who dwell in the rain forest of the 
great Amazonas basin. We will think of others. 
But will we think of ourselves? 
The word ‘indigenous’ has a very simple meaning. It means ‘of a place’. 
So when we have such a hard time calling ourselves indigenous, then we are 
attesting to ourselves simply this: We have, collectively, become estranged from 
the places we inhabit. 
 
This thesis began as an allegory. Both the mountain and the island were a 
metaphor, as was the vast ocean into which we steered. Together they shaped the 
allegory of the journey. But neither mountain nor island nor ocean were actual 
places. All were, in the most direct meaning of the word, u-topian. 
That we gave so much room to the allegory was useful. The metaphor of 
the mountain proved an illustrative tool to develop the central ideas of concentric 
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 ecological ethics. Its transmutation into the ‘human island’ furthermore 
explicated the stark limitations of this project: Even though concentric ethics 
seeks to expand direct moral obligations, the discourse must continue to rebound 
to its most deeply-lying, and most original, problem: its single-centeredness. This 
problem can only be faced if we turn our attention to the awe-inspiring otherness 
of this one world. Hence the voyage. 
But the allegory was not only useful. It was also inevitable. We cautioned 
the reader early on that this thesis has been tended to from its inception to grow 
into a unified and organic whole, and that it cannot be read with a dissective 
attitude. To dismember this thesis of the allegory, in the hope that the arguments 
would come forth more directly, would invalidate the thesis as a whole. For there 
is more to the allegory than we have considered so far. 
The concentric paradigm still dominant in ecological ethics could only be 
retold with the use of an allegory because this paradigm is essentially cut off 
from the places that always already sustain it. There are no particular, living 
places into which the concentric story can be meaningfully bedded. We cannot 
visit it; we cannot sense it. Why? Because that story has unfolded from a utopia, 
a non-place strictly defined by arbitrary human judgment.  
 
But there is more still to our allegory. From its beginning, it was designed to 
expose a pathway from our utopian seclusion into the living locales of this one 
world. The clues were there all along. The dots only needed to be connected. 
There is a precise vantage point at which the allegory has turned into a 
lived story: It is the discovery of the horizon. For when we first discovered the 
horizon at the top of the utopian mountain, we had stumbled upon the particular 
membrane that connects us to this world. From there on, the journey has been an 
exploration of this membrane, and of ways to give speech to it. 
 
So now that the pathway from the utopian allegory into the living world has been 
exposed, there is no more need for the allegory. In the end, the earth itself has 
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 become the nourishing ground for our stories. The air itself has become the 
primary medium through which these stories travel. 
When I started working on this thesis, I knew not what this transition 
might actually mean. I was aware that it would need to take place, but just where 
it would take me, I could not see. And as many of us often do when we have a 
hard time seeing clearly, I strained my eyes and tried to look far. Of old I have 
been spellbound by the sea, and by these wondrous creatures whose forefathers, 
lung-breathers like ourselves, are believed to have returned to this cradle of life 
some fifty million years ago. Before this research project, I had only very 
occasionally come close to free, living whales. Each of those earlier encounters 
had emerged out of chance – I had never before tried to be close to whales –, and 
although each had passed quickly, these few moments continue to occupy a 
living space in the shifting webbing of my storied life. Now that I was pondering 
ways to emerge out of the utopian allegory, I thought: Why not begin by letting 
myself be drawn in more closely by this old and ever orbiting spell? 
Not having brought along a hypothesis, but ‘merely’ curiosity, I was very 
busy keeping a journal during my stay on the Henningsvær archipelago. 
Everything seemed important. And if I look through my notes from those weeks 
today, I know why: A place was speaking through me. I do not mean this 
metaphorically. So let me add: And my body responded. Not only do I find in 
these notes minute descriptions of the flights of herons, or of the ceremonial 
dance between clouds and mountains, or of the excursions of a limping fox, or of 
the omnipresent hissing and rolling and whispering and surging of the surf.     
Not only are there paragraphs of ecstasy jotted down under the influence of 
Aurora borealis, and paragraphs of anxiety scribbled while the full-moon tide 
was sighing achingly around the timber pillars of our cabin. If I look at all these 
notes now, I also find something else: The lower the sun climbed above the 
horizon, – the more this place receded into its winter gloom – the more my body 
became dazed and weary. I had slept no more than five hours per night when I 
first arrived, but I had no problems sleeping eleven or more by the time I was 
getting ready to leave. As the weeks passed and the sun just barely scratched the 
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 horizon anymore, my notes became less frequent, less meticulous, and shorter. At 
the same time, they became more and more occupied by the moon’s journey, and 
the weather, and all those creatures I came across ... The place itself was 
gradually drawing me into an intimate conversation, enchanting my senses with 
its revolving lullaby. And while the precise fabric of this archipelago slowly 
penetrated my moods and honed the texture of my sensations, the utopian 
allegory began to shift quietly, unhurriedly, into the narrative of a place. 
But this is not quite the end of the story. 
Not only did I experience how the place spoke with me, and how it spoke 
through me. I also experienced how this same place was being disturbed by the 
indefatigable mass tourism industry. And I experienced how at times, despite my 
wish to think otherwise, I could not separate this disturbance from my own 
involvement. I was there, after all, when these creatures were being robbed of yet 
another day they might have spent foraging and eating, or introducing their 
newborns to their echoing kindergartens, or reacquainting themselves with old 
relations. 
The conversation with the Henningsvær archipelago was my first step out 
of the utopian allegory. But what I did not know at first: It was only the overture. 
The two very different arenas of experience to which I had exposed 
myself on that journey – the speaking place, and its intrusion and silencing by 
scores of people who were also in search – together brought me to the very brink 
of the actual leap from the utopia back into the one world: That the world we 
inhabit is always local.  We need not go far in search of otherness. The multi-
centric, speaking earth is always already here. Right now. Right here. 
 
If I may use the word ‘outcome’, then I will use it here. To have taken this leap is 
the lasting outcome of my work. But this out-come is as much an in-come. I have 
come out of the utopian story, and I have gone out to the home of killer whale. 
But in the end, at the near completion of a full solar cycle during which this 
journey has claimed my attention, I have come in to the very place where I live. I 
have found that a quiet and patient interlocutor has been there all along, 
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 humming its tunes around me, lending its air to the fabric of these pages, 
awaiting my return during my long absense: Bloksberg, the place where I live. 
 
 
 
AS I AM WRITING THIS, SPRING IS RETURNING TO THIS FOREST CLEARING, AND   
the place is itching with restlessness. The sun rises two hours before my habitual 
winter wake-up time, and I find myself lying in bed, wide awake and waiting, 
wondering what I am waiting for. I cannot lie still, so I slip into a wool sweater 
and go outside. Hosts of chattering magpies overflow with energy, and finches 
and tits rhapsodize from the highest branches. Their songs ebb around me as I 
walk. Days of mild and dew-drenched air have softened the soil, and starlings 
and thrushes have come from afar to hold an impassioned banquet in the mud. A 
few spots of crusty snow still endure on northern slopes and in the shades of 
ancient junipers, and the first yellow blossoms of coltsfoot greet me from their 
abodes on southern slopes. A bumblebee queen has awoken from her hibernation 
and seems to be searching for a suitable nest site. Shoots of wild chives haste to 
emerge from amidst their decaying forebears, and the four deer who struggled 
hard through the cold season now stretch lazily over where the sun speckles the 
forest edge with light. A flock of mallards swishes past me and swoops down 
towards the brook. The banks are flooded after the thaw. Freshly felled alders tell 
me that the beavers are out and about. The merry honking of geese fills the air. 
All these fractured tunes enthrall my ears. Wrinkles and bumps in the stirring 
ground confer with my feet. Bypassing whiffs engage my nose. My eyes and skin 
expand in quiet recognition of the sunbeams’ solicitation. My lungs draw in the 
outside air and breathe out the inside air. I walk, I breathe, I smell, I taste, and all 
the while I shed the dull and dark season like a winter coat. My presence flows 
with the pulse of this place; my mindful body is saturated in its metamorphoses; 
my embodied mind spins forth the awakening that permeates from the pores of 
this forest clearing. Here is an estuary of spring, and it is here that the awaking 
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 place ‘thinks itself within me’. All things here are animate, everything speaks. 
And I am a perpetual learner of curious tongues. 
When I return, I start preparing breakfast. Eggs bounce in the boiling 
water, and honey melts through steaming toast. The fire in the oven just caught a 
good air current; I hear it blaze exultantly. Open books and unfinished notes on 
the table in the other room beg for my attention. The repetitive and predictable 
smells and sounds and feels of my cabin request my full awareness, and habit 
facilitates their lure. The symphony wanes into silence again. Sensuous presense 
turns to nonsensical absense once more. I start to forget. 
The cabin wall begins to tremble. Vibrations wander from the wall into 
my feet. I pause to wonder. Do I feel or do I hear this tremor? I cannot tell.    
Now it is quiet again. I lay my palms against the wall; I wait. The trembling 
returns. I know not whence it comes, but my limbs are strangely stirred. I tiptoe 
around; my heart is pounding. Thump, thump, thump, it goes. Within me            
or without? Perhaps it’s both, or neither. Thump, thump, thump. What came   
first, my pounding heart or the shudder in the wall? Thump, thump, thump.    
Why am I so mesmerized? 
My eyes wander through the room. Nothing here speaks to me now, 
nothing engages me like it did only moments before. All is keeping quiet; all is 
keeping alert. All seems to be, once more, listening. 
Out of the periphery of my eyes I catch a minute movement that comes 
through the window from outside. I turn to look more closely; it takes me a 
moment to focus. Then I see him. The great spotted woodpecker. He is perhaps 
thirty meters away, over on the other side of the dirt road. He is pecking hard and 
loud against the sheet metal top of an energy post, full of vim and vigor, and 
quite obviously thrilled with anticipation that his proud thump, thump, thump  
will arouse a mate. 
 
Once more I am reminded of the continuous reciprocity between myself and this 
land, and of our boundless conversing. 
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SO IS THIS THE END? 
Well actually, no. 
Merleau-Ponty reminds and cautions us that philosophy is an ever-renewed 
experiment in making its own beginning. I have journeyed far only to find that I 
have been here all along. But I have only just begun to marvel at this enigma: 
here. 
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